The Normative Problem of Shame by Oakberg, Timothy James
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences
Summer 8-15-2016
The Normative Problem of Shame
Timothy James Oakberg
Washington University in St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For
more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oakberg, Timothy James, "The Normative Problem of Shame" (2016). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 879.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/879
 
 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 
Department of Philosophy 
Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program 
 
 
Dissertation Examination Committee: 
Carl Craver, Chair  
Julia Driver 
Charlie Kurth 
Ronald Mallon 
Lauren Olin 
 
 
 
The Normative Problem of Shame 
by 
Timothy J. Oakberg 
 
 
A dissertation presented to the  
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences 
of Washington University in 
partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
August 2016 
St. Louis, Missouri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016, Timothy J. Oakberg
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii 
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ viii 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... x 
Preface............................................................................................................................................ xi 
Part I:  The Science of Shame ............................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 1:  An Analytically and Empirically Adequate Characterization of Shame ..................... 1 
1.1 Tangney’s Characterization.............................................................................................. 2 
1.1.1 Shame’s Focus:  The Self ...................................................................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Shame’s Behavioral Tendency:  Avoidance ......................................................................... 4 
1.1.3 Shame’s Phenomenology:  Painful Exposure ....................................................................... 6 
1.1.4 Explanatory Priority .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.2 The Test of Self-Conscious Affect ................................................................................... 8 
1.3 Empirical Support for Tangney’s Characterization ......................................................... 9 
1.3.1 Research on Participants’ Conceptions of Shame ................................................................. 9 
1.3.2 Research Using the TOSCA ............................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Philosophical Characterizations ..................................................................................... 14 
1.4.1 Larry May ........................................................................................................................... 19 
1.4.2 Bernard Williams ................................................................................................................ 20 
1.4.3 Martha Nussbaum ............................................................................................................... 21 
1.4.4 Jesse Prinz ........................................................................................................................... 22 
1.4.5 Heidi Maibom ..................................................................................................................... 23 
1.4.6 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 24 
1.5 The Evolution of Shame ................................................................................................. 24 
1.5.1 A Just-So Story of Shame as a Co-Opted Emotion ............................................................. 25 
1.5.2 A Precedent for Co-Option Views ...................................................................................... 28 
1.5.3 The Submission/Appeasement Evolutionary Just-So Story ................................................ 29 
1.5.4 The Plausibility of the Co-Option Account ........................................................................ 31 
1.5.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 34 
1.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 35 
iii 
 
References ................................................................................................................................. 36 
Chapter 2:  An Empirically-Based View of Shame:  A Little is Good, But More Is Not Better .. 44 
2.1 The State of Shame ........................................................................................................ 45 
2.1.1 Moral Behavior—Honesty .................................................................................................. 45 
2.1.2 Moral Behavior—Sharing Resources ................................................................................. 48 
2.1.3 Repairing an Image ............................................................................................................. 52 
2.1.4 Appeasement ....................................................................................................................... 54 
2.1.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 57 
2.2  The Trait of Shame ......................................................................................................... 57 
2.2.1 Empathy and Personal Distress ........................................................................................... 58 
2.2.2 Mental Illness ...................................................................................................................... 60 
2.2.3 Externalization of Blame .................................................................................................... 62 
2.2.4 Anger Problems................................................................................................................... 64 
2.2.5 Hostility & Aggression ....................................................................................................... 64 
2.2.6 Other Behavior Problems .................................................................................................... 65 
2.2.7 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 65 
2.3 Replication of Research on Shame-Proneness, Externalization of Blame, Anger, and 
Behavior Problems .................................................................................................................... 66 
2.4 Preliminary Conclusion .................................................................................................. 73 
2.5 Objections....................................................................................................................... 74 
2.5.1 All Negatively-Valenced Trait-Level Emotions Are Maladaptive ..................................... 75 
2.5.2 The Presentation Above is Contaminated by Confirmation Bias ....................................... 76 
2.5.3 We Ought to Feel Shame if it is Fitting .............................................................................. 79 
2.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 80 
References ................................................................................................................................. 81 
Part II:  Implications for Ethics ....................................................................................... 92 
Chapter 3:  An Empirically-Based Argument Against the Deterrent Effects of Institutionalized 
Shame Penalties ............................................................................................................................ 93 
3.1 Shame, Shame Penalties, and Proposals to Institutionalize Shame Penalties ................ 95 
3.1.1 What is Shame? ................................................................................................................... 95 
3.1.2 What are Shame Penalties? ................................................................................................. 97 
3.1.3 Proposals to Institutionalize Shame Penalties ..................................................................... 99 
iv 
 
3.2 Existing Empirically-Based Arguments ....................................................................... 102 
3.2.1 The Negative Effects of the State of Shame ..................................................................... 103 
3.2.2 Nussbaum’s Argument ...................................................................................................... 106 
3.2.3 Direct Research on the Effects of Institutionalizing Shame Penalties .............................. 110 
3.3 A New Empirically-Based Argument .......................................................................... 113 
3.3.1 Research on Shame-Proneness .......................................................................................... 113 
3.3.2 Shame-Proneness and Recidivism among Convicted Criminals ...................................... 115 
3.3.3 Summary of Recent Empirical Results ............................................................................. 117 
3.3.4 Institutionalizing Shame Penalties Cultivates Shame ....................................................... 117 
3.3.5 Objections ......................................................................................................................... 118 
3.4 An All-Things-Considered Assessment of Institutionalizing Shame Penalties ........... 122 
3.4.1 The Expressive Function of Shame Penalties ................................................................... 122 
3.4.2 Are Shame Penalties Cost-Effective? ............................................................................... 122 
3.4.3 Are Shame Penalties Beautifully Retributive? .................................................................. 123 
3.4.4 Do Shame Penalties Incapacitate Criminals? .................................................................... 124 
3.4.5 Human Dignity .................................................................................................................. 125 
3.4.6 Mob Justice and Unreliability ........................................................................................... 126 
3.4.7 Final Assessment............................................................................................................... 127 
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 127 
References ............................................................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 4:  A Critique of Bernard Williams on the Restoration of Shame, and Wider Implications 
for Virtue Ethics .......................................................................................................................... 137 
4.1 Williams on Shame and Its Restoration ....................................................................... 140 
4.1.1 Characterization ................................................................................................................ 140 
4.1.2 Clarification ...................................................................................................................... 142 
4.1.3 Restoration ........................................................................................................................ 143 
4.1.4 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 144 
4.2 Against Restoring Shame ............................................................................................. 145 
4.2.1 The Leading Scientific Characterization of Shame .......................................................... 145 
4.2.2 The Empirical Case Against Shame .................................................................................. 147 
4.2.3 Conclusion:  We Ought Not Restore Shame ..................................................................... 152 
4.3 Objections:  Appropriate Shame-Proneness and Its Evolution .................................... 152 
4.3.1 Appropriate Shame ........................................................................................................... 153 
v 
 
4.3.2 The Evolution of Shame-Proneness .................................................................................. 154 
4.4 The Problem of Shame:  A Wider Problem for Virtue Ethics? .................................... 158 
4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 161 
References ............................................................................................................................... 162 
Chapter 5:  There Should Not Be Shame in Sharing Responsibility:  An Alternative to May’s 
Social Existentialist Vision ......................................................................................................... 168 
5.1 May’s Vision of Sharing Responsibility ...................................................................... 169 
5.2 The Problem of Shame ................................................................................................. 173 
5.2.1 Avoidance of Scrutiny ...................................................................................................... 174 
5.2.2 Misdirecting Blame ........................................................................................................... 176 
5.2.3 Anger ................................................................................................................................. 178 
5.2.4 Aggression ........................................................................................................................ 179 
5.3 Concerns and Objections .............................................................................................. 181 
5.3.1 May Does Not Need to Take Empirical Challenges Seriously ......................................... 181 
5.3.2 Group-Based Shame is Less Damaging than Personal Shame ......................................... 182 
5.3.3 A Mischaracterization of Group-Based Shame? ............................................................... 185 
5.3.4 We Can Cultivate Shame without Its Negative Effects .................................................... 187 
5.4 An Alternative Vision of Sharing Responsibility ........................................................ 189 
5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 193 
References ............................................................................................................................... 195 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion................................................................................................................ 201 
References ............................................................................................................................... 202 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 203 
 
  
vi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Auguste Rodin’s Eve………………………………………………………………1 
Figure 2.1: Pictures of Emotional Expressions from Keltner, Young, & Buswell 
(1997, p. 363)…………………………………………………………………….55 
  
vii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Participant Reports of How to Undo Shame- and Guilt-Inducing Situations………11 
Table 1.2: The Relation of Shame-Proneness and Guilt-Proneness to Indices 
 of Psychopathology…………………………………………………………………13 
Table 1.3: A Comparison of Tangney’s Characterization of Shame with Philosophical 
 Characterizations of Shame Since 1980…………………………………………….15 
Table 2.1: Average Number of Coins Given to Partner (with Standard Deviation), 
 by Exogenous/Endogenous and Prosocial/Proself Conditions (Experiment 1)…….50 
Table 2.2: Average Number of Coins Given to Partner (with Standard Deviation), 
 by Exogenous/Endogenous and Prosocial/Proself Conditions (Experiment 2)…….51 
Table 2.3: Mean Motivation Scores (with Standard Deviations) in 5 Experiments 
 Investigating the State of Shame……………………………………………………52 
Table 2.4: Regression Coefficients from Models Investigating the Effects of Group- 
 Based Emotion on Distancing or Repairing…………………………………….…..53 
Table 2.5: The Effects of Private Shame, Public Shame, Guilt, and No Emotion on 
 Others’ Perceptions…………………………………………………………………56 
Table 2.6: Correlations Between Shame-Proneness and Perspective-Taking/ 
 Personal Distress, after Accounting for Self-Esteem and Guilt-Proneness; 
 and Correlations Between Guilt-Proneness and Perspective-Taking/ 
 Personal Distress, after Accounting for Self-esteem and Shame-Proneness…..…....59 
Table 2.7: Correlations and Part Correlations between Shame- or Guilt-Proneness 
 and Subscales of the Eating Disorder Inventory Version 2…………………...…….61 
Table 2.8: Correlations between Shame/Guilt and Externalization of Blame in Two 
 Studies………………………………………………………………………..……..63 
Table 2.9: Correlations of Shame-Proneness at 3 Timepoints with Concurrent 
 Measures of Externalization of Blame, Anger Dysregulation, and 
 Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms………………………………………………..67 
Table 2.10: Partial Correlations of Shame-Proneness at 3 Timepoints with Concurrent 
 Measures of Externalization of Blame, Anger Dysregulation, and 
 Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms, Controlling for History of 
 Depressive Symptoms……………………………………………………………....68 
Table 2.11: Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable 
 as Externalization of Blame………………………………………………..……….70 
Table 2.12: Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable 
 as Anger Dysregulation…...………………………………………………………...71 
Table 2.13: Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable 
 as Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms……………………………..…...………....71 
viii 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to extend my deepest thanks to Carl Craver for accepting me as an advisee and 
giving me untold encouragement, and to Julia Driver for accepting me as an advisee and 
encouraging me before that.  I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, who 
have given me invaluable feedback and support:  Charlie Kurth, Ron Mallon, and Lauren Olin. 
While finishing my dissertation, I worked at the Early Emotional Development Program (EEDP) 
at Washington University School of Medicine.  I would like to thank Joan Luby, Andy Belden, 
and everybody at the EEDP for their support and for teaching me about empirical research. 
I would like to thank Allison Shapiro, and especially Alexandria Jensen, for discussing statistics 
with me and encouraging me to expand my knowledge of the field and use better statistical 
techniques. 
Finally, I would like to thank my entire family for sacrificing and for putting up with me during 
the dissertation process. 
 
Timothy J. Oakberg 
Washington University in St. Louis 
August 2016 
  
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to Bob, Bernice, Liz, and Cam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Normative Problem of Shame 
by 
Timothy J. Oakberg 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016 
Professor Carl Craver, Chair 
What role should shame play in our lives?  This is the normative problem of shame, and it is the 
focus of this dissertation.  Through an examination of empirical research on shame and shame-
proneness, I argue that shame should have only a very limited role in our lives.  More 
specifically, we ought not cultivate shame, because a substantial amount of empirical literature 
points to the conclusion that shame-proneness is counterproductive at both an individual and a 
societal level.  Expanding on this general answer to the normative problem of shame, I discuss in 
detail three proposals regarding shame from the realms of legal studies and ethics.  I argue that 
we ought not institutionalize the use of shame penalties as legal punishments.  I argue that we 
ought not attempt to restore shame and return to something more like a shame culture.  Finally, I 
argue that we ought not cultivate shame as tool to promote shared responsibility.
xi 
 
Preface 
This dissertation is structured around answering what I call the normative problem of shame, or 
the problem of explaining what role shame ought to play in our lives.  It might seem odd to ask 
what role an emotion ought to play in our lives, because we do not choose what emotions to 
have.  Nevertheless, we do have some control over what emotions we feel at both an individual 
and a societal level.  At an individual level, we can, for example, make an effort to change 
patterns of thinking to change patterns of feeling, as when somebody who is afraid of flying 
makes an effort to eliminate distorted thoughts of certain catastrophe.  At a societal level, we can 
enact laws or start campaigns that encourage people to feel certain emotions, as when 
departments of transportation use electronic road signs to publicize traffic fatalities in an effort to 
induce a healthy fear of speeding or texting-while-driving.  Changes in patterns of feeling are not 
immediate, but there are ways to influence these patterns at both an individual and societal level.  
So it does make sense to explore the normative problem of shame, the practical question of what 
role shame ought to play in our lives. 
Other philosophers ask and answer similar questions.  Martha Nussbaum (2004), for example, 
asks, “How do, and how should, [disgust and shame] figure in law’s formulation and 
administration?” (p. 2).1  Although Nussbaum focuses on the law, her work can easily be read as 
addressing the role of disgust and shame in morality as well.  She argues that disgust ought to 
have virtually no role in formulating or applying the law, and recognizes only a sharply limited 
role for shame.  To give another example, Dan Kelly and Nicolae Morar (2014) ask, “Is disgust 
the type of psychological propensity that ought to be involved in morality in some way or 
                                                 
1 Nussbaum, M.  (2004).  Hiding from humanity:  Disgust, shame, and the law.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press. 
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another?  If so, what role should it play, which aspects of society should it be used to help 
regulate, and how would it ideally be reflected in and employed by legal and political 
institutions?” (p. 153).2  Kelly and Morar defend a forceful thesis:  “We think that disgust is ill-
suited to do any moral or social work whatsoever, and hold rather that the ideal role for disgust 
in such contexts is no role at all” (p. 154).  My general strategy in answering the normative 
problem of shame is, following Kelly, Morar, and Nussbaum, to look to empirical evidence.  
Thus, the dissertation is organized into two parts.  Part I investigates the science of shame, and 
Part II explores implications for ethics. 
Ethics often proceeds in isolation from science.  Why should we think that research describing 
facts about shame bears on whether it is morally right to feel it?  For one thing, empirical 
research on shame is not purely descriptive.  Scientists investigate the outcomes of feeling 
shame, outcomes that can be adaptive or maladaptive, prosocial or antisocial, socially desirable 
or undesirable, and so on.  There is little reason to cling to the image of a sharp division between 
the descriptive and the normative.  Scientists bring a particular method to the study of shame, a 
method that can overturn common-sense beliefs of the sort that ethicists often used in their work.  
I believe that this is precisely the case for shame, which is why empirical evidence is such a big 
part of this dissertation.  For another thing, the normative problem of shame is not best described 
as the question of whether and when it is morally right to feel shame.  This makes it seem as if 
the only consideration that matters is whether shame is fitting.  But considerations other than 
fittingness bear on what role shame ought to play in our lives.  A bullfighter ought not feel 
afraid, after all, but it would be fitting for him to do so. 
                                                 
2 Kelly, D. & Morar, N.  (2014).  Against the yuck factor:  On the ideal role of disgust in society.  Utilitas, 26, 153-
177. 
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Over the last several decades, research on shame, shame-proneness, and the moral emotions 
more generally has exploded.  There is now a firm empirical base upon which to base 
philosophical conclusions.  The findings I discuss in the chapters that follow have been 
replicated and included in meta-analyses.  This should help assuage the immediate worry that 
philosophical work sometimes incorporates controversial empirical findings and treats them as 
gospel.  To foreshadow what comes, I come to a similar conclusion as Nussbaum, though for 
different empirically-based reasons.  I am deeply skeptical of the role of shame in morality and 
the law. 
As mentioned previously, Part I is an exploration of the science of shame and shame-proneness.  
In Chapter 1, I outline the most influential characterization of shame from the sciences, that of 
June Tangney.  I also show that there is surprising agreement among scientists and philosophers 
as to how to characterize shame, and discuss views on how shame might have evolved.  In 
Chapter 2, I review empirical research on the state and trait of shame, and present new empirical 
evidence linking shame-proneness to blaming others inappropriately and unproductive anger.  At 
the end of Chapter 2, I propose a very general answer to the normative problem of shame:  
Whereas it might be prudent to feel (or induce) shame in exceptional circumstances, we ought to 
avoid any practices that would cultivate a propensity to feel shame in members of society.  A full 
answer to the normative problem of shame, however, requires a much more in depth analysis of 
ethical (and legal) writings on shame.  Hence, Part II. 
Part II is an exploration of the ethical implications of conclusions drawn in Part I.  Instead of 
offering generalities, I focus in on specific ethical or legal proposals and examine whether they 
are advisable, given what we know about shame and shame-proneness.  In Chapter 3, I take up 
the idea of institutionalizing shaming as a legal penalty, defended by authors such as Dan Kahan 
xiv 
 
and Eric Posner (1999).3  In Chapter 4, I examine Bernard Williams’s (2008/1993) proposal that 
we have retrogressed, morally speaking, by becoming a guilt culture instead of a shame culture.4  
And in Chapter 5, I explore Larry May’s (1992) interesting view that we ought to cultivate 
shame in an effort to encourage people to share responsibility with their associates who 
transgress.5 
I chose to write the chapters in Part II as stand-alone papers, in the hopes of having several 
articles ready, or almost ready, for publication at the end of my PhD.  Because of this choice, I 
am painfully aware that there is overlap in some of the material discussed in different chapters.  
Certain empirical findings, for example, provide the best examples of research on shame or 
shame-proneness, so I describe them in multiple chapters.  Each chapter, however, includes 
novel research or a novel argument.  In Chapter 1, I present a new just-so story for the evolution 
of shame that paints it as a co-opted emotion, similar to disgust.  Although Darwin presented a 
co-option account of shame nearly 150 years ago in his 1872 work The Expressions of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, almost no recent authors (to the best of my knowledge) defend or 
much less take seriously such an account.6  In Chapter 2, I present new analyses of empirical 
data gathered at the Early Emotional Development Program at Washington University School of 
Medicine.  In Chapter 3, I present a new argument that focuses on the adverse wide (or societal) 
deterrent effects of institutionalized shame penalties.  In Chapter 4, I explore whether the 
maladaptiveness of the trait of shame is a general problem for virtue ethicists, who regularly 
emphasize the evaluation of character.  Finally, in Chapter 5, after arguing that we ought not 
                                                 
3 Kahan, D.M. & Posner, E.A.  (1999).  Shaming white-collar criminals:  A proposal for reform of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The Journal of Law & Economics, 42, 365-392. 
4 Williams, B.  (2008).  Shame and necessity.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.  (Original work 
published 1993) 
5 May, L.  (1992).  Sharing responsibility.  Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press. 
6 Darwin, C.  (1872).  The expressions of the emotions in man and animals.  London, England:  John Murray.  
Retrieved from http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F1142&viewtype=text 
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cultivate shame in an effort to encourage the sharing of responsibility, I offer a new way that we 
might be able to share responsibility through cultivating guilt and empathy instead. 
There are always more papers to read, more edits to make, and more conversations to have.  At 
the start of my graduate studies, I saw the dissertation as the endpoint of scholarly activity—as a 
perfectly crafted expression of fully fleshed-out arguments.  Now, I see it as a resting point along 
the way.  There will be poorly-worded passages in what follows.  There will be papers that I 
ought to have cited, or arguments that I ought to have anticipated, which I did not.  I will 
incorporate suggestions into revised versions of chapters, and move forward with publication.  It 
is my hope, however, that the following chapters are complete enough to convey my ideas about 
the normative problem of shame.  At the very least, after 5 years of writing and 10 years of 
schooling, it was time to stop
1 
 
Part I:  The Science of Shame 
What is shame?  How is it different from guilt?  Do scientists and philosophers generally agree 
on what shame is?  Does the empirical literature shed any light on what role shame should play 
in our lives?  Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 focus on answering these questions, to set the stage for 
more detailed critiques (in Part II) of proposals surrounding the normative problem of shame.
1 
 
Chapter 1:  An Analytically and Empirically 
Adequate Characterization of Shame 
 
Figure 1.1 Auguste Rodin’s Eve 
Shame is easy to identify when one encounters it—as the sculpture above, Auguste Rodin’s Eve, 
demonstrates1—but it is much more difficult to characterize in words.  The purpose of this 
chapter, nevertheless, is to explain how I will use the term shame in this dissertation.  Given that 
I wish in this dissertation to draw philosophical conclusions from empirical research, the 
characterization that I adopt must not only adequately circumscribe the phenomenon in question, 
but also be close enough to the characterizations used by both psychologists and philosophers to 
allow for fruitful interdisciplinary exchange.  This is a difficult task, but I will argue that the 
psychologist June Tangney defends a characterization that meets all of these desiderata.  
Tangney is currently the foremost researcher of shame and guilt, and she and her colleagues have 
                                                 
1 This image is part of the public domain in the United States (see 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Auguste_Rodin_Eve_Gsell_15_us.jpg). 
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spent the last several decades researching these emotions.  They have created and validated an 
important measure of shame, the Test of Self Conscious Affect (or TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, & 
Gramzow, 1989), which has been used in hundreds of experiments.2  Tangney’s characterization, 
I will argue, is both analytically and empirically adequate, and supports interdisciplinary work. 
In Section 1.1, I present Tangney’s characterization of shame.  In 1.2, I describe her primary 
measure of shame, the TOSCA.  In 1.3, I present a selection of the evidence that backs up 
Tangney’s characterization of shame, making it widely accepted in the sciences and empirically 
adequate.  In 1.4, I show that most philosophers in recent years characterize shame in such a way 
that they reference the same phenomenon as does Tangney, which is evidence of the analytic 
adequacy of Tangney’s characterization.  Finally, in Section 1.5, I address several features of 
shame that Tangney’s characterization does not address, and theorize that we can account for 
these features by considering the evolutionary history of shame.3  I ultimately conclude that with 
respect to shame, work in psychology has the potential to bear on work in philosophy and vice 
versa. 
1.1 Tangney’s Characterization 
There is more agreement among psychologists than there is among philosophers as to the best 
way to characterize shame.  This is largely because over the last few decades, June Tangney’s 
characterization (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) has gained 
widespread support.  Tangney defines shame in tandem with guilt, both of which are emotions 
commonly experienced in response to (or in anticipation of) a moral transgression.  She 
distinguishes the emotions based on their focuses, behavioral tendencies, and phenomenologies.  
                                                 
2 As I discuss in Section 1.2, the TOSCA has been revised several times, translated into a number of languages, and 
there are versions for special populations such as children. 
3 Maibom (2010) also argues that we can account for features of shame in today’s world by theorizing about its 
evolutionary descent.  Kelly (2011) mounts a similar argument, but for disgust instead of shame. 
3 
 
Shame, on Tangney’s view, is a self- or character-focused emotion associated with avoidance 
tendencies such as covering up and withdrawing from scrutiny.  A person feeling shame often 
feels a painful sense of exposure, like the core of herself is being picked apart and judged by 
others.  Guilt, in contrast, is an action-focused emotion associated with reparative tendencies 
such as apologizing and making amends.  A person feeling guilt feels bad about what they have 
done, but the emotion is typically not as painful as shame.  Below, I present the characteristics of 
shame according to Tangney’s account, and describe how she views the explanatory 
relationships among those characteristics. 
1.1.1 Shame’s Focus:  The Self 
Tangney (again, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) follows 
Helen Block Lewis (1971) in identifying a focus on the self as the key distinguishing feature of 
shame.  Guilt, in contrast, focuses on one’s behavior.  This distinction parallels the way we talk 
about shame and guilt.  Whereas we often say “you should be ashamed of yourself,” we never 
use a similar locution for guilt.  According to Tangney, when we feel shame, we tend to turn our 
attention inwards and focus on our own failings and shortcomings.  But when we feel guilt, we 
are prone to turn our attention outwards to what we have done and the people we have harmed. 
Sometimes shame focuses on the self as a whole, but we can also feel ashamed of our character 
traits or aspects of our identities—in other words, parts of ourselves.  We can feel ashamed, for 
example, of being lazy, or of being American.4  According to Tangney, these are still 
paradigmatic cases of shame.  Tangney (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007) views her theory as in 
agreement with that of Tracy and Robins (2006).  According to Tracy and Robins, we tend to 
feel shame when we view a transgression as stemming from a relatively stable, relatively 
                                                 
4 We also seem to feel ashamed of ourselves due to our family, because family can be an important component of 
identity. 
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uncontrollable aspect of the self—for instance, a character trait.  This stands in contrast to guilt.  
We tend to feel guilt when we view a transgression as stemming from a relatively unstable, 
relatively controllable aspect of the self—for instance, a failure of motivation. 
Admittedly, it is not always easy to know if a negative appraisal focuses on the self or on an 
action.  In part, this is because shame and guilt can be felt contemporaneously and for the same 
transgression, as John Rawls (1971, p. 445) notes in A Theory of Justice.  Imagine someone who 
picks on a coworker and causes the coworker to quit.  The person might feel guilty about causing 
harm to the coworker (and hence be focusing on the other), and also ashamed for being a bully 
(and hence also be focusing on the self).  It is also because some appraisals are ambiguous 
(although perhaps not to the person experiencing the emotion).  Imagine somebody who causes a 
car accident and feels bad about being inattentive while driving.  It is not clear whether this 
person feels bad about something he was doing—a momentary lapse of attention—or the sort of 
person he is—an inattentive driver.5  Despite some difficult instances, however, shame 
characteristically focuses inwards at the self, and guilt outwards at behavior. 
1.1.2 Shame’s Behavioral Tendency:  Avoidance 
According to Tangney (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), the 
characteristic behaviors of shame are designed to avoid being scrutinized by others.  One avoids 
making eye contact with others through a bowed head or averted gaze, so as not to bring 
attention to oneself (see the opening image of Rodin’s Eve).  One might physically shrink away 
from others or cover oneself up.  In some cases, one might isolate oneself from others.  One also 
tends not to admit wrongdoing if that is possible.  All these types of avoidance tendencies stand 
                                                 
5 In this case and others like it, additional characteristics might help to distinguish the primary emotion as shame or 
guilt.  If the person felt compelled to apologize, for example, then the (predominant) emotion would likely be guilt.  
But if the person felt like covering up or escaping from the situation, then the (predominant) emotion would likely 
be shame. 
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in contrast to the approach tendencies associated with guilt.  When one feels guilty, one tends to 
try to undo the harm done, by apologizing or making reparations. 
The avoidance tendencies associated with shame are perhaps its most salient and recognizable 
features.  Authors who describe shame often note the desire to avoid others or their gaze.  
Bernard Williams (2008/1993), for example, offers a personal description of shame that vividly 
illustrates shame’s association with avoidance tendencies and the desire to withdraw: 
In my experience of shame, the other sees all of me and all through me, even if the 
occasion of the shame is on my surface—for instance, in my appearance; and the 
expression of shame… is not just the desire to hide, or to hide my face, but the desire to 
disappear, not to be there.   It is not even the wish, as people say, to sink through the 
floor, but rather the wish that the space occupied by me should be instantaneously empty.  
(p. 89) 
It is important to note that the avoidance tendencies associated with shame are just that—
tendencies.  This means that one can be experiencing shame without manifesting any of those 
behaviors.6  Characteristically, as Williams (2008/1993) indicates, one will still have a desire to 
shrink or hide or disappear.  However, other desires or motivations could trump the ones 
associated with shame.  One might feel like avoiding a professor after failing miserably on an 
exam, but muster the courage to go back to class for the sake of one’s grade.  Alternatively, some 
avoidance behaviors might not be feasible in certain situations.  A defendant facing a judge 
might feel intense shame and the desire to flee, but that is not a viable option.  Characteristically, 
however, a person feeling shame will manifest at least some of the behavioral tendencies 
associated with that emotion.  A student or a defendant may avoid eye contact and lower one’s 
                                                 
6 We need not think of tendencies or dispositions merely as regularities.  See Romero & Craver (2015). 
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head, for example, even if fleeing is not feasible. 
1.1.3 Shame’s Phenomenology:  Painful Exposure 
Finally, Tangney contends that shame has a distinctive phenomenology.  When we feel ashamed 
of ourselves, we feel a painful sense of exposure.  Oftentimes, we feel gazed upon by a real or 
imagined audience, or even as if we see things through their eyes.  Sartre’s (2003/1943) well-
known example from Being and Nothingness speaks to this.  Sartre imagines peering through a 
keyhole in jealousy, engrossed in the situation.  All of a sudden, he hears footsteps, and in that 
instance, becomes ashamed.  He writes, “Now, shame… is shame of self; it is the recognition of 
the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging” (p. 285).  The 
anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1946) also characterizes shame based on its association with an 
audience and exposure.  She writes: 
True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt 
cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin.  Shame is a reaction to other people’s 
criticism.  A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by 
fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous.  In either case it is a potent 
sanction.  But it requires an audience or at least a man’s fantasy of an audience.  Guilt 
does not.  (p. 223) 
Although Tangney agrees with Sartre and Benedict that shame is associated with feeling 
exposed, she rejects a strong public/private distinction between shame and guilt of the sort that 
Benedict (1946) is often thought to adopt.  Benedict is often interpreted as suggesting that people 
living in shame cultures do not internalize moral standards.  Thus, people in shame cultures must 
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be prodded by others to feel bad for their transgressions.7  Tangney contends, however, that one 
can easily feel either guilt or shame in response to public criticism.  Similarly, she contends that 
violations of internal standards can easily result in either guilt or shame.  Like many other 
authors, she attempts to distance herself from Benedict on this point, as Benedict’s view seems to 
make out some cultures less-than-moral (Creighton, 1990).  Thus, Tangney rejects the sort of 
strong public/private distinction that Benedict makes between shame and guilt, while retaining 
the idea that painful exposure is the characteristic phenomenology of shame. 
1.1.4 Explanatory Priority 
In addition to her characterization, Tangney argues that shame’s focus on the self helps to 
explain its other characteristics.  This is why a focus on the self is the central characteristic of 
shame on Tangney’s view.  Shame is associated with avoidance, for instance, because fixing a 
flawed self is more difficult than fixing a flawed action.  Thus, when feeling ashamed, the salient 
behavioral response is to conceal one’s flaws from others, rather than to apologize or to make 
amends.  Also, when focusing on one’s personal flaws, one feels apt to have one’s true self 
exposed to others.  That is why an audience, real or imagined, is often associated with shame.  
Finally, shame is particularly painful because its focus, the self, is more significant than 
something like an action.  Shame hits us at our core, unlike an emotion such as guilt.  Hence, 
Tangney views a focus on the self as the central characteristic of shame. 
In summary, according to Tangney, when we feel ashamed of ourselves, we characteristically 
focus on our personal flaws or character issues, want to shrink away and hide, and experience a 
particularly aversive sense of exposure to others. 
                                                 
7 I suspect that the attribution of this view to Benedict stems from an uncharitable (though understandable) reading 
of her work, although I do not claim to be an expert on Benedict.  It is an attribution, however, that is commonly 
found in the literature. 
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1.2 The Test of Self-Conscious Affect 
To measure shame as she conceives it, Tangney has developed a number of versions of the Test 
of Self-Conscious Affect, or TOSCA (Tangney, Gramzow, & Wagner, 1989).  The TOSCA is a 
well-established measure in psychology.  It has gone through several revisions, and was itself 
revised from an earlier measure, the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory, or SCAAI 
(Tangney et al., 1988, March).  It has different versions for children (Tangney et al., 1990), 
adolescents (Tangney et al., 1991), adults (Tangney et al., 2000), and special populations such as 
inmates (Hanson & Tangney, 1996; Tangney et al., 2008).  It has also been translated into 
several languages, including “Hebrew, Italian, French, German, Hungarian, and Swedish” 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 46).  More recently, researchers have created and validated 
Japanese (Hasui et al., 2009) and Chinese (Gao et al., 2013) versions of the TOSCA.  Along with 
shame, the TOSCA measures other self-conscious emotions such as guilt and pride.  It also 
measures phenomena related to these emotions such as the tendency to blame others, or what 
Tangney calls externalization of blame. 
To complete the TOSCA, a participant reads a series of scenarios.  Each scenario is followed by 
a set of statements about what the participant might think, feel, or do in such a situation.  The 
participant rates each statement on a scale from 1 to 5, depending on how likely such a response 
would be.  For example, one scenario in the TOSCA-3 reads, "You make a big mistake on an 
important project at work.  People were depending on you, and your boss criticizes you.”  The 
statements that follow include:  “A) You would think your boss should have been more clear 
about what was expected of you; B) You would feel like you wanted to hide; and C) You would 
think:  ‘I should have recognized the problem and done a better job.’”  In the example just given, 
the participant’s answer to A contributes to a scale that measures how much the participant tends 
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to externalize blame; the answer to B contributes to a shame-proneness scale; and the answer to 
C contributes to a guilt-proneness scale.  The Appendix presents the complete text of the 
TOSCA-3 (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), the most current version of the measure for English-
speaking adults. 
1.3 Empirical Support for Tangney’s Characterization 
Empirical support for Tangney’s characterization of shame comes in two forms:  Research 
probing participants’ conceptions of shame, and, perhaps more importantly, successful research 
that uses the TOSCA, her preferred measure of shame.  These forms of support complement one 
another to establish Tangney’s characterization of shame as the leading alternative in psychology 
and beyond.  Even researchers who disagree with some of Tangney’s conclusions commonly 
accept her characterization of shame (see, e.g., de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; 
Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011), which is a good indication of its general acceptance. 
1.3.1 Research on Participants’ Conceptions of Shame 
Tangney and other psychologists have used a number of methods for probing participants’ 
conceptions of shame.  They have asked participants to list situations in which they felt ashamed, 
and have analyzed participants’ written descriptions of shame experiences (e.g., Tangney, 1992).  
They have had participants vividly recall being ashamed and then answer questions about their 
past experience (Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983; Tangney et al., 1996).  They have also asked 
participants what could have been done to prevent a shame- or guilt-inducing transgression 
(Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994).  When considering this group of studies as a whole, 
the results support Tangney’s conceptualization of shame. 
To give an example, Tangney et al. (1996) had undergraduates write a detailed description of a 
time they felt ashamed.  After participants vividly remembered the event, they answered a series 
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of questions about it.  They rated, for instance, how intense the experience was, how much they 
felt like hiding from others, and how much of a physiological response they had.  For the 
purposes of comparison, the students did the same exercise for guilt.8  The results showed that 
participants associated shame with avoidance.  Participants reported a greater urge to isolate 
themselves and to conceal their transgression when feeling shame than when feeling guilt.  The 
results also showed that participants associated shame with painful exposure.  They rated shame 
as more intense and more physiologically arousing than guilt; they also reported feeling gazed 
upon and judged by others more when feeling ashamed than when feeling guilty.  The results did 
not, however, show that participants distinguished shame by its focus on the self over behavior.  
According to the authors, this might have been because this cognitive difference between guilt 
and shame is less salient to participants than the phenomenologies or behavioral tendencies 
associated with these emotions. 
Although the study described above did not demonstrate that shame focuses more on the self 
than on behavior, other studies have.  In a pair of studies (1a and 1b), for instance, Niedenthal, 
Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) had undergraduates imagine themselves in two situations, one 
picked to induce more shame than guilt, and the other more guilt than shame.  In the situation 
designed to lean towards shame, participants imagined answering a question incorrectly in class 
and being rebuked by the professor.  In the situation designed to lean towards guilt, participants 
imagined being responsible for the death of bird they were pet-sitting.  The students then thought 
of four ways in which the situation and the negative emotion could have been avoided or undone, 
starting with the prompt “if only….”  The authors coded whether these responses referenced 
fairly constant aspects of the self (for example, “if only I were smarter”), more temporary aspects 
                                                 
8 Participants also reported on embarrassment, but the most relevant comparison is between shame and guilt. 
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of the self (“if only I understood the book better”), behaviors (“if only I had read the assignment 
more carefully”), or aspects of the situation itself (“if only the teacher would have been more 
clear”).  As Table 1.1 illustrates, for the professor (shame) situation, participants referenced an 
aspect of the self 47% of the time (self-chronic plus self-temporary), and behavior 26% of the 
time.9  For the bird situation, the finding was reversed:  participants referenced behavior 46% of 
the time, and an aspect of the self 20% of the time.  The authors concluded that the results favor 
the proposal that shame focuses on the self, because participants tended to undo aspects of the 
self to avoid feeling it. 
Table 1.1 Participant Reports of How to Undo Shame- and Guilt-Inducing Situations. 
 TYPE OF REMEDY  
ITEM Self-Chronic Self-Temp. Behavior Situation Total 
Professor 50 (10%) 180 (37%) 126 (26%) 134 (27%) 490 
Bird 17 (3%) 84 (17%) 226 (46%) 167 (34%) 494 
Reported as number of participants, with percentages of participants in parentheses. 
Adapted from Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994), Table 1 (p. 589) and Table 2 (p. 590). 
 
Although research probing our folk conception of shame is suggestive, there is admittedly no 
guarantee that our ordinary way of thinking about shame is fully accurate.  We might hold 
misconceptions about shame that need to be corrected in the course of scientific inquiry.  
Furthermore, in the sorts of research described above, participants are almost certainly biased 
                                                 
9 It is difficult to tell whether answers that explicitly cited more temporary aspects of the self were implicitly 
referencing more chronic aspects of the self, which could explain why the reports for chronic aspects of the self 
were the least frequent.  Thus, a participant who reported “if only I understood the book better” could have been 
implicitly referring to her intelligence, a fairly constant aspect of the self. 
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towards reporting on features of shame that are easy to imagine, such as action tendencies and 
physiological changes.  The productiveness of research using the TOSCA complements this 
evidence, however, to support Tangney’s conceptualization of shame. 
1.3.2 Research Using the TOSCA 
Tangney created the TOSCA to capture her characterization of shame, and its productiveness is a 
reason to think that her characterization is correct.  The typical article in psychology is cited only 
a handful of times per year (Times Higher Education, 2011, March 31).  The TOSCA and its 
direct predecessors and subsequent revisions, however, are exceptions.  These measures have 
been used in hundreds of studies and cited in hundreds of papers over several decades.  The 
results from these studies illustrate just how productive a measure it is.10 
Studies using the TOSCA (or its direct predecessors or revisions), for example, have found that 
shame—more so than guilt—is related to many aspects of mental illness (or psychopathology).  
Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) asked undergraduates to fill out the SCAAI, the 
TOSCA, the Symptom Checklist 90 (SC90), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).  The SC90 measures symptoms of a number of mental 
illnesses to produce scores on nine dimensions, including depression, anxiety, and hostility.  The 
BDI is standard measure of depression.  And the STAI measures both an individual’s current 
state of anxiety (state anxiety), as well as the individual’s tendency to be anxious (trait anxiety).  
The authors found that shame was positively correlated with all measures of psychopathology, 
and that guilt was significantly correlated with 7 of the 12 measures (Table 1.2).  When the 
authors accounted for the correlation between shame and guilt, however, shame remained 
positively correlated with all measures of psychopathology, whereas guilt become insignificantly 
                                                 
10 Not all of the TOSCA’s scales, however, have proven successful.  Interestingly the pride scales have not 
generated anywhere close to the same amount of research as the shame and guilt scales. 
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or even negatively correlated with the measures.11  This not only demonstrates that shame is 
more related to psychopathology than guilt, but also explains why guilt has often been thought to 
be associated with psychopathology. 
Table 1.2 The Relation of Shame-Proneness and Guilt-Proneness to Indices of Psychopathology. 
 BIVARIATE 
CORRELATIONS 
PART CORRELATIONS: 
RESIDUALS 
INDEX Shame Guilt Shame Guilt 
SC90 Somatization .27*** .11 .25*** -.02 
SC90 Obsessive-Compulsive .38*** .22*** .31*** .05 
SC90 Psychoticism .34*** .15* .31*** -.01 
SC90 Paranoid Ideation .35*** .08 .35*** -.09 
SC90 Hostility-Anger .20** -.05 .24*** -.15** 
SC90 Interpersonal 
Sensitivity 
.46*** .21*** .42*** -.00 
SC90 Anxiety .34*** .19** .29*** .04 
SC90 Phobic Anxiety .25*** .01 .27*** -.11* 
SC90 Depression .43*** .15* .41*** -.06 
Beck Depression .51*** .19** .47*** -.05 
                                                 
11 The same pattern held for shame and guilt as measured by the SCAAI, but I have not reproduced the results here 
for ease of presentation.  Accounting for the correlation between shame and guilt allows one to better estimate the 
unique contribution of each emotion to symptoms of psychopathology. 
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Trait Anxiety .53*** .17* .51*** -.09 
State Anxiety .41*** .10 .41*** -.10 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
The TOSCA was used to measure shame- and guilt-proneness.  Each correlation was based on 
data from between 211 to 230 participants. 
Adapted from Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992, p. 473). 
 
This study is merely one among many that illustrate the productiveness of the TOSCA, and many 
more will be presented in Chapter 2.  This productiveness lends credence to Tangney’s 
characterization of shame.  In theory, we should expect that shame is more associated with 
mental illness than is guilt, because shame is the more encompassing and intense emotion.  This 
is precisely what empirical findings suggest. 
1.4 Philosophical Characterizations 
In recent years, there has been surprising convergence between psychological and philosophical 
characterizations of shame.  In part, this is because Tangney and her collaborators' work has been 
adopted by, or has at least influenced, some philosophers.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), for 
example, cites psychologists who influenced or collaborated with Tangney when introducing his 
definitions, and accepts exactly the same definitions of shame and guilt as Tangney.  He sums up 
the position nicely:  “In short, people feel guilty for what they do, and they feel ashamed of who 
they are” (p. 200).  The convergence is also due, however, to Tangney’s careful analysis of the 
phenomenon in question.  She and many philosophers independently endorse similar 
characterizations.  Regardless of the reasons, I contend that most recent philosophical 
characterizations of shame are close enough to Tangney’s that they refer to the same 
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phenomenon. 
Table 1.3 presents a table of philosophical characterizations of shame offered since 1980.12  Over 
the last 3 and a half decades, at least 25 philosophers have published reasonably detailed 
characterizations of shame.  Of those, 21 explicitly cite Tangney’s central characteristic of a 
focus on the self (in contrast with an action).  Seventeen explicitly cite not only the central 
characteristic, but also at least 2 more of the characteristics that Tangney identifies.  And of those 
17, there are no authors who cite a further characteristic that is incompatible with Tangney’s 
characterization.  Conservatively, then, I believe that 60% of philosophical characterizations of 
shame since 1980 overlap enough with Tangney’s that they both reference the same 
phenomenon.  Furthermore, visual inspection of the table shows that among philosophers, 
agreement with Tangney’s characterization is generally on the rise. 
Table 1.3 A Comparison of Tangney’s Characterization of Shame with Philosophical 
Characterizations of Shame Since 1980.13 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF SHAME 
AUTHOR 
Focuses 
on the 
self, 
character, 
or identity 
Leads to 
withdraw
al, 
covering 
up 
Involves 
feeling 
exposed, 
gazed-
upon, 
small, etc. Is painful 
Not discussed by Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek (2007) 
Boonin 
(1983) Y Y M Y 
Stems from not living up to an internal 
ideal 
                                                 
12 I have omitted cases in which authors give a peripheral or perfunctory discussion of shame, since these 
characterizations might not reflect an author’s full view of the emotion.  I have also omitted cases in which authors 
are summarizing the views of another author, particularly when it is difficult to know if the author fully endorses the 
other author’s views.  It is certainly possible that I have missed authors who give a characterization of shame, but I 
have tried to make the chart complete and I believe that the chart represents a sufficient sample size of authors. 
13 “Y” indicates that an author agrees with the characteristic, “N” that the author does not, and “M” that there is 
some question as to whether the author endorses the characteristic.  A blank signifies that the author did not discuss 
the characteristic. 
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 CHARACTERISTICS OF SHAME 
AUTHOR 
Focuses 
on the 
self, 
character, 
or identity 
Leads to 
withdraw
al, 
covering 
up 
Involves 
feeling 
exposed, 
gazed-
upon, 
small, etc. Is painful 
Not discussed by Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek (2007) 
Lamb 
(1983) 
N M   
Is not (logically) associated with 
responsibility, blame, etc.; can take a 
wide range of objects; stems from not 
living up to an ideal 
Taylor 
(1985) Y  Y  
Is a response to a loss of esteem 
Kekes 
(1988) Y  Y Y 
Stems from not living up to an ideal 
Gibbard 
(1990) 
Y Y   
Is a counterpart of disdain; stems from 
inability to cooperate; can spur 
development of abilities 
May 
(1992 & 
1996) Y Y Y  
Is not connected with causal agency; 
can spur us to better ourselves 
Williams 
(2008/199
3) Y Y Y  
Is a counterpart of disdain; can spur 
development of character 
Sabini & 
Silver 
(1997) Y Y Y Y 
 
Blackburn 
(1998)  Y Y  
Is a counterpart of disdain; does not 
require agency 
Wollheim 
(1999) Y N Y  
Stems from not living up to an ideal; 
spurs changing oneself 
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 CHARACTERISTICS OF SHAME 
AUTHOR 
Focuses 
on the 
self, 
character, 
or identity 
Leads to 
withdraw
al, 
covering 
up 
Involves 
feeling 
exposed, 
gazed-
upon, 
small, etc. Is painful 
Not discussed by Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek (2007) 
Velleman 
(2001) 
  M  
Is a form of anxiety; paradigmatically 
stems from failing to keep something 
private, a failure to keep up one's 
persona 
Manion 
(2002) 
Y Y Y Y  
Nussbau
m (2004) 
Y Y Y Y 
Develops from narcissism and seeks to 
restore it 
Sinnott- 
Armstron
g (2005) 
Y Y Y Y  
Solomon 
(2007) 
M N Y Y 
Spurs reparation, or alternatively 
withdrawal then reintegration 
Deigh 
(2008) 
Y Y Y  
Implies identification with a 
community 
Morgan 
(2008) 
Y Y Y Y Can spur self-reflection 
Teroni & 
Deonna 
(2008) 
Y Y Y Y Stems from violating a personal value 
Haggerty 
(2009) 
Y Y Y  
Is associated with the threat of 
abandonment; can spur reconciliation 
Prinz Y Y Y  Is a counterpart of disgust 
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 CHARACTERISTICS OF SHAME 
AUTHOR 
Focuses 
on the 
self, 
character, 
or identity 
Leads to 
withdraw
al, 
covering 
up 
Involves 
feeling 
exposed, 
gazed-
upon, 
small, etc. Is painful 
Not discussed by Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek (2007) 
(2009) 
Maibom 
(2010) 
Y Y Y Y Is heteronomous; spurs submission 
Miller 
(2010) 
Y Y Y Y  
Williston 
(2012) 
Y Y Y  Encompasses guilt; spurs reintegration 
Galligan 
(2014) 
Y  Y   
Thomaso
n (2015) 
Y Y Y  
Stems from dissonance between 
identity and self-concept 
“Y” indicates that an author agrees with the characteristic, “N” that the author does not, and “M” 
that there is some question as to whether the author endorses the characteristic.  A blank signifies 
that the author did not discuss the characteristic. 
 
Although Table 1.3 presents a summary of philosophers’ views, what follows is a more detailed 
look at select philosophers’ presentations.  This will provide support for the table as a whole, and 
introduce the views of some of the authors whom I discuss in more detail in later chapters.  This 
is important, as it establishes that empirical evidence gathered by researchers like Tangney very 
likely bears on the work of these philosophers.  At the very least, one cannot maintain that 
scientific researchers and philosophers are talking past one another, because they accept different 
conceptions of shame.  Below I provide evidence for the views, as they are captured in Table 1.3, 
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of Larry May, Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum, Jesse Prinz, and Heidi Maibom. 
1.4.1 Larry May 
May (1992, 1996) discusses shame in the context of group responsibility.  Although he 
characterizes shame in Sharing Responsibility (1992), the clearest single statement of his view of 
shame is from his later work, The Socially Responsive Self (1996): 
Shame is best understood as the response that people feel when they believe that others 
(an anticipated audience) would judge them to have a particular failing or character 
defect.  Shame has its origins in the feeling of wanting to hide from someone whose gaze 
betrays some sort of disapproval of one’s person (p. 81). 
This short quotation illustrates that May agrees with most of the characteristics of shame that 
Tangney identifies.  When we feel ashamed, we feel exposed to the gaze of others.  When we 
feel ashamed, we feel as if our self or character has been damaged.  And when we feel ashamed, 
we feel like withdrawing from others and concealing ourselves. 
There are, however, two notable differences between May’s and Tangney’s characterizations.  
First, May emphasizes that shame is not connected to causal agency in the same way that guilt is, 
since guilt focuses on an action, whereas shame focuses on the self.  According to May, for 
example, you can feel ashamed when your colleague does something wrong even if you did not 
straightforwardly transgress yourself, whereas you could not feel guilty.  Tangney does not 
discuss this as a characteristic of shame (although she might in fact agree).  Second, May 
contends that shame can spur one to repair or better the self.  So it seems as if May includes 
betterment of the self as an action tendency of shame along with avoidance.  Tangney, in 
contrast, does not view betterment as a characteristic of shame.  In fact, she argues that her 
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evidence shows quite the opposite.14  Despite these two differences, May’s (1992, 1996) 
characterization of shame is close to Tangney’s—close enough that we can assume that they are 
discussing the same phenomenon. 
1.4.2 Bernard Williams 
Williams (2008/1993) presents his characterization of shame in Shame and Necessity.  Like May, 
he agrees with 3 of the characteristics that Tangney outlines.  He agrees with the central 
characteristic of a focus on the self:  “[...] in the experience of shame, one’s whole being seems 
diminished or lessened” (p. 89).  He agrees that shame involves a feeling or thought of exposure 
to an audience:  “[...] shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of 
the gaze of another,” even if that is merely “the imagined gaze of an imagined other” (p. 82).  
And he agrees that a behavioral tendency associated with shame is avoidance:  “[...] the 
expression of shame… is not just the desire to hide…, but the desire to disappear, not to be 
there” (p. 89). 
Williams’s (2008/1993) characterization of shame does diverge in some ways from Tangney’s.  
The following quotation illustrates the two ways in which Williams’s characterization differs: 
What arouses shame… is something that typically elicits from others contempt or 
derision or avoidance….  It will lower the agent’s self-respect and diminish him in his 
own eyes.  His reaction… is a wish to hide or disappear….  More positively, shame may 
be expressed in attempts to reconstruct or improve oneself.  (p. 90) 
First, Williams claims that disdain is the third-person counterpart of shame.  This is something 
                                                 
14 May might very well agree that we ought not include betterment of the self as a characteristic of shame, although 
he discusses it when he is characterizing shame.  Williams (2008/1993; see Section 1.4.2) also might be thought to 
include self-improvement as a characteristic of shame.  To include this characteristic, however, would rule out the 
possibility of the sort of argument presented in this dissertation.  I think it is best practice for characterizations of the 
behavioral tendencies associated with shame ought to steer clear of questionable scientific notions like “betterment” 
or “self-improvement.” 
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upon which Tangney does not touch in her characterization, but it does not seem to conflict with 
her account in any way.  Second, one of the action tendencies that Williams associates with 
shame, like May, is self-improvement.  Once again, this is not something that Tangney includes 
in her characterization of shame.  She looks to empirical evidence on this point.  Neither of these 
differences, however, is substantial enough to maintain that Williams and Tangney refer to 
different phenomena when discussing shame. 
1.4.3 Martha Nussbaum 
In Hiding from Humanity, Nussbaum (2004) develops a characterization of shame based largely 
on the writings of the physician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott and others in the 
psychoanalytic tradition.  Nussbaum follows Winnicott in tracing the experience of shame back 
to infancy: 
When an infant realizes that it is dependent on others, and is by this time aware of itself 
as a definite being who is and ought to be the center of the world, we can therefore expect 
a primitive and rudimentary emotion of shame to ensue.  For shame involves the 
realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects oneself to 
be adequate.  (p. 183) 
This view of shame as forming in infancy, “over the course of the first year of life” (p. 184), is 
controversial, although Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and Cole (1993) argue that 2-year-olds experience 
guilt and shame. 
Despite Nussbaum’s (2004) controversial view of the development of shame, she endorses all 
four of Tangney’s characteristics of the emotion.  She states that shame focuses on the self:  “To 
put things very generally, shame, as I shall understand it here, is a painful emotion responding to 
a sense of failure to attain some ideal state.  Shame, as is generally agreed by those who analyse 
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it, pertains to the whole self, rather than to a specific act of the self” (p. 184).  She also states that 
shame tends to lead to covering up, and is associated with painful exposure:  “Sometimes, 
however, our ‘abnormal’ weaknesses are uncovered anyway, and then we blush, we cover 
ourselves, we turn away our eyes.  Shame is the painful emotion that responds to that 
uncovering.  It brands the face with its unmistakable signs” (p. 173).  Similar to other authors, 
then, Nussbaum characterizes shame in a way that is very similar to how Tangney does. 
1.4.4 Jesse Prinz 
Prinz (2009) explores the notion of shame in an overview article of the moral emotions.  Prinz 
classifies shame, very broadly speaking, as a self-directed emotion of blame.  He accepts 
Tangney’s central characteristic of shame, a focus on the self, as well as the idea that shame is 
involved with an audience: 
Shame arises when one performs an action that is perceived as being likely to bring about 
unwelcome attention from others….  Shame is particularly likely when one fears that one 
will be viewed as a defective person.  It is said that guilt is act-focused (I did something 
bad), and shame is person-focused (I am a bad person).  Consequently shame is likely to 
arise when an action is seen as rendering one’s self impure, corrupt, or contaminated.  It 
is, thus, an analogue of disgust” (p. 527). 
Although Tangney does not explicitly link shame with disgust, this does not seem to be 
incompatible with her position in any way.  Additionally, Prinz (2009) agrees that the behavioral 
tendency characteristic of shame is hiding or withdrawal.  “Simple reparative behaviors, such as 
confession or apology,” he writes, “cannot alleviate shame very effectively because these 
behaviors cannot eliminate feelings of contamination.  Instead, shame is associated with 
concealment” (p. 527).  The only characteristic of shame that Tangney adopts, but which Prinz 
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does not mention, is the particular painfulness of shame.  This, however, is a minor discrepancy, 
and it seems safe to say that Prinz and Tangney adopt the same characterization of shame. 
1.4.5 Heidi Maibom 
To give a final example, Maibom (2010) characterizes shame as follows:  “Shame is a painful 
emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals.  The subject 
feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed.  As a result, she feels 
bad about the person that she is” (p. 566).  This short quotation provides evidence that Maibom 
agrees with almost all of Tangney characteristics of shame.  Shame, for Maibom and Tangney 
alike, focuses on the self, is associated with an audience/exposure, and is particularly painful.  
Maibom also notes that shame is associated with avoidance tendencies.  Subsequently, she 
writes, “[Shame] tends to make people who experience it feel small or inferior to others, and to 
want to hide from them” (p. 569).  Maibom might not agree with Tangney’s thoughts on the 
explanatory relationships among the characteristics of shame (perhaps Maibom sees exposure as 
the primary characteristic), but this is likely a minor difference, if it is a difference at all. 
Maibom (2010) argues at some length that the “standards, norms, or ideals” (p. 566) to which an 
ashamed subject does not adhere are publicly held—that is, that shame is heteronomous.  This is 
a characteristic of shame that Tangney does not address, likely because it is one that is mostly 
relevant for philosophical discussions, not psychological ones.  According to Kant’s view, for 
example, all actions of moral worth stem from knowledge of the moral law, which is given by 
rationality.  One cannot, for example, be trying to avoid public censure if one is acting morally.  
If shame were a response to public expectations—an emotion responding merely to public 
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opinion—then for Kant it would fall outside the scope of morality.15  This is a debate that 
Tangney does not address, so it is unclear where she stands on the heteronomy issue.  But given 
the agreement on other characteristics of shame, it is clear that Maibom and Tangney are 
referencing the same phenomenon. 
1.4.6 Summary 
There is solid support among contemporary philosophers for Tangney’s characterization of 
shame.  This means that the characterization of shame as focusing on the self, as being associated 
with a painful sense of exposure, and as motivating avoidance tendencies is widely accepted both 
in the scientific and philosophical communities.  That is quite remarkable, and it suggests that 
Tangney’s characterization is adequately capturing the core features of shame. 
1.5 The Evolution of Shame 
As one would expect of an account that aims to pick out the core features of a phenomenon, 
there are some features of shame that Tangney’s characterization does not address.  To begin 
with, people feeling ashamed often blush.  Second, people feel ashamed not just in response to 
moral failures, but also in response to (for example) athletic or academic failures; in fact, shame 
seems to be particularly associated with the body and nudity, even in non-moral situations 
(again, recall the image of Rodin’s Eve that opened this chapter; see also Gilbert & Miles, 2002; 
Williams, 2008/1993).  Finally, shame has an overlapping (though not identical) domain with 
guilt, that is, we both commonly feel guilt and shame in response to our moral transgressions.  
Although not core features of shame, it is reasonable to ask if one could supplement Tangney’s 
characterization to account for these features.  The absence of such a supplementary account 
would not necessarily speak against Tangney’s characterization, but if there were a way to 
                                                 
15 Williams (2008/1993) addresses the Kantian view at length in Shame and Necessity. 
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explain the supplementary features, it could lend some credence to the idea that Tangney’s 
characterization is adequate. 
One approach to providing such a supplementary account is with an evolutionary just-so story 
(see, e.g., Maibom, 2010).  The point of such a story is less to specify how a feature actually 
evolved than it is to specify how a feature plausibly evolved.16  Since a characterization of a 
phenomenon can stand on its own as adequate or inadequate, a just-so story is not a critical 
component of a characterization.  But it can help to ameliorate worries that a characterization 
cannot account for such-and-such a feature.  With this in mind, what follows is an evolutionary 
just-so story of shame as a co-opted moral emotion. 
1.5.1 A Just-So Story of Shame as a Co-Opted Emotion 
Human beings, as a species, are particularly vulnerable to the elements.  Whereas most other 
species have fur, feathers, or scales, human beings noticeably do not.  As a consequence, we are 
particularly dependent on clothing and shelter to survive.  In fact, these items of protection are 
considered to be basic needs for human beings.  Clothing and shelter protect us from wind, rain, 
cold, sun, and so on.  Given that clothing and shelter are basic needs, it would make sense if 
human beings had a drive to cover themselves and to seek shelter from exposure.  Shame 
plausibly could have evolved to fulfill this role.  In response to physical exposure or the threat of 
it, shame would drive us to cover our bodies and retreat to cover, that is, to seek protection. 
Features that evolved for one purpose do not necessarily continue to serve that purpose, or to 
serve that purpose exclusively, in the future.  Disgust is a perfect example of this, and is 
(importantly I believe) another emotion that spans both the moral and non-moral domains.  Dan 
                                                 
16 See Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000) or Craver (2006) on how-possibly, how-plausibly, and how-actually 
descriptions (although in the context of mechanistic explanation). 
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Kelly (2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014) presents the most detailed account of the evolution of 
disgust, arguing that it represents an “entanglement” of two adaptations.  As Kelly and Morar 
(2014) write, “disgust is a composite emotion whose two main components originally evolved to 
protect against poisons and parasites, respectively” (p. 155).  Characteristics of disgust such as 
its phenomenology of nausea and its facial expression—an open, gaped mouth—relate to the 
need to expel poisonous substances.  Characteristics such as its withdrawal tendencies and the 
way it focuses one’s attention on contamination and objects proximal to the source of 
contamination relate to the need to avoid infection by parasites.  Although other animals share 
parts of the human disgust response, disgust proper, as the entanglement of responses to poisons 
and parasites, is peculiarly human.  Furthermore, according to Kelly’s account, although disgust 
originally evolved in the realm of physical poisons and parasites, it has been co-opted to play a 
role in the sociomoral realm.  “In virtue of its flexibility and susceptibility to learning,” Kelly 
and Morar (2014) write, “a given individual’s disgust system will be calibrated by her own 
personal experience, her family and peers, and her cultural in-group.  Thus, her disgust will be 
directed not just at ‘exotic’ cuisines and locally salient markers of disease and infection, but also 
at those practices, norms and values that the cultural in-group deems wrong and disgusting, as 
well as at those people, including members of cultural out-groups, who embrace them” (p. 156). 
Like disgust, shame could have evolved in a non-moral domain, and been co-opted to serve a 
function in the sociomoral domain.  This possibility appears most plausible if we think about the 
feeling of exposure that is associated with shame.  Shame was, according to this co-option story, 
initially a response to physical exposure.  But we can also feel exposed in a social sense, when 
others are gazing upon us critically or we are apt to be scrutinized.  This transfer to the social 
realm parallels the transfer of disgust to the social realm.  There is a comparison to be made 
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between substances that cause contamination, for example, and people who cause contamination.  
That which an infected substance touches contaminates other things and makes it unsuitable for 
consumption, similar to how an immoral person contaminates relationships and dealings with 
others.  The behavioral responses we make to a contaminated substance could be fitting for 
contaminated people:  focused attention, avoidance, and so on.  Similarly, the behavioral 
responses we make to physical exposure to the elements could be fitting for social exposure:  
withdrawing, hiding, and so on.  They would serve as a form of self-protection (Taylor, 1985).  
In short, it makes sense why the co-option of both disgust and shame for functioning in the 
sociomoral realm could have happened. 
As I will argue throughout the rest of this dissertation, shame—although often thought of as a 
moral emotion—is flawed in that role.  In this respect, it is once again similar to disgust 
(Nussbaum, 2004; Kelly, 2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014).17  Although the behavioral tendencies 
associated with both disgust and shame could suffice for the social realm, they are not 
necessarily the best fitting or most constructive responses.  An emotion such as guilt, in contrast, 
seems finely tuned to the sociomoral domain and sensitive to considerations such as agency and 
intent.  In fact, Larry May (1992) argues that guilt is an inappropriate emotion for sharing 
responsibility with one’s associates precisely because it is too closely intertwined with questions 
of agency (see Chapter 5).  Interestingly, guilt does not seem to have the negative effects of 
shame (for a review, see Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).  This lends some credence to 
how-plausibly stories according to which disgust and shame were co-opted as quick and dirty 
                                                 
17 Kelly and Morar (2014) defend the strong claim that “disgust is ill-suited to do any moral or social work 
whatsoever”, although a more moderate statement might be “there are no defensible uses for disgust in legal or 
political institutions” (emphasis added; p. 154).  The argument in this dissertation is similar in spirit, though on the 
less extreme end of the spectrum.  I contend that having a propensity to feel shame—the trait of being shame 
prone—is morally, socially, and personally counterproductive.  But I do not deny that there are some instances of 
feeling shame—the state of feeling shame—that, in the moment, are morally, socially, or personally useful. 
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solutions to problems in the sociomoral realm, but did not evolve for that purpose. 
1.5.2 A Precedent for Co-Option Views 
The speculation that shame did not evolve specifically for a moral purpose is not new.  Darwin, 
in Chapter 13 of his 1872 work The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, speculates 
that shame evolved as a response to physical shortcomings or slights, especially those that affect 
one’s appearance or attractiveness to potential mates such as conspicuous birthmarks or crippled 
limbs.  He advances several reasons for thinking that this was the original domain of shame.  
Primary among those is that comments about appearance tend to elicit blushes more strongly 
than anything else.  Furthermore, blushing is especially common among those to whom, Darwin 
suggests, attractiveness is most important:  young (presumably unmarried) ladies in the company 
of young (presumably unmarried) men. 
Darwin (1872) draws on associationism to explicate a possible co-option mechanism for shame: 
Many reasons can be assigned for believing that originally self-attention directed to 
personal appearance, in relation to the opinion of others, was the exciting cause; the same 
effect being subsequently produced, through the force of association, by self-attention in 
relation to moral conduct.  It is not the simple act of reflecting on our own appearance, 
but the thinking what others think of us, which excites a blush.  (pp. 326-327) 
It is noteworthy that Darwin characterizes shame with many of the same features as does 
Tangney (although as the title of his work suggests, he is particularly interested in the expression 
of emotions, that is, in blushing in relation to shame).  In the previous quotation, he notes the 
relationship between shame an audience, as well as the relationship between shame and a focus 
on the self.  He also notes shame’s withdrawal tendencies:  “Under a keen sense of shame there 
is a strong desire for concealment.  We turn away the whole body, more especially the face, 
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which we endeavor in some manner to hide” (p. 322). 
Darwin (1872) does not link the evolution of shame to exposure to the elements, although he 
comes fairly close: 
It is a rather curious question why, in most cases the face, ears, and neck alone redden, 
inasmuch as the whole surface of the body often tingles and grows hot.  This seems to 
depend, chiefly, on the face and adjoining parts of the skin having been habitually 
exposed to the air, light, and alternations of temperature, by which the small arteries not 
only have acquired the habit of readily dilating and contracting, but appear to have 
become unusually developed in comparison with other parts of the surface.  (p. 315) 
Instead of pursuing exposure, however, Darwin ultimately explores a mechanism by which 
attention to the prominent feature in determining attractiveness—the face—causes dilation of the 
capillaries there.  But it is significant that Darwin notes that those of our features that are most 
exposed to the elements are also those features in which blushing is most prominent. 
1.5.3 The Submission/Appeasement Evolutionary Just-So Story 
Darwin’s (1872) proposal has not received much attention in modern times.18  The currently 
dominant view on the evolution of shame points to its role in submission and appeasement, and 
views shame as evolving in a distinctly sociomoral, cooperative realm.  The most prominent 
authors to suggest such a view are Keltner (see, e.g., Keltner & Harker, 1998) and Fessler (see, 
e.g., 1999, 2007).19  Even Tangney (Tangney & Tracy, 2012) seems to favor such a view.  For 
                                                 
18 There are, of course, exceptions.  See, e.g., Crozier (2006). 
19 On Fessler’s (2007) view, especially, human shame is importantly different from shame in other animals 
Arguing that this primordial facet of shame operates in hierarchical social relationships, I then suggest that 
our species’ reliance on culture and cooperation favored the evolution of a new motivational system, one 
oriented not toward relationships between superiors and inferiors, but rather toward relationships among 
prospective cooperative partners.  It is this orientation, I suggest, that lies at the heart of most human shame 
experiences.  (p. 174) 
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the purposes of exposition, however, I will focus on Heidi Maibom’s (2010) recent account in 
this tradition, which incorporates many of the ideas of authors writing before her.  Maibom’s 
central thesis is that “[human] shame and the emotion underlying the submissive displays of 
nonhuman animals are descended from the same emotion; they are both modifications of it” (p. 
579).  Because human and nonhuman shame share a common descendant, Maibom argues that 
we can learn something about the former by studying the latter.  In animals, submission is all 
about maintaining social order to facilitate living in groups, so that individuals are not constantly 
struggling for dominance and resources.  Human shame is undoubtedly different from animal 
shame, but we can leverage work on animal shame to explain features of human shame.  Maibom 
writes, “... there are important lessons to be learned about shame from its origins.  In particular, 
we can understand why shame features an audience centrally, why status matters, and why 
shame concerns the whole person, not just her actions” (p. 577).  Maibom also argues that we 
can learn about the phenomenology of shame by studying its descent. 
First, Maibom (2010) argues that shame is associated with an audience because appeasement 
cannot take place without someone to appease.  Furthermore, the internalization of rules and 
norms is a recent evolutionary development.  Most species rely on the gaze of their conspecifics 
to dissuade behaviors, and the association between shame and an audience reflects that.  Second, 
shame is associated with status because the evolution of shame is intimately linked with 
maintaining social order through dominance hierarchies.  Thus, feeling ashamed in the presence 
of a powerful individual makes sense, which is a phenomenon for which Maibom argues a theory 
should account.  Next, shame is associated with the whole self, as opposed to actions, because 
social hierarchies and maintaining social order is more about who one is, and one’s place in the 
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hierarchy, than about what one does.20  The caste system in India is a good illustration of this.  
Finally, shame is associated with feeling small and the feeling of wanting to hide, because those 
are perceptions of the appeasement displays associated with shame, such as shrinking away and 
covering up. 
There are certainly attractive features of Maibom’s (2010) account of the evolution of shame.  
Maibom argues, for instance, that it beautifully explains why a sexual assault victim might feel 
ashamed (Nathanson, 1989), given that such a victim has not violated any norm or transgressed 
in any way.  This form of shame is explained simply by the emotion’s descent from an emotion 
closely tied with aggression and dominance.  Nevertheless, as I will argue in the next section, the 
co-option view of shame has several distinct advantages over the submission/appeasement 
account.  And Maibom herself admits that her account “does not explain why people feel shame 
at the approval of others, of public nudity, of their sexual desires, etc.” (pp. 589-590).  All in all, 
I contend that the exposure-based co-option story is a more plausible account that its leading 
competitor. 
1.5.4 The Plausibility of the Co-Option Account 
To begin with, the exposure-based co-option view of shame provides a satisfying how-plausibly 
explanation for why shame is associated with blushing, instead of with some other conspicuous 
signal to others.  After all, any conspicuous signal would satisfy the demands of an 
appeasement/submission signal.  As Darwin (1872) noted more than a century ago, blushing is 
most common in the parts of the body that are most exposed to the elements:  the face, ears, and 
neck.  These areas are the most difficult for human beings to cover up, while still being able to 
sense the environment and respond to potential dangers.  The flushing of capillaries near the skin 
                                                 
20 Maibom (2010) also notes that the focus on the self is reinforced by human shame’s connection with being 
elicited by disgust, since we shun whatever has been contaminated or corrupted in its entirety. 
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plays a clear function in combatting damage caused by exposure.  By releasing blood to exposed 
skin, our bodies protect against damage from the wind and cold.  Coming in from the outside on 
a cold, blustery day, one’s cheeks will certainly be flushed, illustrating this response.21 
Second, the co-option view of shame provides a plausible explanation for why shame spans both 
moral and non-moral domains.  Shame did not evolve in the sociomoral/cooperative domain, so 
it is not finely tuned to moral transgressions and other moral considerations.  Given that shame 
evolved in a sociomoral context on Maibom’s account, she has more difficulty explaining this 
fact, although she can point to the nature of social hierarchies perhaps.  Furthermore, we can still 
note the evolutionary past of shame in its current association with nudity and the body, which is 
something that Maibom (2010) admits her account cannot explain.  Uncovering our bodies 
makes us prone to exposure, and shame prompts us to attempt to cover up.  Given that sex 
necessitates exposure, it is naturally linked with shame. 
Next, the co-option view of shame, in contrast to the submission/appeasement account, supports 
a good just-so explanation for why both guilt and shame exist.  Guilt is, by all accounts, 
associated with apology and reparation—paradigms of appeasement behavior.  But according to 
Maibom (2010), shame evolved squarely in this domain to appease conspecifics.  It is difficult to 
understand, then, why two emotions evolved with overlapping domains and functions.  The co-
option account, on the other hand, provides a nice explanation for why this is so.  Shame is not a 
perfect fit as an emotional response to violations of norms and expectations, although it has 
features by which it can satisfice in such a role.  Violating a norm or expectation does not 
                                                 
21 There is a parallel here with disgust.  The explanation of the characteristic facial expression of disgust is given a 
satisfyingly deep, rather than a shallow, explanation by being linked with the original evolutionary purpose of 
disgust.  Certainly, a gaped mouth signals to others that one is feeling disgust, but there is a reason why this signal in 
particular, as opposed to another other signal, evolved. 
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necessarily reflect on one’s character, yet shame focuses on the whole person.  Similarly, the best 
response to harming another is often to apologize and repair relationships or reintegrate into the 
group, yet avoidance tendencies can at least ameliorate immediate punishment.  Thus, in human 
beings, it is plausible that guilt evolved specifically for a social/cooperative purpose, given 
shame’s imperfect yet satisficing role.  I believe that the research discussed in Chapter 2 will 
reinforce this point, as it highlights the damaging effects of shame-proneness, whereas guilt-
proneness has not been shown to have similarly negative effects, and instead largely positive 
ones. 
Finally, the exposure-based co-option view of shame provides competing explanations for why 
“shame features an audience centrally,” why “shame concerns the whole person, not just her 
actions” (p. 577), and why shame relates to feeling small and as if one should disappear; Maibom 
(2010) favors her account for providing these explanations, but the co-option account succeeds 
as well.  Shame plausibly features an audience because an audience (real or imagined) provides 
the exposure trigger, though a metaphorical, social form of exposure rather than a physical 
exposure to the elements.  Shame concerns the whole person or self because physical exposure 
concerns the whole physical body or self.  And shame features a phenomenology of smallness 
and a desire to disappear because those are ways to respond to physical exposure, to ball-up, 
cover-up, and/or hide.  The exposure-based co-option account even provides a competing 
explanation of why sexual assault victims sometimes feel shame, given the exposure that usually 
accompanies that terrible act.  All in all, the co-option account supports more plausible 
explanations than submission/appeasement account, and should be considered a superior just-so 
story for that reason. 
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1.5.5 Summary 
Human beings need protection from exposure to the elements, and shame makes us cover up, 
seek protection, and it flushes the most exposed parts of our bodies with blood.  Although shame 
is often categorized as a moral emotion, according to the co-option how-plausibly story 
presented here, it did not evolve specifically to play a role in this domain.  Such a view can 
strengthen Tangney’s characterization of shame, by giving plausible explanations of additional 
features of the emotion. 
Evolutionary accounts are speculative, and the co-option account is no exception.  Aside from 
pointing out the explanatory advantages of the account in comparison with other competing 
accounts, there is little evidence to which one can point to support it.  Furthermore, an important 
criticism is that there is always an evolutionary story that one can weave to fit the features one 
wishes to explain.  This is a criticism that I will not address here, however, for the empirical 
evidence that I present in the rest of this dissertation is a solid foundation, by itself, for the 
arguments I present in Chapters 3-5. 
That being said, one upshot of the evolutionary just-so story that I have sketched is that it 
provides a reason—though not the only reason—for thinking that shame and guilt are distinct 
natural kinds.22  On a view like Maibom’s (2010), one could view guilt as a modification of 
shame, rather than a separate emotion.  If this were the case, then perhaps the differences 
between guilt and shame are more a result of cultural expectations, rather than deep biology.  On 
the co-option story, however, shame and guilt serve a similar function and cover similar 
                                                 
22 One might be inclined to think that neither shame nor guilt are natural kinds at all.  Griffiths (2004) sees a 
category as a natural kind if scientists can reasonably make discoveries about its members by studying individual 
instances.  Is shame a natural kind according to this definition?  It strikes me that the best way to answer this 
question is to attempt to study shame scientifically.  At present, the scientific consensus seems to be that shame is 
indeed a natural kind. 
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domains, but they have distinct evolutionary histories.  This fits with other evidence in favor of 
viewing shame as a distinct natural kind, namely, that the behaviors and expressions associated 
with shame cross cultures (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner & Harker, 1998), that shame 
produces a different physiological response than guilt (Dickerson et al., 2004), and that shame 
has distinct neurological correlates (Wagner et al., 2011; Whittle et al., 2016). 
1.6 Conclusion 
June Tangney identifies a focus on the self as the central characteristic of shame.  She argues that 
this characteristic helps explain the other characteristics of shame that she identifies, namely, that 
shame causes avoidance tendencies and that it is associated with a painful feeling of exposure.  I 
believe that Tangney’s characterization is both analytically and empirically adequate.  It can 
serve as fruitful characterization for interdisciplinary work. 
Empirical evidence for Tangney’s characterization comes in two forms:  Research on 
participants’ conceptions of shame, which gives face validity to Tangney’s characterization, and 
research using the TOSCA, which measures shame as Tangney conceives of it.  Research on 
participants’ conceptions of shame supports Tangney’s characterization, although participants 
often report the easily observable characteristics of shame, such as its behavioral tendencies.  
Research using the TOSCA also supports Tangney’s characterization, because the measure has 
proven to be extremely productive and to confirm intuitive hypotheses.  Several decades’ worth 
of research using the TOSCA demonstrates that it is a useful measure. 
There is significant overlap between Tangney’s characterization of shame and most recent 
philosophical characterizations.  Conservatively, 60% of philosophers endorse characterizations 
of shame that are similar enough to Tangney’s so that we can safely presume they are 
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referencing the same phenomenon.  This is good evidence that Tangney’s characterization gets at 
the core features of shame, and that shame is reasonably seen as a scientific kind.  It also means 
that there is plenty of room for interdisciplinary engagement between philosophers and 
psychologists.  I illustrate the potential for this engagement in Chapters 3-5 of this dissertation. 
Although Tangney’s characterization can stand alone, I contend that we can complement it with 
a novel evolutionary just-so story.  Human beings need protection from the elements, and shame 
plausibly could have evolved to spur covering up and seeking shelter.  These action tendencies 
also satisfice as a response to social exposure, so shame might have been co-opted to serve in the 
sociomoral realm.  This story supports a deep how-plausibly explanation of phenomena like 
blushing, which makes it superior to other modern views on the evolution of shame. 
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Chapter 2:  An Empirically-Based View of 
Shame:  A Little is Good, But More Is Not 
Better 
Empirical research on shame tends to come in two sorts.  Some researchers focus on shame as a 
state—for example, by inducing shame in research participants and recording the effects—and 
some on shame as a trait—for example, by having research participants rate how likely they are 
to feel shame and associating that rating with outcomes of interest.  A similar thing could be said 
of research on fear (and other emotions), some of which focuses on the state of fear, and some on 
the trait of being fearful.  To mark the state/trait distinction for shame, many researchers use the 
term shame-proneness (or variants like propensity to feel shame) to refer to trait-level shame, a 
practice to which I will try to adhere when clarity is necessary in this and future chapters. 
The purpose of this chapter is provide an overview of scientific research on both shame and 
shame-proneness.  It is upon this foundation of empirical evidence that I will construct my 
arguments in Part II of this dissertation, where I trace out specific implications for ethics.  In 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I summarize existing empirical research on shame and shame-proneness, 
respectively.  In Section 2.3, I present evidence from the Early Emotional Development Program 
at Washington University School of Medicine, which reinforces existing evidence on shame-
proneness.  Subsequently, in Section 2.4, I state and clarify my central empirically-based 
conclusion—namely, that according to a review of empirical evidence, the state of shame 
sometimes has desirable consequences, but the trait of shame does not—and I explain away the 
apparent conflict in this conclusion.  In Section 2.5, I continue to address objections to the 
preliminary conclusion stated in Section 2.4.  I address the objections that all negatively-
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valenced trait-level emotions are maladaptive; that my summary of the empirical literature is 
contaminated by confirmation bias; and that we need to consider whether shame is fitting, not 
whether it is adaptive or beneficial to feel.  I argue that the objections to my central conclusion 
can be met.  Lastly, in Section 2.6, I state my general answer to the normative problem of shame.  
Since the state of shame can have beneficial effects, we ought not eliminate the use of shame; 
there may be limited instances in which we ought to feel or induce shame, depending on specific 
circumstances.  Since shame-proneness has negative effects, however, we ought to eliminate and 
avoid practices that cultivate shame. 
2.1 The State of Shame 
Researchers interested in the state of shame often emphasize the positive effects that it can have.  
Research shows that shame can motivate moral behavior such as honesty and sharing; it can 
drive one to repair an image of oneself or one’s community; and it can appease others.  Thus, it 
appears as if (state-level) shame is beneficial both at an individual and at a societal level, as I 
will demonstrate in the following sections. 
2.1.1 Moral Behavior—Honesty 
Several investigations have suggested that feeling shame can spur honesty (e.g., Cochran et al., 
1999; Tibbetts, 1999; Bryan, Adams, and Monin, 2013).1  Cochran et al. (1999) studied the 
effects of anticipated feelings of shame, anticipated feelings of embarrassment, and anticipated 
institutional sanctions on academic integrity issues such as plagiarism and cheating on an exam.  
The authors asked undergraduate students (N = 448) to fill out anonymous and confidential 
surveys inquiring about history (within the last year) of 5 types of academic integrity 
transgression.  The surveys also asked participants about perceived certainty and seriousness of 
                                                 
1 Several authors suggest that shame might be particularly suited to inhibiting antisocial behavior, such as preventing 
cheating.  See Olthof (2012) and Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman (2010). 
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feelings of shame, embarrassment, and institutional sanctions if one were to commit each of the 
5 types of transgression.2  Anticipated shame—but not anticipated embarrassment or the threat of 
institutional sanctions—was widely correlated with intentions to avoid academic integrity 
transgressions.  The authors concluded, 
[...] the only form of sanction threat that appears to enter into and influence the rational 
calculus of prospective cheaters is their own sense of shame associated with acts of 
academic dishonesty.  Those undergraduates who indicated the highest likelihood of 
feeling ashamed of themselves if they were to cheat in school and who said that their 
shame would pose a problem for them reported the lowest frequencies of involvement in 
acts of academic dishonesty.  (p. 98) 
To give another example, in a series of experiments, Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) 
investigated whether giving participants instructions with the word cheater, as opposed to the 
word cheating, led to an increase in moral behavior.  In each experiment, the authors gave 
participants a chance to cheat without anybody (including the experimenters) ever knowing 
whether they cheated.  Although the authors did not interpret their experiment specifically in 
terms of shame and guilt, according to Tangney’s definitions (see Chapter 1), it is likely that 
using the word cheater facilitated feeling shame, whereas cheating facilitated feeling guilt.  The 
former refers to a character trait—an aspect of the self—whereas the latter refers to an action. 
In Experiment 1, Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) exploited the unusual fact that when asked to 
think of a number between 1 and 10, people usually pick an odd one (Kubovy & Psotka, 1976).  
A research assistant who was blind to the purpose of the study stopped students on a college 
                                                 
2 The items that measured shame were worded “Would you feel ashamed of yourself if you…?” and “How big of a 
problem would feeling ashamed of yourself be for you if you…?”, where the ellipses were filled in with the 5 types 
of academic integrity transgression (Cochran et al., 1999, p. 95). 
47 
 
campus and asked them to participate in the experiment.  Each participant was read the following 
script, hearing either the cheater or the cheating version: 
We’re interested in how common [cheating is/cheaters are] on college campuses.  We’re 
going to play a game in which we will be able to determine the approximate [rate of 
cheating/number of cheaters] in the group as a whole but it will be impossible for us to 
know whether you’re [cheating/a cheater].  (p. 1002) 
The game simply involved thinking of a number between 1 and 10.  Participants were then 
informed that if they thought of an even number, they would receive $5.  About 20% of 
participants in the cheater condition claimed to have thought of an even number, a rate that the 
experimenters confirmed was the baseline rate for choosing an even number.  Participants in the 
cheating condition, on the other hand, reported thinking of an even number 50% of the time.  
Thus, the cheating instructions were not effective at motivating participants to do the right thing, 
whereas the cheater instructions motivated honesty. 
A potentially important detail of Experiment 1 was that participants interacted with a research 
assistant face-to-face.  To test whether it was in fact important, the researchers (Bryan, Adams, 
& Monin, 2013) conducted Experiment 2 entirely online.  Participants from a university-run pool 
of volunteers were instructed that the experiment was a skeptical investigation of psychokinesis.  
They were to find a coin and toss it 10 times, recording whether it came up heads or tails, and to 
try to influence the coin with their mind to make it come up heads.  Purportedly for motivation, 
participants were instructed that they would receive $1 every time the coin came up heads.  They 
also read a script similar to that quoted above, which explicitly instructed them not to cheat/be a 
cheater, as it could affect the outcome of the experiment.  On average, participants in the 
cheating condition reported 5.49 heads, whereas participants in the cheater condition reported 
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4.88 heads.  The average number of heads reported in the cheating condition was significantly 
greater than what would be expected by chance, whereas the average in the cheater condition 
was not, showing once again that implicating the self spurred honesty. 
Finally, in Experiment 3, Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) replicated Experiment 2 using 
participants recruited from a FaceBook advertisement.  They also included a condition to 
investigate baseline rates of cheating.  For the cheating, cheater, and baseline conditions the 
mean number of heads reported were 6.22, 5.23, and 6.31, respectively.  All in all, presenting 
participants with the instructions using the term cheater suppressed cheating, whereas presenting 
them with the instructions using the term cheating (or a variant emphasizing behavior) did not. 
2.1.2 Moral Behavior—Sharing Resources 
There is also evidence that the state of shame can lead to sharing resources.  de Hooge, 
Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) designed a series of 4 experiments to investigate this 
possibility.  According to the authors, emotions orient us to what is important in the 
environment, and they affect decisions that need to be made.  Disgust orients us to food, for 
example, affecting the decision of whether to consume it.  They made a distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous effects of emotions: 
Influences of emotions are denoted as endogenous when they concern behaviors in 
situations that are related to the emotion-causing event.  Examples are the influence of 
fear of animals on the decision to visit a zoo or the experience of sadness when taking a 
loved one to the airport for her departure….  We refer to influences of emotions as 
exogenous when they influence behaviors in situations that are unrelated to the emotion-
causing event. Examples of exogenous influences are the spillover effects of emotions 
resulting from a prior experience, such as watching a happy or a sad movie, on 
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subsequent unrelated decisions, such as deciding how much to tip the driver of the cab 
that brings you home.  (p. 935) 
The authors hypothesized that endogenous effects of shame would likely be moral and 
beneficial, whereas exogenous effects of shame would be more likely to be undesirable.  The 
authors also made a distinction between prosocials—people who tend to act prosocially 
already—and proselfs—people who tend to act more selfishly.  The authors hypothesized that 
the prosocial effects of shame would be more evident for proselfs than prosocials, since 
prosocials already have the disposition to be moral and helpful. 
Each of the 4 experiments had a similar design.  de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) 
induced shame in some participants and used others as controls, measured participants’ 
endogenous or exogenous behavior to see if it was prosocial, and finally measured whether 
participants qualified as prosocials or proselfs.  The induction methods varied and will be 
described below.  The authors sorted participants as prosocials or proselfs using a questionnaire 
about how to divide money, the Triple Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientations (Van 
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997).  In the majority of experiments, the authors used the 
10-coin give-some dilemma game (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) to measure the endogenous or 
exogenous behavioral effects of shame.3  In this game, participants were asked to divide ten 
coins between themselves and a partner, where the value of the coin was double for the partners 
than it was for the participants.  In the endogenous condition, the partners knew about and were 
made relevant to the participants’ shame-inducing situations.  In the exogenous condition, they 
did not know and were not relevant. 
                                                 
3 The exception being Experiment 4, in which the experimenters used scores on the Prosocial Tendencies Scale (de 
Hooge et al., 2007) as their outcome variable. 
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In Experiment 1, university students read scenarios and imagined themselves in the situation.  In 
the shame-inducing scenario, participants imagined performing extremely poorly in a class 
presentation, exposing that they did know the material at all.  In the control scenario, participants 
imagined doing as well as the other students.4  Participants then imagined playing the 10-coin 
game with either another student in the class who saw the presentation (endogenous condition) or 
another student who did not see the presentation (exogenous condition).  As Table 2.1 shows, 
among participants who were classified as proselfs, shamed participants who played the 10-coin 
game with a student in the class reported that they would give more coins to that student.  The 
other comparisons did not reveal any statistically significant effects.  This suggests that shame 
had a prosocial, reparative effect among proselfs. 
Table 2.1 Average Number of Coins Given to Partner (with Standard Deviation), by 
Exogenous/Endogenous and Prosocial/Proself Conditions (Experiment 1). 
 Shame Control 
Prosocial:  Exogenous 5.86 (2.85) 5.93 (3.01) 
                   Endogenous 6.06 (2.29) 6.94 (2.66) 
Proself:     Exogenous 3.20 (1.82) 3.65 (2.21) 
                  Endogenous* 6.21 (2.90)* 4.47 (2.10)* 
* Indicates that the shame/control comparison was statistically significant for the row. 
Adapted from de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg (2008, Table 1, p. 938). 
 
Experiment 2 was almost identical to Experiment 1, except to induce shame, participants recalled 
                                                 
4 The authors included a manipulation check in each experiment to verify that participants in the shame condition 
reported feeling more shame than those in the control condition. 
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a situation in which they felt ashamed in the past.  Control participants imagined a normal day.  
Then, participants imagined playing the 10-coin game either with somebody who witnessed or 
knew about the recalled event (endogenous condition), or somebody unrelated (exogenous 
condition).  Once again, as Table 2.2 shows, proselfs contributed significantly more coins to their 
gaming partner in the endogenous condition than in the exogenous condition.  This again 
suggests that under certain circumstances, shame appears to have a prosocial effect on behavior. 
Table 2.2 Average Number of Coins Given to Partner (with Standard Deviation), by 
Exogenous/Endogenous and Prosocial/Proself Conditions (Experiment 2). 
 Shame Control 
Prosocial: Exogenous 5.38 (1.99) 5.06 (2.41) 
                   Endogenous 6.33 (2.32) 7.62 (2.90) 
Proself:     Exogenous 3.82 (2.40) 3.57 (2.32) 
                  Endogenous* 6.56 (2.75)* 2.74 (2.49)* 
* Indicates that the shame/control comparison was statistically significant for the row. 
Adapted from de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg (2008, Table 1, p. 938). 
 
The pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4 replicated the pattern from Experiments 1 and 2, 
adding further support to the conclusion that among proselfs, endogenous shame contributes to 
prosocial behavior.  The authors concluded that “As ugly and negative as shame experiences can 
be, feeling this emotion can have clear positive consequences for interpersonal behavior” (p. 
940). 
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2.1.3 Repairing an Image 
In a subsequent paper, de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2010) investigated the 
hypothesis that feeling shame prompts attempts to restore one’s self-image if such restoration is 
feasible, but withdrawal if not; the authors termed these restore motivations and protect 
motivations, respectively.   In 5 experiments, de Hooge and colleagues induced shame in a 
sample of participants and measured resultant restore and protect motivations.  In Experiment 1, 
for example, the authors induced shame using the same procedure as in Experiment 1 described 
above in Section 2.1.2 (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008).  Then they measured 
restore and protect motivations using a novel self-report questionnaire.  Table 2.3 shows the 
results from the 5 experiments.  In general, the results show that shame can indeed motivate 
restoration of one’s self, although it often also motivates protection (i.e., avoidance). 
Table 2.3 Mean Motivation Scores (with Standard Deviations) in 5 Experiments Investigating 
the State of Shame. 
 Shame Control 
Study Restore Protect Restore Protect 
1 3.78 (1.89)a 4.16 (1.99)a 2.51 (1.50)b 3.61 (1.81)c 
2 5.14 (1.23)a 3.59 (1.52)b 3.48 (1.26)b 2.08 (0.96)c 
3 6.26 (1.88)a 6.40 (1.87)a N/A N/A 
4 4.75 (1.70)a 3.85 (1.66)b N/A N/A 
5 5.34 (0.96)a 4.88 (1.05)b 3.07 (1.55)c 3.37 (1.58)c 
Within each row, cells with different superscript letters are significantly different from one 
another.  Restore and protect motivations were measured on a 7-point scale. 
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Adapted from Table 1 (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010). 
 
To give another example, Schmader and Lickel (2006, Study 1) investigated the behavioral 
tendencies associated with group-based shame, or shame that does not stem directly from one’s 
own behavior, but rather an associate’s.5  More specifically, the authors investigated group-based 
shame stemming from another person’s negative stereotypical behavior.  The authors asked 
Hispanic university students to recall and write about a time that somebody (other than 
themselves) acted in line with a negative stereotype about Hispanics.  Afterwards, participants 
completed a set of surveys, including a survey about how they felt about the event they described 
and a survey about how they felt like acting in response to the event.6  As part of their data 
analysis, Schmader and Lickel tried to predict how participants felt about acting in response to 
the event from the emotions they reported feeling about the event.  The results are presented in 
Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Regression Coefficients from Models Investigating the Effects of Group-Based 
Emotion on Distancing or Repairing. 
 Outcome Variables 
 Distance from 
Group Member 
Distance from 
Group Identity 
Repair Group 
Image 
Repair Event 
Predictors     
     Shame .28*** .49*** .42*** .11 
                                                 
5 For additional work on shame and image restoration, see, e.g., Gausel and Leach (2011); Gausel et al. (2012); 
Lickel, Steele, & Schmader (2011); and Lickel et al. (2014). 
6 The participants also filled out a survey beforehand about how much they esteemed their ethnic group, but this 
measure does not pertain to the results presented here. 
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     Anger .54*** -.07 -.03 .06 
     Guilt .16# -.02 .08 .24* 
     Sadness -.15# .11 .10 .33** 
     Anxiety -.04 .13 .00 .04 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, #p < .10 
Adapted from Schmader & Lickel, (2006, Table 13.3, p. 275). 
 
As Table 2.4 shows, Schmader and Lickel (2006, Study 1) found that participants rated shame to 
be a powerful motivator.  Reports of group-based shame in response to a negative stereotypical 
event predicted a desire to distance or insulate oneself from both the group member who 
exemplified the stereotype and the group itself.7  Shame was also the only emotion that predicted 
a desire to counteract the negative stereotype of the group.  Thus, shame appears to be able to 
induce prosocial motivations even in those who have not done anything wrong. 
2.1.4 Appeasement 
A final example of research on the state of shame comes from Dacher Keltner and colleagues 
(Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997; see also Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012).  In two 
experiments (Study 3 and Study 4), participants viewed pictures of actors displaying different 
emotions (see Figure 2.1 below), and imagined that the emotions were felt by the actors in 
response to an event.  In Study 3, the event was tripping in front of other people.  In Study 4, it 
was giving a terrible presentation in a course.  Afterwards, participants rated how much 
amusement, anger, contempt, disgust, concern, forgiveness, and sympathy they felt towards the 
                                                 
7 Distancing was measured by items that suggested avoidance tendencies, such as trying to avoid being associated 
with the group or group member. 
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person in the picture, each on a scale of 1 to 7.  The authors then combined the ratings for anger, 
contempt, and disgust into an antipathy superscale, and the ratings for concern, forgiveness, and 
sympathy into a sympathy superscale.  In both experiments, Keltner, Young, and Buswell found 
that participants reported feeling the most sympathy, and the least antipathy, towards people 
feeling shame.  This suggests that the state of shame serves an appeasement function, soothing 
social tensions. 
 
Figure 2.1 Pictures of Emotional Expressions from Keltner, Young, & Buswell (1997, p. 363). 
 
Stearns and Parrott (2012) also investigated the effects of perceiving somebody who feels 
ashamed.  In Experiment 1, the experimenters asked participants to read descriptions in which an 
author detailed a transgression and either acknowledged or did not acknowledge moral 
responsibility.  If the author of the writing acknowledged moral responsibility, the author 
described it explicitly as either a feeling of guilt or a feeling of shame.  Participants then rated 
their agreement with statements about the author, such as “The person who wrote this account 
has taken responsibility for what happened,” “The person who wrote this account has empathy 
for how [injured party] is feeling,” and “The person who wrote this account is a nice person” (see 
Stearns & Parrott, Table 1, p. 413).  This allowed Stearns and Parrot to calculate variables such 
as how moral the author was perceived to be, how much empathy the author was perceived to 
have for the victim, and how generally likable the author was perceived to be.  The 
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experimenters found that guilt and shame were equally likely to improve ratings of morality, 
empathy, and likeability, when compared with the no responsibility condition.  Thus, feeling 
shame was as effective as feeling guilt at improving others’ perceptions and appeasing their 
moral judgments. 
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in that the vignettes did not explicitly use the terms 
guilt or shame, and in that Stearns and Parrott (2012) investigated two different forms of shame.  
As the experimenters conceptualized the difference, “One, public shame, stems from public 
exposure of personal defects and results in concern about reputation, status, and others’ 
evaluations; it results in a motivation to hide or otherwise escape public scrutiny.  The other, 
private shame, stems from a more private negative evaluation of oneself that results in feelings 
of self-contempt, inferiority, and worthlessness” (p. 417).  Otherwise, Experiment 2 was similar 
to Experiment 1.  Results are presented in Table 2.5.  The results suggested that experiencing 
private shame was effective at appeasing others, but that public shame was not effective.  Guilt 
appeared to be the most adaptive emotion to express.  Nevertheless, both Experiments 1 and 2 
showed that if a transgressor felt ashamed, it typically improved the way others perceived them, 
and hence served an appeasement function. 
Table 2.5 The Effects of Private Shame, Public Shame, Guilt, and No Emotion on Others’ 
Perceptions. 
 Private 
Shame 
(n=55) 
Public 
Shame 
(n=50) 
Guilt 
(n=47) 
No 
Emotion 
(n=41) 
df F-value 
Moral 
Character 
scale 
4.82 (1.20)a 3.53 (1.41)b 5.11 (1.38)a 3.43 (1.12)b (3, 189) 21.49*** 
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Empathy 
for Victim 
scale 
3.97 (1.87)a 3.19 (1.85)a, c 5.39 (1.76)b 2.75 (1.38)c (3, 189) 20.13*** 
Likeability
/Approval 
scale 
4.37 (1.58)a 4.27 (1.60)a, c 5.51 (1.47)b 3.55 (1.31)c (3, 189) 12.94*** 
*** indicates p < .001 
Means (on a 9-point scale) are given with standard deviations in parentheses.  Within each row, 
cells with different superscript letters are significantly different from one another. 
Adapted from Stearns and Parrott (2012, Table 4, p. 419). 
 
2.1.5 Summary 
The experiments described above are representative of the experimental corpus on the state of 
shame.  Much of this research seems to confirm the common-sense view that shame is a moral 
emotion that has benefits both for the individual who feels it (e.g., by appeasing others) and for 
society as a whole (e.g., by reducing cheating), although sometimes the effects only appear under 
limited circumstances. 
2.2  The Trait of Shame 
According to those who research the trait of shame such as June Tangney, shame has a dark side 
(see, e.g., Tangney, 1995a).  Evidence shows, for instance, that shame-proneness is either anti-
correlated, or not correlated at all, with empathy.  Rather, shame-proneness is associated with 
feelings of personal distress.  Also, shame-proneness is positively correlated with many types of 
mental illness.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, shame-proneness is associated with a 
defense mechanism of blaming others, getting angry, and being aggressive and having other 
conduct issues.  Thus, at both an individual- and societal-level, shame-proneness seems to have 
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negative effects. 
2.2.1 Empathy and Personal Distress 
Shame has been found to be uncorrelated or sometimes negatively correlated with empathy, but 
positively correlated with personal distress (Tangney, 1991; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Joireman, 2004).  Empathy and personal distress can be characterized as different ways of 
reacting to another’s pain or misfortune.  To feel empathy for the person is to feel that person’s 
pain in some sense, although typically in a warm-hearted way, while maintaining focus on the 
other in need and understanding things from the other’s perspective.8  To feel personal distress, 
in contrast, is to feel distress oneself because of the other’s distress, but to focus on one’s own 
distress instead of the other’s.  Empathy and personal distress lead to different action tendencies.  
To relieve empathic feelings, one often helps the other in need.  But to relieve personal distress, 
it is often easiest to avoid the distressing stimulus, for example, by leaving the situation (Batson, 
Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Batson, 1991). 
Leith and Baumeister (1998) conducted a series of experiments to explore the relationships 
among shame, personal distress, and the perspective-taking component of empathy.  In 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, the authors had undergraduate volunteers fill out questionnaires, 
including the TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989), to measure shame-proneness, 
self-esteem, personal distress, and perspective-taking abilities, among other things.  The authors 
then performed statistical analyses designed to reveal the unique contributions of shame-
proneness to perspective-taking and personal distress, while controlling for guilt-proneness and 
self-esteem.  Results are presented in Table 2.6.  In all 3 experiments, shame-proneness, but not 
guilt-proneness, was associated with personal distress.  Shame-proneness was uncorrelated with 
                                                 
8 There are well-known difficulties in defining empathy and characterizing different forms of it, which I cannot hope 
to detail here.  See Coplan & Goldie (2011). 
59 
 
perspective-taking (although guilt-proneness was clearly associated with it).  The results 
suggested that shame-prone individuals are disposed to respond in less prosocial ways when 
encountering others who are in pain, turning inwards and focussing on their own distress, instead 
of outwards on the other’s. 
Table 2.6 Correlations Between Shame-Proneness and Perspective-Taking/Personal Distress, 
after Accounting for Self-Esteem and Guilt-Proneness; and Correlations Between Guilt-
Proneness and Perspective-Taking/Personal Distress, after Accounting for Self-esteem and 
Shame-Proneness. 
 Shame Guilt 
Perspective-taking   
     Exp. 1a -.03 .32* 
     Exp. 1b -.03 .31* 
     Exp. 2 -.05 .34* 
Personal distress   
     Exp. 1a .23* .04 
     Exp. 1b .24* .04 
     Exp. 2 .29* -.01 
*p<.01 
Adapted from Leith & Baumeister (1998), Table 2, p. 12. 
 
In another study, Joireman (2004) investigated the mechanism by which shame-proneness might 
lead to personal distress.  He hypothesized that self-rumination might explain why people who 
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tend to feel shame also tend to focus inwards on their own distress when seeing others in pain.  
Results showed that shame-proneness (measured using the TOSCA) was indeed predictive of 
personal distress.  This replicated previous research showing that “Whereas shame predicts 
higher levels of ‘self-oriented’ personal distress (feelings of anxiety in emergency situations), 
guilt predicts higher levels of ‘other-oriented’ perspective taking (the ability to take the 
perspective of another) (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995b), and in some cases, higher 
levels of empathic concern (warm, tender feelings for others in need) (Tangney, 1995b)” (p. 
226).  Analyses of the relationships among shame-proneness, self-rumination, and personal 
distress revealed that “shame and self-rumination may feed each other within a reciprocal cycle 
that is likely to result in a maladaptive empathic response (i.e., personal distress)” (p. 225). 
2.2.2 Mental Illness 
In numerous studies that have accounted for both guilt and shame, shame has been found to be 
associated with psychopathology, whereas guilt has not been found to be associated with it (Orth, 
Berking, and Burkhardt, 2006; Robinaugh and McNally, 2010; Stuewig and McCloskey, 2005; 
Fergus et al., 2010; Bennett, Sullivan, & Lewis, 2010; Hedman et al., 2013; Highfield et al., 
2010; Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002; Pineles, Street, & Koenen, 2006; Tangney, Burggraf, 
& Wagner, 1995).9  Luby et al. (2009b) investigated the relationships among guilt, shame, major 
depressive disorder (MDD), and other psychiatric disorders in a large sample of preschoolers.  
An interviewer acted out the beginnings of stories with figurines, and the children were asked to 
complete them.  Some of these story stems contained a transgression.  Trained researchers then 
coded the number of shame themes and guilt themes that the children used in the story endings 
they created.  The severity of depression predicted how many shame themes the children used, 
                                                 
9 See also the evidence presented in Chapter 1 linking shame-proneness with a myriad of symptoms of mental 
illness. 
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but none of the psychopathology severity measures predicted the number of guilt themes used. 
As another example, Saftner et al. (1995) investigated the role of shame in eating disorders in 
college-aged women.  The authors used the TOSCA to measure shame- and guilt-proneness, and 
the Eating Disorder Inventory Version 2 (EDI; Garner, 1991) to measure symptoms of eating 
disorders.  They found that shame-proneness was significantly positively correlated with 
symptoms such as being obsessed with thinness and binging/vomiting cycles.  Guilt-proneness, 
in contrast, was generally negatively related to subscales of the EDI, especially when controlling 
for the effects of shame by using partial correlations.  Complete results are presented below in 
Table 2.7.  The authors concluded that “these findings suggest that shame is an important 
emotion to consider in working with women who have eating difficulties” (p. 322), although they 
also noted that it is difficult to isolate shame-proneness as a cause or an effect of eating 
difficulties, as there are likely feedback effects.10 
Table 2.7 Correlations and Part Correlations between Shame- or Guilt-Proneness and Subscales 
of the Eating Disorder Inventory Version 2. 
 Bivariate Correlations Part Correlations 
EDI Subscales Shame Guilt Shame Residuals Guilt Residuals 
Drive for 
Thinness 
.22*** .05 .21** -.07 
Bulimia .19* -.01 .22** -.12 
Body 
Dissatisfaction 
.21** -.08 .27*** -.20** 
                                                 
10 On shame and guilt in obesity, see Conradt et al. (2008), “Who Copes Well?  Obesity-Related Coping and Its 
Associations with Shame, Guilt, and Weight Loss.” 
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 Bivariate Correlations Part Correlations 
EDI Subscales Shame Guilt Shame Residuals Guilt Residuals 
Ineffectiveness .31** -.09 .39*** -.26** 
Perfectionism .07 .12 .01 .09 
Interpersonal 
Distrust 
.10 .16* .20** -.24** 
(Lack of) 
Interoceptive 
Awareness 
.24** .03 .25*** -.10 
Maturity Fears .10 -.03 .13 -.09 
Asceticism .25** -.01 .28*** -.15 
Impulse 
Regulation 
.15 -.11 .22** -.20** 
Social 
Insecurity 
.30*** -.13 .40*** -.31*** 
N = 171; p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001*** 
Reproduced from Saftner et al. (1995). 
 
2.2.3 Externalization of Blame 
One of the strongest findings in research on trait-level shame is that shame-proneness is 
associated with externalizing blame, that is, with a tendency to blame other people for 
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transgressions instead of blaming oneself.11  In two experiments, for example, Tangney et al. 
(1992) asked undergraduate participants to fill out a series of questionnaires.  The authors used 
the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) and the TOSCA to measure guilt, 
shame, and externalization of blame.  A striking pattern emerged, presented in Table 2.8.  When 
looking at simple (bivariate) correlations, shame was in each instance correlated with 
externalization of blame.  Also in each instance, guilt was uncorrelated with externalization of 
blame.  Taking the analysis one step further, the authors investigated partial correlations to parcel 
out the effects of one emotion from the other.  When doing so, the correlation between shame 
and externalization became even stronger, whereas the correlation between guilt and 
externalization became negative. 
Table 2.8 Correlations between Shame/Guilt and Externalization of Blame in Two Studies. 
 Bivariate Correlation Part Correlation 
Externalization Shame Guilt Shame Residual Guilt Residual 
Study 1 SCAAI .21*** -.06 .27*** -.18** 
Study 2 SCAAI .32*** .02 .40*** -.24** 
Study 2 
TOSCA 
.40*** .07 .41*** -.12* 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Reproduced from Tangney et al. (1992), Table 1, p. 672. 
 
                                                 
11 Several of the papers summarized in the following sections report the shame-proneness and externalization of 
blame finding, so I only summarize one paper here. 
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2.2.4 Anger Problems 
Guilt-proneness has been found to be associated with less anger and better ways of dealing with 
it, and shame-proneness with more anger and worse ways (Tangney et al., 1992; Wright, 
GudJonsson, & Young, 2008; Hejdenberg & Andrews, 2011; Tangney et al., 1996; Peters et al., 
2014).  Peters et al. (2014), for example, studied the links among shame-proneness, anger, and 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) symptoms in a large sample of college students (N = 823), 
using self-report questionnaires.  Individuals with BPD tend to have trouble in relationships with 
others, have outbursts of and dramatic swings in emotion, and engage in risky behaviors.  Using 
structural equation modeling, the authors found that shame tended to lead to BPD symptoms via 
anger and rumination about anger, illustrating the link between shame and anger.  Their data did 
not support the model that anger tended to lead to shame and then BPD.  Thus, this model 
provided evidence that shame-proneness causes individuals to have problems with anger and 
rumination about anger. 
2.2.5 Hostility & Aggression 
Shame-proneness has also been linked more directly with increased hostility and aggression.  
Heaven, Ciarrochi, and Leeson (2009) conducted a longitudinal study lasting one year in a large 
sample (N = 670) of high school students.  The authors investigated the causal relationship 
between shame-proneness and hostility.  They used the expanded form of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) to measure shame-proneness and 
hostility.  To completed the PANAS-X, participants rated how much they had felt emotions over 
the past month.  Items such as “ashamed” and “disgusted with self” were combined to measure 
shame-proneness, and items such as “hostile” and “irritable” were combined to measure hostility.  
The authors found that “Structural equation modelling showed that higher shame in Grade 9 was 
predictive of increases in hostility in Grade 10, whereas hostility was not predictive of increases 
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in shame” (p. 841). 
Stuewig et al. (2010), to give another example, explored the mechanisms that might link shame-
proneness with aggression.  Using statistical modeling techniques and 4 substantially different 
samples of participants (including a group of inmates), the authors found that there is indeed a 
link between shame-proneness and aggression, and that it leads through the intermediate of 
externalization of blame.  The authors measured aggression in a variety of ways, including with 
clear-cut self-report items such as “‘I get in many fights’” and “‘I physically attack people’” (p. 
95).  Thus, there is good evidence that suggests that shame-proneness is associated with 
increased aggressive tendencies, as well as good evidence for a mechanism that explains the 
relationship. 
2.2.6 Other Behavior Problems 
Finally, shame-proneness as opposed to guilt-proneness has been found to be linked with a 
variety of negative behaviors or outcomes (Treeby and Bruno, 2012; Covert et al., 2003; Hosser, 
Windzio, & Greve,  2008; Kivisto et al., 2011; Lotze, Ravindran, & Myers, 2010; Roos, Hodges, 
& Salmivalli, 2014; Stuewig & Tangney, 2007).  Dearing, Stuewig, and Tangney (2005), for 
example, investigated how guilt-proneness and shame-proneness related to the abuse of alcohol 
and illegal drugs.  Two large samples of college students, and one large sample of inmates, 
completed the TOSCA along with measures of alcohol and drug use.  The authors found a 
positive relationship between shame and substance use problems in all samples, but found 
negative or negligible relationships between guilt and substance use. 
2.2.7 Summary 
The evidence on shame-proneness reviewed above presents a strikingly different picture than 
evidence on the state of feeling shame.  To a surprisingly large extent, research on shame-
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proneness has found that it is a problematic trait, both for individuals and for society.  At the 
level of individuals, shame-proneness is persistently linked with symptoms of many mental 
disorders.  On a societal level, shame-proneness is not associated with prosocial ways of 
responding to or interacting with others.  On the contrary, it is associated with feeling personal 
distress, a lack of perspective-taking abilities, blaming others, anger, aggression, and other 
undesirable behaviors such as substance abuse. 
2.3 Replication of Research on Shame-Proneness, 
Externalization of Blame, Anger, and Behavior Problems 
Data gathered at the Early Emotional Development Program (EEDP) at Washington University 
School of Medicine support the hypothesis that being disposed to feel shame is associated with 
blaming others and with having anger issues.12  The Preschool Depression Study (PDS) has 
followed hundreds of children for over 10 years, beginning when they were aged 3-6 (for a 
description of the initial study, see Luby et al., 2009a).13  Children were initially recruited for the 
study if they had either high or very low scores on a brief measure of depression (Luby et al., 
2004).  At yearly assessments, children and their parents completed measures of psychiatric 
symptoms, emotional well-being, and conduct issues (among other things).  At three consecutive 
annual assessments (study timepoints 6, 8, and 10, or T6, T8, and T10) when the children were 
7.5 to 13.5 years of age, they also completed the TOSCA for children (or TOSCA-C; Tangney et 
al., 1990).  This data afforded the opportunity to investigate the relationships among shame-
proneness, the tendency to externalize blame, anger, and conduct problems. 
The analyses presented below feature data gathered using the Children’s Anger Management 
                                                 
12 I would like to thank Dr. Joan Luby for giving me permission to use data from the EEDP. 
13 The Preschool Depression Study has been refunded several times, but for ease of presentation I treat all of this 
work (which uses the same participants) as the Preschool Depression Study.  It is still ongoing at the EEDP. 
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Scale (CEMS-A or CAMS; see Zeman, Shipman, & Suveg, 2002) and the Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatric Assessment (CAPA; see Angold et al., 1995), along with the TOSCA-C data.  The 
CEMS-A measures anger dysregulation as a simple sum of the scores of 3 items (with each item 
being a 3-point scale).  The three items target “culturally inappropriate expression of anger” (p. 
395).  The CAPA is a comprehensive psychiatric interview that allows trained administrators to 
investigate and quantify psychiatric symptoms, including a simple binary measure of whether a 
symptom is absent or present.  The measure of externalizing psychiatric symptoms used below is 
a count of this binary measure for symptoms of externalizing disorders such as Oppositional 
Defiance Disorder and ADHD.  The measure of history of depressive symptoms (later called 
Avg. MDD Sum Score, or simply Avg. MDD) is an average of the sum of depression symptoms 
from all previous annual waves of the PDS study. 
Exploratory cross-sectional correlations were conducted using SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2011), 
and the results are presented in Table 2.9.  The results suggest that shame-proneness is in general 
correlated with concurrent measures of externalization of blame, anger dysregulation, and 
externalizing symptoms. 
Table 2.9 Correlations of Shame-Proneness at 3 Timepoints with Concurrent Measures of 
Externalization of Blame, Anger Dysregulation, and Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms. 
  Externalization 
of Blame (T6, 
T8, or T10) 
Anger 
Dysregulation 
(T6, T8, or T10) 
Externalizing 
Symptoms (T6, 
T8, or T10) 
T6 Shame Correlation .343** .185** .151* 
 Significance .000 .006 .026 
 N 219 219 219 
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T8 Shame Correlation .310** .095 .227** 
 Significance .000 .151 .001 
 N 229 229 229 
T10 Shame Correlation .508** .234** .163* 
 Significance .000 .001 .021 
 N 201 201 201 
* Significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
** Significant at .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Given that the PDS sample was selected in part based on symptoms of depression, there was the 
distinct possibility that these symptoms would wash out any potential findings related to shame-
proneness, given the known correlation between depressive disorder and shame.  Thus, 
additional exploratory partial correlations were conducted in order to control for history of 
depressive symptoms.  As shown in Table 2.10, the results continued to be promising. 
Table 2.10 Partial Correlations of Shame-Proneness at 3 Timepoints with Concurrent Measures 
of Externalization of Blame, Anger Dysregulation, and Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms, 
Controlling for History of Depressive Symptoms. 
  Externalization 
of Blame (T6, 
T8, or T10) 
Anger 
Dysregulation 
(T6, T8, or T10) 
Externalizing 
Symptoms (T6, 
T8, or T10) 
T6 Shame Partial Corr.1 .345** .181** .153* 
 Significance .000 .007 .024 
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 N 216 216 216 
T8 Shame Partial Corr.2 .297** .066 .132* 
 Significance .000 .323 .047 
 N 226 226 226 
T10 Shame Partial Corr.3 .510** .206** .081 
 Significance .000 .004 .257 
 N 197 197 197 
1 Controlling for the average number of MDD symptoms at annual waves through T6 
2 Controlling for the average number of MDD symptoms at annual waves through T8 
3 Controlling for the average number of MDD symptoms at annual waves through T10 
* Significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
** Significant at .01 (two-tailed) 
 
The correlational analyses presented above suggested that there could be important relationships 
between shame and externalization of blame, anger dysregulation, and behavior issues.  A 
weakness of the analyses, however, was that they neither revealed effect sizes, nor took into 
account standard control variables, nor exploited the longitudinal nature of the data.  Thus, 
additional analyses were warranted.  Instead of conducting regression analyses cross-sectionally 
at each wave, generalized estimating equations (GEEs) were used to increase power.  GEEs take 
into account the correlational structure inherent in longitudinal study designs with repeated 
measures (Burton, Gurrin, & Sly, 1998; Hanley et al., 2003), and so are well-suited for 
longitudinal analyses.  GEE analyses were conducted using SAS (SAS Institute Inc., 2013).  
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Control variables in each model included age, income-to-needs ratio (as a surrogate for 
socioeconomic status, or SES), sex, and race.14  Results are shown below in Tables 2.11, 2.12, 
and 2.13. 
Table 2.11 Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable as 
Externalization of Blame. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > [Z] 
Intercept 23.4112 4.74 14.1209 32.7015 4.94 <.0001 
Avg. MDD 
Sum Score 
51.4095 18.8669 14.4311 88.388 2.72 0.0064 
Age -0.0941 0.0241 -0.1414 -0.0468 -3.9 <.0001 
SES -0.0885 0.4961 -1.061 0.8839 -0.18 0.8584 
Sex (F) 2.4347 0.9913 0.4918 4.3777 2.46 0.014 
Race (AA) 0.6291 1.4043 -2.1233 3.3815 0.45 0.6542 
Race (Not 
AA or C) 
3.2668 1.5666 0.1964 6.3373 2.09 0.037 
Shame 0.6092 0.0764 0.4595 0.7589 7.98 <.0001 
Avg. MDD 
x Shame 
-1.281 0.4711 -2.2044 -0.3576 -2.72 0.0065 
Bolded rows are significant at .05. 
 
                                                 
14 An income-to-needs ratio factors in the number of people supported by an annual income.  It was calculated from 
data collected at participants’ initial visits to the EEDP, as SES is thought to be particularly important when children 
are young. 
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Table 2.12 Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable as Anger 
Dysregulation. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > [Z] 
Intercept 1.4444 0.1793 1.093 1.7958 8.06 <.0001 
Avg. MDD 
Sum Score 
1.0654 0.5614 -0.0348 2.1657 1.9 0.0577 
Age -0.0013 0.001 -0.0032 0.0006 -1.3 0.193 
SES -0.02 0.0174 -0.0542 0.0142 -1.15 0.2517 
Sex (F) 0.0246 0.0319 -0.038 0.0872 0.77 0.441 
Race (AA) 0.0256 0.0477 -0.0679 0.119 0.54 0.5915 
Race (Not 
AA or C) 
-0.0394 0.0534 -0.1441 0.0652 -0.74 0.4602 
Shame 0.0057 0.0025 0.0008 0.0106 2.29 0.0221 
Avg. MDD 
x Shame 
-0.0107 0.0137 -0.0376 0.0161 -0.78 0.4337 
Bolded rows are significant at .05. 
Table 2.13 Parameters of the General Estimating Equation with Outcome Variable as 
Externalizing Psychiatric Symptoms. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > [Z] 
Intercept 1.6014 0.5294 0.5638 2.639 3.02 0.0025 
Avg. MDD 5.7152 1.8415 2.1059 9.3244 3.1 0.0019 
72 
 
Sum Score 
Age -0.0095 0.0025 -0.0144 -0.0046 -3.82 0.0001 
SES 0.0056 0.0532 -0.0987 0.1099 0.1 0.9164 
Sex (F) -0.2299 0.0978 -0.4215 -0.0383 -2.35 0.0187 
Race (AA) 0.0628 0.153 -0.2372 0.3627 0.41 0.6816 
Race (Not 
AA or C) 
0.1891 0.125 -0.0558 0.434 1.51 0.1302 
Shame 0.0104 0.0082 -0.0055 0.0264 1.28 0.2006 
Avg. MDD x 
Shame 
0.0003 0.0461 -0.0901 0.0907 0.01 0.9955 
Bolded rows are significant at .05. 
As shown in in Table 2.11, shame-proneness was a highly statistically significant predictor of 
externalization of blame, along with history of depressive symptoms, age, sex, race (not African 
American or Caucasian), and the interaction between previous MDD symptoms and shame-
proneness.15  Shame-proneness was also the only statistically significant predictor of anger 
dysregulation (Table 2.12).  Lastly, shame-proneness was not a statistically significant predictor 
of externalizing psychiatric symptoms.  Rather, only previous MDD symptoms, age, and sex 
were significant predictors (Table 2.13). 
Overall, the results of the GEE analyses supported the hypothesis that shame is associated with a 
                                                 
15 It is unsurprising that prior history of depressive symptoms, age, and sex were statistically significant.  The race 
finding would need much more investigation before I could make any comment.  Finally, it is very difficult to 
interpret the continuous interaction effect of Avg. MDD x Shame without further analyses, so I will not attempt to 
here. 
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defense mechanism of externalizing blame and becoming angry.  The analyses did not reveal the 
hypothesized final step in the mechanism, a tendency towards aggressive behavior.  This could 
be because externalizing psychiatric symptoms were not a targeted measure of aggressive 
behavior.  They included, for example, symptoms of ADHD.  It is also possible that as the last 
step in the mechanism, it was most difficult to detect the relationship between shame-proneness 
and aggression.16  Some shame-prone people may be able to regulate their emotions to prevent 
aggressive outbursts.  Another possibility is that including history of depressive symptoms as a 
control variable washed out some of the effect of shame. 
Additional analyses might help to clarify whether shame-proneness was a predictor of conduct 
issues or aggression.  In many analyses, for example, researchers use residuals in their models to 
isolate the effects of guilt-proneness and shame-proneness from one another.  This would be a 
good idea to explore in future analyses.  Another hypothesis of interest to explore would be that 
shame-proneness mediates the relationship between MDD and externalizing symptoms.  More 
sophisticated mediational analyses would need to be undertaken to explore such a hypothesis.  
Despite some limitations, however, the analyses above replicated the findings on shame-
proneness, externalization of blame, and anger. 
2.4 Preliminary Conclusion 
The evidence presented above suggests the following preliminary conclusion, which has yet to 
stand up to objections:  Whereas the state of shame has some positive effects, the trait of shame 
has negative effects both for the individuals who tend to feel ashamed and for society as a whole.  
Unpacking this a bit further, the conclusion suggests that while it might be unobjectionable in 
                                                 
16 Recall that the correlation coefficients tended to decrease as one moved from externalization of blame to anger to 
conduct issues.  See Table 2.9. 
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each instance to induce or feel shame, to cultivate shame-proneness is in fact objectionable, 
because of its counterintuitive and negative effects. 
There is, admittedly, a tension in this conclusion.  If individual instances of feeling shame have 
beneficial effects, how can having a tendency to feel shame come to have a negative effect?  One 
might think that most commonly, if a state is generally beneficial, then the propensity to be in 
that state ought to be beneficial as well.  There is no guarantee, however, that a simple additive 
relationship exists when moving from claims about states to claims about traits.  It is good to 
consume sugar every once in a while, but bad to be prone to consuming sugar (at least in 
industrialized society).  It is good to get some sun (to produce Vitamin D and improve mood), 
but there are negative effects to having a propensity for being in the sun (sunburn and an 
increased risk for skin cancer).  More is not always better.  It is certainly possible that shame 
falls into such a category. 
I believe that the tension mentioned above can be further dissipated by considering the 
evolutionary just-so story that I presented in Chapter 1.  If feeling shame were never beneficial 
after moral transgressions, then it would be difficult to see why it would have been co-opted to 
fill that role.  We should expect, then, to be able to find evidence that the state of feeling shame 
has some beneficial effects.  But shame plausibly did not evolve specifically to play a role in 
morality.  It is, perhaps, a kludge, like using a sledgehammer to pound nails when building a 
house.  Yes, it works for a few nails.  But it can also cause substantial damage and be 
counterproductive to one’s overall efforts if used consistently. 
2.5 Objections 
Before accepting the preliminary conclusion stated above, it is important to consider objections 
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to it.  Three worries, in particular, are as follows.  The first is that the conclusion is of no import, 
because it would hold for all negatively-valenced emotions.  Of course tending to feel an excess 
of an emotion or tending to feel it in unfitting circumstances is bad, but this does not mean that 
the trait of feeling shame proportionally and in fitting situations is maladaptive.  Second, one 
might be worried that the evidence presented above reflects a confirmation bias.  Is there really 
no evidence that shame-proneness has beneficial effects?  Finally, one might object to the idea 
that we ought not tend to feel shame even if it seems fitting to do so, for example, if one has 
committed a transgression because of one’s vicious character.  Below, I address each of these 3 
objections in turn. 
2.5.1 All Negatively-Valenced Trait-Level Emotions Are Maladaptive 
One might object to the importance of the conclusions drawn above by arguing that similar 
conclusions would likely hold for all emotions, and certainly for all negatively-valenced 
emotions.  To give an example, the state of fear could easily be shown to have positive effects, 
but being prone to feeling fear in general or to a magnified extent would be maladaptive.  The 
issue here is most likely one of fittingness and proportionality.17  Being prone to feel a 
reasonable amount of fear in objectively fearful (i.e., fitting) situations, if we presume that there 
is such a category, would not be maladaptive.  But a general proneness to feel fear or to feel too 
much fear, even in situations that may not be objectively fearful, would be maladaptive.  
Measurements such as those of shame-proneness using the TOSCA, then, might be thought to 
tap into a tendency to feel unfitting or disproportionate shame.18 
There is, however, a counterexample to this objection.  Guilt is a negatively-valenced emotion, 
but guilt-proneness—including as measured by the TOSCA, using exactly the same scenarios 
                                                 
17 I discuss fittingness further in Section 2.5.3. 
18 For Tangney’s views on issues surrounding the measurement of shame, see Tangney (1996). 
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and study populations—has not been found to have negative effects.  Evidence to support this 
conclusion has been presented above (see also reviews such as Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 
2007).  Thus, it does not appear to be true that all negatively-valenced trait-level emotions are 
maladaptive. 
It is difficult to know for certain if measures like the TOSCA are tapping propensities to feel 
emotions like shame disproportionately or in unfitting circumstances.  The scenarios that the 
TOSCA uses are often ambiguous (by design) as to the underlying responsibility for a 
transgression (for example, there are numerous reasons why a ball you have thrown could hit 
somebody in the face), and some scenarios do not even feature a clear transgression (for 
example, putting off a difficult phone call for a few days, or having a friend’s spouse find one 
attractive).  Crucially, if the TOSCA measured unfitting or disproportionate shame, it would also 
pick up on unfitting or disproportionate guilt.  Thus, it is challenging to explain why being prone 
to feeling guilt disproportionately or in unfitting situations would be adaptive, whereas being 
prone to feeling shame disproportionately or in unfitting situations would not be.19  Furthermore, 
as I will discuss in the following section, meta-analyses that included research using a variety of 
measures of shame-proneness have substantiated findings of maladaptiveness.20  Thus, the 
findings on shame-proneness cannot be dismissed as inevitable or uninteresting. 
2.5.2 The Presentation Above is Contaminated by Confirmation Bias 
One might be concerned that the evidence presented above on shame and shame-proneness is not 
                                                 
19 Some authors (e.g., Rodogno, 2008; see also Fontaine et al., 2001) object that the very characterization of shame 
biases one towards finding maladaptive effects.  The state of shame, however, has positive effects, so it is unlikely 
that the characterization is overly biased.  Furthermore, the characterization is widely accepted as analytically and 
empirically adequate (see Chapter 1). 
20 A newer scale of shame-proneness, the GASP scale, seems to produce evidence in line with the TOSCA, although 
the sample of research using the GASP is much too small to draw firm conclusions (Cohen et al., 2011).  Also recall 
Heaven, Ciarrochi, and Leeson’s (2009) research using the PANAS-X (see Section 2.2.5). 
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truly representative of either domain, due to confirmation bias.  Empirical research has shown 
that people tend to seek out evidence that confirms their views, while not seeking out (or 
ignoring) evidence that contradicts it (for a review, see Nickerson, 1998).  In particular, is there 
research on the positive effects of shame-proneness that I have overlooked or failed to present? 
To begin with, even researchers who disagree with the portrayal of shame as a negative emotion 
admit that the research on shame-proneness establishes its negative effects: 
Shame-proneness is the general tendency of an individual to experience shame (Tangney, 
1990).  [Research on shame-proneness] convincingly shows that people who are likely to 
experience shame, or who experience shame very frequently, are also prone to feelings of 
inferiority, anxiety, lessened empathy, shyness, interpersonal distrust, and depression 
(Gilbert et al., 1994; Harder et al., 1992; Tangney and Dearing, 2002).  However, it is not 
at all clear that these findings of shame-proneness as a trait can be generalized to 
experiences of the emotion shame as a state.  (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 
2008) 
More importantly, however, in situations such as this, experimenters turn to two things to 
establish trends in research:  replications and meta-analyses.  We are at the point in research on 
shame-proneness where findings are being replicated in different populations and under different 
circumstances.  The new evidence presented above, for example, can be considered to be a 
replication of findings that originally came from young adult populations, typically “normal” 
undergraduates.  That the same findings emerge under slightly different conditions strengthens 
those findings, even if the condition in question is as seemingly innocuous as being conducted at 
a different laboratory under a different investigator. 
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In addition, three recent meta-analyses support the preliminary conclusion stated above.  First, 
Leach and Cidam (2015) performed a meta-analysis on studies of episodic shame, looking for 
evidence of when the state of feeling shame led to what they term a “constructive approach” (p. 
984) to the transgression and towards others (e.g., by making amends).  The authors 
hypothesized that mixed results in the literature could be due to variability in the ease with which 
transgressors could repair the damage they had done.  When it is difficult to repair the situation 
or one’s image, then shame fails to motivate constructive approaches to reparation.  When repair 
of the situation or of one’s image is easy, shame can indeed motivate us to repair.  The authors 
found good evidence for this hypothesis across a number of studies.  It appears that the state of 
shame can have prosocial effects in some circumstances. 
Second, Kim, Thibodeau, and Jorgensen (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of findings related to 
shame, guilt, and depression.  The authors included almost 250 experimental findings in their 
analysis, and came to the general conclusion that “Shame showed significantly stronger 
associations with depressive symptoms (r = .43) than guilt (r = .28)” (p. 68).  Thus, shame does 
appear to be particularly related with at least depression, and likely with other mental disorders 
as well. 
Finally, with respect to shame-proneness, Tignor and Colvin (2016, January 25) recently 
conducted a meta-analysis on shame-proneness and prosocial behavior.  The authors found that 
shame-proneness is negatively correlated with prosocial behavior.  This is strong confirmation of 
the preliminary conclusion stated above, especially as it relates to the society-level conclusion 
that becoming a shame culture would be beneficial for us, overall, as a society.  All-in-all, given 
the substantial number of replications and the recent emergence of meta-analyses, the concern 
about confirmation bias is unsubstantiated. 
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2.5.3 We Ought to Feel Shame if it is Fitting 
Lastly, one might object by claiming that if it is fitting to feel or cultivate shame, then we ought 
to feel or cultivate it, which is in conflict with the preliminary conclusion drawn here.  Suppose 
that one has a vicious character and engages in a pattern of transgressions.  This person, it seems, 
ought to tend to feel ashamed.  This suggests, given the preliminary conclusion, that we both 
ought to and ought not to cultivate shame, which certainly appears contradictory. 
There is, however, more than one sense of “ought” In the previous sentence.  In one sense, it is 
the ought of fittingness (see D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000).  In another sense, it is the ought of 
prudence or instrumental value.  John Heil (1983) provides a good example in “Believing What 
One Ought,” even if it is from the epistemic instead of emotional domain: 
 Sally and Bert have been happily married for fifteen years and have every reason 
to look forward to continuing connubial bliss.  One day, however, Sally notices a long 
blonde hair on Bert’s coat.  On a later occasion she discovers in the same coat a lipstick-
stained handkerchief and a matchbook from an intimate French restaurant that she has 
never visited.  These, together with certain other bits of evidence, seem plainly to warrant 
the conclusion that Bert has been seeing another woman. 
 Sally, however, while appreciating the import of the evidence against Bert, 
believes passionately in her marriage.  It is, she thinks, worth preserving even if the cost 
is high.  Further, Sally recognizes that she is the sort of person who cannot easily conceal 
suspicions.  If she were genuinely to believe that Bert might be unfaithful, she would 
come to treat him with coolness and indifference, and the marriage, already teetering, 
would not survive.  Because this prospect is unacceptable to Sally, she decides to believe, 
despite a mounting tide of evidence to the contrary, that Bert is not seeing another 
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woman.  (pp. 752-753) 
Heil argues that for Sally, it is reasonable for her to believe that her husband is not having an 
affair.  “There is... something oddly unsettling,” he writes, “about the notion that it is in every 
case most reasonable, all things considered, to believe on the evidence, to do so even when such 
belief may issue in tragedy or worse” (p. 753).  He continues, 
 Reasonable belief, like reasonable action, is most naturally regarded as the result 
of an agent’s practical reasoning.  Such reasoning takes into account levels of epistemic 
warrant, but it takes into account, as well, an agent’s nonepistemic interests.  Where these 
interests are regarded as being best served by adopting beliefs solely on the basis of 
epistemic considerations, such beliefs are, for that agent, reasonable.  If, in contrast, an 
agent’s practical interests outweigh epistemic claims, then beliefs based on the latter 
cease to be reasonable for that agent.  (pp. 753-754) 
A similar analysis can be given for emotion.  We can continue Heil’s (1983) example by noting 
that it would be fitting for Sally to feel angry with Bert.  But recognizing that the anger would 
likely result in a broken marriage, she might bring herself to remain calm through whatever 
means she can.  This example illustrates that fittingness is not the only evaluation that goes into 
an assessment of whether one ought to feel an emotion.  The upshot is that it is not always true, 
in an all-things-considered sense, that we ought to feel an emotion if it is fitting to do so. 
2.6 Conclusion 
I believe that all of the empirical evidence reviewed above and more besides points to an answer 
to the normative problem of shame:  Shame can be a good and fitting thing, but we ought not 
cultivate it, for to do so would be to make people more prone to feeling shame, which is 
counterproductive at both an individual and social level.  This is, admittedly, a very general 
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answer.  There is work to be done in translating it into specific arguments and recommendations 
about the role of shame in morality.  Thus, in the remaining 3 chapters of the dissertation, I 
explore the implications of the above answer to the normative problem of shame. 
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Part II:  Implications for Ethics 
What are the implications for ethics of the conclusion that being prone to feel shame benefits 
neither individuals nor society?  Do philosophers or other academics advocate for shame having 
an important role in our lives?  Do the empirical findings on shame-proneness really bear on 
specific proposals concerning the role of shame?  Part II explores these questions to flesh-out the 
answer to the normative problem of shame presented in Part I.
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Chapter 3:  An Empirically-Based Argument 
Against the Deterrent Effects of 
Institutionalized Shame Penalties 
Can we shame our way to a better society?  Would the threat of shame deter criminals from 
reoffending and promote prosocial behavior?  Does this form of punishment have advantages 
over more traditional options, such as incarceration and fines?  The answer to all of these 
questions, many think, is yes.  In recent years, judges (for examples, see Brooks, 2014; Morrison, 
2014, May 24; Goldman, 2015), legal scholars (e.g., Kahan & Posner, 1999; Book, 1999; 
Brooks, 2008; Moskos in Simon, Moskos, & Turley, 2013, August 24; Coontz, 2015), and other 
academics (e.g., Etzioni, 2001; Jacquet, 2015) have shown a renewed interest in 
institutionalizing shame punishments or penalties.1 
One of the primary arguments given in favor of reintroducing shame penalties is that they have a 
special deterrent effect.  In a narrow sense, they deter convicted criminals who receive the 
sentence from reoffending.  In a wider sense, they help prevent the general population from 
committing crimes, and instead promote legal and ethical behavior.  These deterrent effects are 
thought to stem from the expressiveness of shame penalties.  Being imprisoned or paying a fine 
are relatively anonymous punishments.  They do not expose one to the moral disapproval and 
anger of a large number of one’s peers, like shame penalties do.  This painful exposure of one’s 
transgressions and character, or the threat of such exposure, is thought to be a particularly 
compelling motivation to comply with the law.  When combining the expressive and deterrent 
                                                 
1 I understand shame punishment to be a broader category than shame penalty, wherein a shame penalty must be 
imposed through a legal process by the state. 
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properties of shame punishments with other considerations, such as their cost-effectiveness, it is 
easy to see why judges, legal scholars, and others see them as an attractive type of sentence. 
As long as shame penalties are believed to have special deterrent properties, it is likely that 
interest in institutionalizing this form of legal punishment will continue.  Most theories of 
punishment recognize the importance of deterrence.  Certainly, for non-retributivist or utilitarian-
style theories, deterrence is characteristically of central importance.2  Even some forms of 
retributivist theory acknowledge the importance of deterrence.  If reform is what an offender 
deserves, then deterrence is good indicator of whether that reform is occurring.  In any case, it is 
only very rarely that an author argues, for example, for a purely expressivist theory of 
punishment (see, e.g., von Hirsch, 1976; Duff, 2003; Glasgow, 2015).  Most theorists and legal 
scholars recognize that there are multiple factors that enter into an evaluation of a type of 
punishment, such as whether it fulfills retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, reintegrative, and/or 
expressive functions. 
In this paper, I will argue that based on empirical evidence, we ought not expect institutionalized 
shame penalties to have a deterrent effect, either narrow or wide.  In fact, the opposite is true:  
We should expect a negative change in ethical and legal compliance, in the general population in 
particular, were we to institutionalize shame penalties.  This is a significant blow to those who 
argue in favor of institutionalizing shame penalties.  The deterrent properties of shame penalties 
are often taken for granted.  If proponents cannot make this assumption, then the case for 
institutionalizing shame penalties becomes much more difficult to make. 
                                                 
2 For a brief overview of theories of punishment, see Ellis (2014). 
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In Section 3.1, I will characterize shame and shame penalties, and I will introduce proposals to 
institutionalize shame penalties.  In Section 3.2, I will argue that there are currently no adequate 
empirically-based arguments against the deterrent effects of institutionalized shame penalties.  In 
Section 3.3, I will present recent empirical evidence on the propensity to feel shame both in the 
general population and in convicted criminals, and I will argue that this evidence supports the 
hypothesis that institutionalized shame penalties do not have the expected deterrent effects.  In 
fact, the evidence suggests that institutionalizing shame penalties would if anything make people 
less prosocial.  Finally, in Section 3.4, I will present an all-things-considered assessment of 
institutionalized shame penalties, given that the main argument presented in this paper only 
focuses on their deterrent effects.  I will contend that although institutionalized shame penalties 
are undeniably expressive, they are not a viable option as a legal penalty. 
3.1 Shame, Shame Penalties, and Proposals to 
Institutionalize Shame Penalties 
Two teenagers walk through their community, leading a donkey, with a placard that says “Sorry 
for the Jackass Offense.”  A judge orders a man to sleep in a doghouse for an entire month.  
Adolescents wear signs declaring “I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL” (Turley, 2005, September 
18).  These are all good examples of shame penalties.  What, however, links them all together?  
With a characterization of shame in hand, I will explain why all of these examples count as 
shame penalties, and why some defend the idea that we ought to institutionalize them. 
3.1.1 What is Shame? 
To understand shame penalties, it helps first to understand the character of shame.3  According to 
Nussbaum (2004) and many contemporary authors, shame is the painful feeling that one’s being 
                                                 
3 For a more complete characterization, see Chapter 1. 
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has been exposed, or is apt to be exposed, as weak or defective or deficient in some way.4  
Nussbaum writes, “shame involves the realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way 
in which one expects oneself to be adequate” (p. 183).  Shame hits at one’s core, and makes one 
feel small and helpless.  The action tendencies associated with shame are covering up and hiding:  
“Its reflex is to hide from the eyes of those who will see one’s deficiency, to cover it” 
(Nussbaum, 2004, p. 183).  To feel exposed as a liar, for example, is to feel shame. But to feel 
bad about telling lie, in contrast, is to feel guilt.  Guilt does not strike at one’s core in the same 
way as shame does—one does not feel as if one’s self or character has been exposed.  Thus, 
Nussbaum clarifies that “whereas shame focuses on defect or imperfection, and thus on some 
aspect of the very being of the person who feels it, guilt focuses on an action (or a wish to act), 
but need not extend to the entirety of the agent” (p. 207). 
The exposure associated with shame appears to be related to an audience, although it does not 
require one.5  Thus, one can feel shame without others knowing about a weakness or character 
flaw, as long as one feels apt for exposure; private shame is possible (Tangney, 1992).  
Nevertheless, when we undergo shame, we tend to have thoughts about what others are thinking 
of us, at least more so than we do when we undergo guilt (Tangney et al., 1996).  Thus, there is 
something right about Sartre’s (2003/1943) noted example of a man looking through a keyhole, 
who suddenly feels ashamed (and exposed) when hearing approaching footsteps and becoming 
the object of attention for another.  Other people do seem to feature in the experience of shame, 
although it would be a mistake to think that publicity were an essential feature of the emotion. 
                                                 
4 I focus on Nussbaum’s (2004) characterization for expository purposes, as I discuss her arguments against shame 
penalties later in the paper; Nussbaum is one of the only authors to offer an empirically-based argument against 
shame penalties and their purported deterrent effects.  Many other philosophers agree with Nussbaum’s general 
characterization, including, among others, Bernard Williams (2008/1993), Larry May (1996), and Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (2005). 
5 Bernard Williams’s (2008/1993) analysis of shame, and in particular his defense of shame against the Kantian 
claim that it is a heteronomous emotion, is particularly illuminating on this point. 
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3.1.2 What are Shame Penalties? 
Shame penalties are legal punishments, administered by the state, which are designed to induce a 
sense of exposure and a sense that one has failed as a person in some way.  They are generally 
designed so that the person being punished cannot hide from a disapproving audience—to ensure 
a sense of exposure—and so that the person feels small, inadequate, or helpless—to ensure a 
sense of failure as a person.  Perhaps the paradigmatic form of shame penalty in modern times is 
ordering a convicted criminal to stand in a public place with a sign that references one’s 
transgression.  In a case that will not gain more publicity by being presented here, for example, a 
woman was sentenced to stand for two mornings on a corner, holding a sign that read, “Only an 
idiot would drive on the sidewalk to avoid a school bus.”  Her punishment was broadcast by 
local TV stations and picked up by national news (Muskal, 2012, November 13).  The penalty 
was clearly designed both to expose her to public disdain and to affect her as a person, as the 
sign explicitly questioned her intelligence. 
In perhaps the best publicized case, since it was addressed by the Supreme Court, Shawn 
Gementera was sentenced—along with 2 months’ incarceration (the mandatory minimum), 
among other things—to stand outside a San Francisco post office for 8 hours, wearing a sign that 
read, “I stole mail.  This is my punishment” (Turley, 2005, September 18).6  Gementera’s 
punishment was clearly meant to expose him to the public.  One could argue, however, that it 
was not meant to denounce his character, given the content of the sign, which only referenced an 
                                                 
6 A summary of the Supreme Court filing is available at https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/gementera-v-united-
states-opposition (accessed March 19, 2016).  Gementera’s lawyers argued in part that their client’s punishment was 
cruel and unusual, an affront to his human dignity.  The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the lower court’s 
decision.  In fact, the lower court noted that the punishment served a crucial expressive function:  Gementera was 
forced to confront potential victims of his crime, users of the US Postal Service. See 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/379/596/475040/ (accessed March 19, 2016) for a summary 
of the case in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Gementera was arrested with stolen mail a month after 
serving his shame penalty (Harden, 2012). 
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action.  It seems reasonable to consider this a shame penalty, however, because of the way it 
implicitly invited the public to judge Gementera’s character.  Gementera’s punishment was not 
standing and holding a sign per se, it was facing the judgement and disapproval of passing 
citizens.  His sign invited those citizens to punish him, and we can assume that those citizens 
knew what the invitation meant.  It meant that they should see Gementera with a special scorn, as 
a person bad enough to be served with this unusual sort of legal penalty.  Thus, I believe that 
Gementera’s penalty is a reasonable example of a shame penalty. 
An offshoot of the paradigmatic shame penalty, sign holding, is the sort of Scarlet Letter penalty 
that would require convicted drunk drivers to have special license plates on their cars.  Ohio 
requires those convicted of drunk driving to use bright yellow license plates with red numbers in 
certain circumstances (Drew, 2003, October 5).  One might argue that these license plates serve a 
function for fellow drivers who see the plates, as those drivers know to take special care around 
these cars.  Special license plates, however, are also clearly an invitation to stigmatize 
individuals, to mark them off as deficient beings.  Thus, Scarlet Letter penalties are another good 
example of shame penalties, as they seek to expose and debase. 
All of the shame penalties discussed above involve securing the in-person gaze of others.  
Sometimes, however, penalties such as having to sleep in the woods or to live in slums are cited 
as shame penalties (Morrison, 2014, May 24).  Although some have disputed this 
characterization (including Nussbaum herself), I believe that these punishments are indeed 
shame penalties, given that they are clearly designed both to gain publicity and to dehumanize 
the convicted individual.  The aim of such punishments is to extend them further than merely the 
uncomfortable time spent in less-than-human living conditions.  The aim is to have media cover 
the sensational punishments and the convicted individuals, so that the community can express 
99 
 
their disapproval and scorn.  Thus, they are designed to secure exposure.  And clearly, the 
penalties in question are designed to make the offenders feel less than human—not worthy of 
decent living conditions. 
It might help to contrast shame penalties with more common forms of punishment in Western 
societies, such as receiving jail time, doing community service, or paying fines.  Although each 
of these forms of punishment can have the effect of exposing and demeaning individuals, that is 
neither their intent nor arguably their primary effect.  Publicity can accompany a jail sentence, 
for example, but the point of the sentence is not to notify the community of a transgression, 
invite them to participate in punishment, or to dehumanize the offender.  Community service 
does indeed expose an individual to the gaze of community members (at least to some extent), 
but it is not designed to invite those members into the punishment or to induce a sense of a failed 
or damaged self—in fact, quite the opposite.  And fines are generally paid without publicity, and 
generally do not stigmatize an individual.  Again, intent and considerations of a penalty’s 
primary effect can be important.  Some of these punishments will dehumanize and publicize, but 
that is neither their intent nor a primary effect, so they do not qualify as shame penalties. 
In summary, shame penalties are legal penalties, administered by the state, that are designed to 
expose a transgressor to the gaze of individuals in the community, and to make the transgressor 
see him or herself as having deficient identity or character. 
3.1.3 Proposals to Institutionalize Shame Penalties 
The focus of this paper is not on individual instances of judges assigning shame penalties.  I will 
not, for example, argue that Gementera’s penalty was ill-advised.  Perhaps in this exceptional 
instance, the judge was correct in thinking that a shame penalty was justified and prudent.  
Rather, the focus of this paper is on proposals to institutionalize shame penalties.  To give an 
100 
 
example, the most influential proposal to institutionalize shame penalties comes from Kahan and 
Posner’s (1999) article entitled “Shaming White-Collar Criminals:  A Proposal for Reform of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”  The authors argue that institutionalized shame penalties for 
white-collar crimes like embezzlement or tax evasion are “an economically efficient and 
politically viable sanction” (p. 367).  Another good example of an institutionalized shame 
penalty, which has been noted above, is requiring DUI offenders who meet certain criteria to use 
a special license plate on their cars (Drew, 2003, October 5).  These are the sorts of proposals for 
institutionalizing shame penalties that are the target of this paper. 
Several of the arguments that proponents of institutionalized shame penalties offer have been 
noted above.  First, proponents favor these penalties because they serve a crucial expressive 
function.  In Kahan’s (1996) seminal paper “What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?”, he argues 
that the “political unacceptability of alternative sanctions… reflects their inadequacy along the 
expressive dimension of punishment.  The public rejects the alternative not because they 
perceive that these punishments won’t work or aren’t severe enough, but because they fail to 
express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment” (p. 592).7  Kahan 
favors shame penalties precisely because they allow the public forcefully to express their moral 
condemnation.  This makes shame penalties satisfy one function of legal penalties, which is to 
communicate to an offender that a transgression of the law or community norms is unacceptable. 
Second, building on the expressiveness of institutionalized shame penalties, proponents argue 
that they are particularly good at deterring criminal behavior.  Kahan and Posner (1999), for 
example, view shame penalties as particularly deterrent because of the damage that they do to the 
                                                 
7 The alternative sanctions to which Kahan refers do not include shame penalties, but more traditional alternative 
sanctions such as community service. 
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offender’s reputation.  For one thing, because of the expressiveness of shame penalties, others in 
the community know that the offender has character flaws, and should not be trusted.  Part of 
their deterrent effect, then, is a form of incapacitance (as might be achieved through 
incarceration).  Another part of the deterrent effect, of course, is the psychological pain of shame 
and stigmatization.  This is a direct effect of the expressive nature of shame penalties, as 
criminals are painfully exposed to the moral condemnation of their community.  But the 
deterrent effects are even wider than this.  The expressiveness of shame penalties also results in a 
deterrent effect for those who witness the penalties and see how undesirable and humiliating they 
are.  Thus, shame penalties reinforce norms both in convicted criminals and in community 
members. 
Third, proponents argue that shame penalties are cost-effective in comparison with other forms 
of sentence, especially imprisonment (Kahan & Posner, 1999; Book, 1999; Moskos in Simon, 
Moskos, & Turley, 2013, August 24).  The costliness of imprisonment as an institutionalized 
legal penalty is well known (see, e.g., Schmitt, Warner, & Gupta, 2010, June).  This is a strong 
incentive to find effective alternative sentences, and shame penalties are thought to be a good 
option.  Typical shame penalties cost very little to implement, certainly much less than 
incarceration.  Having an offender purchase an add in a local newspaper or hold a sign on a 
corner pales in comparison to housing, feeding, and policing an inmate.  If shame penalties 
function just as well as incarceration but for less money, it is another reason to institutionalize 
them. 
Finally, Whitman (1998), although not a proponent of shame penalties per se, calls them 
“beautifully retributive” (p. 1062), and the slogan has stuck.  Shame penalties often have an eye-
for-an-eye quality, like sentencing someone who abandoned kittens in a forest to sleep outdoors 
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in the forest for a night (Morrison, 2014, May 24).  Thus, they are thought to satisfy the 
retributive function of legal punishments particularly well. 
These four arguments do not carry equal weight.  Authors often take it for granted that shame 
penalties have special deterrent properties.  This assumption forms the starting point for an 
argument in their favor that cites other advantages such as their cost-effectiveness or retributive 
qualities.  A New York Times opinion article, for example, states that “Shaming is clearly useful 
for minor offenses, particularly those involving juveniles” (The New York Times, 1997, January 
20).  The usefulness in question is usefulness in deterring juveniles from future criminal activity.  
This is not to say that the other arguments in favor of institutionalized shame penalties carry no 
weight.  The expressiveness of shame penalties in particular is often cited as a primary reason to 
favor them, but even then, one of the reasons expressiveness is thought to be important is that it 
ultimately results in deterrence.  In any case, it should be clear that an argument that targets the 
purported deterrent properties of shame penalties has the opportunity to be a particularly 
effective part of a case against institutionalizing shame penalties. 
3.2 Existing Empirically-Based Arguments 
There are several ways in which authors appeal to empirical evidence in attempts to argue 
against the deterrent effects of institutionalized shame penalties.  These include focusing on 
research that investigates the state of shame (as opposed to shame as a trait), focusing on the 
development of shame, and focusing on research on the real-world outcomes of institutionalized 
shame penalties.  None of these arguments, however, amounts to a successful empirically-based 
argument against the deterrent properties of institutionalized shame penalties. 
103 
 
3.2.1 The Negative Effects of the State of Shame 
Some scholars warn that feeling ashamed (i.e., the state of shame) often leads to reactive anger 
and aggression (e.g., Scheff & Retzinger, 2001/1991; Gilligan, 1997).  Scheff and Retzinger, for 
example, study shame in interpersonal conflict.  They document what they term shame-rage 
spirals.  One party in a conflict feels belittled and ashamed, which causes that party to lash out at 
the other party, which causes the other party to feel belittled and ashamed, and so the spiral 
starts.  If the state of shame tends to have these sorts of effects, then it would not be good to 
institutionalize shame penalties.  Causing an offender to feel shame would tend to lead to lashing 
out at others, rather than compliance with the law. 
It is difficult to argue against the deterrent effects of institutionalizing shame penalties, however, 
by focusing on the consequences of the state of shame.  Although there may be studies 
documenting negative effects, there are conflicting studies showing that feeling shame can spur 
reintegration attempts and deter unwanted behavior.  de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg 
(2008), for example, hypothesized that feeling shame would have a positive effect on behavior 
when the shame was directly related to a decision one was facing (but that it would not 
necessarily have such an effect for unrelated decisions).  Thus, feeling ashamed after a 
transgression because of how you treated an individual ought to improve a follow-up interaction 
with that individual or with others aware of or related to the transgression (but not necessarily 
improve an interaction with an unrelated person who was unaware of the transgression).  
Furthermore, the authors predicted that this relationship should be most detectable in people who 
aren’t already generally motivated to act prosocially. 
To investigate their hypotheses, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) conducted a 
series of experiments.  To give an example, in Experiment 3, the authors invited a group of 
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students into a room and seated them at computers.  The students then each took two mock 
intelligence tests.  The “results” of these tests were shown to everybody in the group.  
Participants in one condition of the experiment were led to believe that they received a poor 
score, while the others in the group did well.  Participants in the other condition were led to 
believe that they received an adequate score, which was comparable to the scores received by the 
others.  Next, participants played an economic game with either a member of their group, or an 
outsider who had no knowledge of the IQ scores.  In the game, each participant has 10 coins that 
are worth half as much to themselves as to the other.  Each participant can choose to keep the 
coins or to give some to the other participant.  The number of coins handed over is a measure of 
prosocial behavior.  Among participants who tend towards selfish behavior, playing with another 
who knew about the low IQ score was a significant predictor of increased prosocial behavior—of 
handing over more coins, presumably in an effort to restore esteem.  A manipulation check 
verified that these participants were feeling an increase in shame. 
Perhaps even more to the point, in “When Cheating Makes You a Cheater:  Implicating the Self 
Prevents Unethical Behavior,” Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) conducted an elegant series of 
experiments to show that wording that emphasizes the self can promote prosocial actions.  In 
Experiment 1, for example, the authors approached 51 undergraduate students (one student was 
excluded from analyses, however, for not being a native English speaker).  After agreeing to 
participate in the study, the authors read each student one version of the following script: 
We’re interested in how common [cheating is/cheaters are] on college campuses.  We’re 
going to play a game in which we will be able to determine the approximate [rate of 
cheating/number of cheaters] in the group as a whole but it will be impossible for us to 
know whether you’re [cheating/a cheater].  (p. 1002) 
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Each participant then was asked to think of a number between 1 and 10.  Once the participant 
had a number in mind, the researchers instructed the participant that they would receive $5 if 
they thought of an even number, but nothing if they thought of an odd number.  Participants 
revealed their numbers and were paid accordingly. 
Surprisingly, when asked to think of a number between 1 and 10, a large majority of people think 
of odd numbers (Kubovy & Psotka, 1976).  Leveraging this fact, Bryan, Adams, and Monin 
(2013) found that 13 of 26 participants (50%) in the cheating condition reported thinking of an 
even number, whereas just 5 of 24 participants (just over 20%) in the cheater condition did.  In a 
follow up study with no script or monetary incentive, only 5 of 26 participants (just under 20%) 
reported thinking of an even number.  Thus, it would appear that the cheater condition was very 
effective at making participants honest.  Although the authors did not explicitly investigate 
shame (for example, by administering follow-up questionnaires as a manipulation check), it is 
likely that the anticipation of shame played a role motivating honest behavior, given the intimate 
connection between shame and appraisals of the self. 
Leach and Cidam (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of studies of what they call episodic shame, 
to distinguish it from the disposition to feel shame.  They set out to try to explain an apparent 
contradiction:  Although we think of shame as a moral emotion that can motivate fixing a failure, 
there is a trend in psychology to see shame as a negative emotion that motivates avoiding fixing 
failures.  The authors hypothesized that reparability is a crucial variable that can help explain 
when episodic shame is positive or negative.  In fact, through their meta-analysis, the authors 
found that reparability was key.  When it was easy to repair failures, episodic shame motivated 
approach tendencies and reparative action.  But when it was more difficult to repair failures, 
episodic shame was negatively associated with approach and fixing failures. 
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The recent empirical literature demonstrates that in some situations, the state of shame can have 
prosocial outcomes.  Given this mixed evidence, one cannot mount an evidence-based argument 
against the deterrent effects of institutionalized shame penalties by focusing on research on the 
state of shame. 
3.2.2 Nussbaum’s Argument 
Nussbaum (2004) attempts to strengthen arguments that stem from empirical research on the 
state of shame by defending a developmental account of shame.  She bases this account on 
psychoanalytic theory, and, in particular, on what is known as object-relations theory.8  
According to her account, shame develops during infancy—in fact, over the first year of life—
and is closely linked with infantile narcissism.  The needs of fetuses are constantly met, and 
young infants still desire whole and complete comfort.  They are unaware of the wants and needs 
of others, and demand that their needs be met on cue.  Everything seems made for them and their 
comfort.  All infants know, then, is fulfillment on the one hand, and on the other hand the sense 
of weakness and powerlessness when their narcissistic desires are frustrated.  As infants begin to 
develop their senses of self, this feeling of weakness or powerlessness is what Nussbaum 
identifies as primitive shame, or what I will simply refer to below as shame.9  Nussbaum 
summarizes, 
When an infant realizes that it is dependent on others, and is by this time aware of itself 
as a definite being who is and ought to be the center of the world, we can therefore expect 
a primitive and rudimentary emotion of shame to ensue.  For shame involves the 
                                                 
8 Key authors in the object-relations tradition include Donald Winnicott, W.R.D. Fairbairn, and Otto Kernberg, 
among others. 
9 Nussbaum (2004) identifies this as primitive shame, because she recognizes a more mature and beneficial form of 
shame.  However, mature shame is such a small and narrow category that it seems appropriate for expository 
purposes to use the term shame without the qualifier primitive, with the understanding that Nussbaum marks off a 
small category of shame to which her argument does not apply. 
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realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects oneself to 
be adequate.  (p. 183) 
Nussbaum (2004) argues that as children age past infancy into toddlerhood and beyond, a critical 
developmental milestone is coming to terms with the world of objects, including other people.  If 
development goes as planned, children will come to see themselves as one person among many, 
whose needs are interdependent.  By constructing what Nussbaum (2004), following Winnicott, 
calls a “facilitating environment,” parents can help their children develop “mature 
interdependence” (p. 223).  This involves bringing the child to recognize their humanness and 
messiness, and to accept their inherent flaws.  It involves letting the child know that their needs 
will be met, so that they can develop trust and explore the world.  If this process goes awry, 
however, children can remain overly narcissistic and prone to feeling shame when their needs go 
unfulfilled.  Nussbaum reminds us, “It is only because one expects oneself to have worth or even 
perfection in some respect that one will shrink from or cover the evidence of one’s nonworth or 
imperfection” (p. 184).  According to Nussbaum, however, even those who have developed 
mature interdependence can lapse into infantile narcissism and shame—it is always a threat.  She 
writes, “the primitive shame that is connected to infantile omnipotence and (inevitable) 
narcissistic failure lurks around in our lives, only partially overcome by the later development of 
the child’s own separateness and autonomy” (p. 185). 
Certain reactions are common from people who are prone experiencing shame, given shame’s 
close links with frustrated infantile narcissism.  One reaction is anger and rage directed towards 
others.  Just as young children often become enraged at others when they do not meet their needs 
or demands, older children and adults often turn outwards in anger when experiencing shame, 
inappropriately blaming others.  “We can already see,” Nussbaum (2004) writes, “that this 
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primitive shame is closely connected to aggressive wishes toward those people who fail to 
minister to the infant’s needs; thus we can look down the road to see that some difficulties for 
social interactions may arise if primitive shame is not adequately dealt with” (p. 186).  
Depression is another common reaction, when one becomes overcome with the sense of 
helplessness, smallness, and worthlessness.  Nussbaum writes, “The shame person feels a 
pervasive sense of inadequacy, and no clear steps suggest themselves to remove that inadequacy.  
The tendency may often be simply to retreat and shut down” (p. 209), resulting in a dive into 
depression.10 
In summary, Nussbaum (2004) follows Freud and later psychoanalysts in locating the roots of 
shame in infancy.  Infants are narcissistic beings, and shame is the emotion they feel when they 
are faced with limits to their power.  To overcome narcissism, infants must have stable, 
consistent care from their caretakers.  If this developmental process is disrupted, individuals will 
be particularly prone to feeling shame.  This can lead to reactive anger and aggression and to 
depression. 
Nussbaum (2004) argues that her developmental account of shame adds force to previous 
empirically-based arguments, including the argument against the deterrent effects of shame 
                                                 
10 The final step of Nussbaum’s (2004) developmental account, which is critical in other of her arguments against 
shame penalties, links primitive narcissism and shame to practices of shaming and stigmatizing others.  By 
stigmatizing others and groups who are different in some way, one can make oneself feel whole, perfect, and 
complete.  In fact, Nussbaum speculates that all attempts to shame and stigmatize others stem from one’s own 
unresolved, pathological narcissism: 
 I believe the use of the category “normal” to stigmatize deviant behavior should be understood as 
the outgrowth of the primitive shame that to some degree affects us all.  Because we are all aware that there 
are many ways in which we fail to measure up to the exorbitant demand of infancy for complete control 
over the sources of good, because we retain our nostalgic longing for the bliss of infantile oneness with the 
womb or the breast, we need a surrogate kind of safety of completeness.  And those who call themselves 
“normals” find this safety in the idea of a group that is both widespread, surrounding them on all sides, and 
good, lacking in nothing.  By defining a certain sort of person as complete and good, and by surrounding 
themselves with such people, normals gain comfort and the illusion of safety.  The idea of normalcy is like 
a surrogate womb, blotting out intrusive stimuli from the world of difference. 
 But of course, this stratagem requires stigmatizing some other group of persons.  (pp. 218-219) 
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penalties that stems from research on the state of shame.11  In particular, Nussbaum uses her 
account to substantiate findings associating shame with anger and aggression.  For Nussbaum, it 
is no accident that feeling ashamed of oneself often leads to anger and lashing out.  Shame is an 
infantile response, and in infants and young children leads to these negative effects.  Thus, there 
is a developmental mechanism that links shame to anger and aggression.  It would be very 
difficult to break this link and disassociate shame from its negative effects.  This is a strong 
empirically-based reason, according to Nussbaum, to avoid institutionalizing shame penalties.  
One cannot argue, for instance, that there is a way to break the link between shaming an offender 
and making it more likely that the offender will blame others and become angry and possibly 
aggressive.  Those responses are deeply intertwined with the experience of shame. 
The difficulty with Nussbaum’s (2004) empirically-based argument, however, is the questionable 
firmness of its psychoanalytic base.12  One common worry about psychoanalytic theories, for 
instance, is that their theoretical apparatus tends to outpace the empirical evidence that would 
warrant it.13  An example of a concern in this domain is that psychoanalytic theories tend to over-
attribute mental states, including complex mental states, to very young children.  This is true of 
Nussbaum’s (2004) account:  She attributes a complex emotional state, shame, to children 
beginning at a very young age (starting around 6 months, and definitely by 1 year).  Attributions 
of shame to young children are coupled with complex attributions of recognition of being weak 
or deficient.  These judgments seem overly sophisticated for infants.  Furthermore, Nussbaum 
draws much of her evidence from clinical reports.  That is not to say that there is no experimental 
                                                 
11 Nussbaum (2004) actually identifies 5 arguments against shame penalties, including the argument against 
deterrent effects, and argues that her developmental account strengthens each one.  Some of the arguments she 
identifies (relating to human dignity, mob justice, and unreliability) will be discussed in Section 3.4. 
12 See Grunbaum (1985) and Eysenck (2004/1985) for critiques of psychoanalytic theories. 
13 This criticism is particularly associated with B.F. Skinner (1954), although one certainly need not adhere to 
behaviorism to see the force of the criticism. 
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evidence in favor of Nussbaum’s account.14  But some of the central theses are presented without 
supporting experimental evidence.15  And with the paradigm shifts in psychology, new evidence 
is getting harder to come by.  Thus, it is sometimes not a matter of there being evidence that 
contradicts a psychoanalytic theory, but more that there is an insufficient evidence base at all. 
I believe that the problems with Nussbaum’s (2004) developmental account undermine her 
argument against the deterrent effects shame penalties.  There are good reasons to be skeptical of 
the account, so it cannot provide good support for linking the state of shame with antisocial 
consequences.16 
3.2.3 Direct Research on the Effects of Institutionalizing Shame Penalties 
Given the interest in shame penalties and prominent claims that they are more effective at 
deterring crime than other forms of punishment, one would expect there to be a body of 
empirical literature that substantiates these claims through direct study of institutionalized shame 
penalties.  In fact, very little research has been done on shame penalties—so little, in fact, that 
this body of literature is of questionable value.17  This is understandable, given the difficulties in 
performing appropriate scientific studies of shame penalties in situ.  Governments, of course, do 
not institute policies such as special license plates for DUI offenders with an eye towards the 
                                                 
14 To give an example, there are some older papers that link pathological narcissism with shame.  See, for example, 
Gramzow and Tangney (1992). 
15 This is particularly true for the claim that attempts to define oneself as normal and complete are behind attempts 
to shame others.  Nussbaum (2004) herself admits that this is “highly conjectural” (p. 217).  And there appear to be 
counterexamples to the claim.  This might seem plausible when considering school-yard instances of shaming, but it 
should be less so when considering instances of parents shaming their children—a practice that is undoubtedly on 
the rise in America, with the aid of social media.  It is difficult to see how a parent could successfully set themselves 
up as normal in comparison to a child, when the child will (typically) share a large number of traits with the parent, 
including socioeconomic status, race, religious orientation, and so on.  There are most likely a number of reasons 
why parents resort to shaming a child, including the parent’s own history of maltreatment, and seeing shaming as a 
last resort. (Surprisingly, however, there is a dearth of research on the topic of parents shaming their children.) 
16 The emphasis on the state of shame is important.  Research on the trait of shame, or shame-proneness, 
convincingly shows the trait is associated with antisocial tendencies. 
17 There is a substantial literature on restorative justice conferences (or reintegrative shaming), but as I argue in 
Section 3.3.5, shame is not the dominant emotion evoked by such conferences. 
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methodology of science.  Thus, it is difficult to isolate the effects of such policies.  There are 
confounds of time and enforcement emphasis, among other things.  Thus, it is unlikely that good 
direct evidence is on the horizon. 
There are a small number articles that purport to address the ramifications of shame penalties 
instituted by governments, but do not discuss empirical evidence.  In “Beyond First Blush:  The 
Utility of Shame as a Master Emotion in Criminal Sentencing,” Coontz (2015) advances a theory 
of shame to explain why it is a “master emotion,” and particularly useful in a criminal setting.  
But he does not report on any studies that have demonstrated these useful qualities of shame in 
action.  Similarly, one might expect that an article subtitled “Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming 
Sanctions in Criminal Law” (Anonymous, 2003) would point to empirical studies of shame 
penalties, but this is not the case.18  The author states, instead, that few if any empirical studies of 
shame penalties have been conducted. 
Grasmick and colleagues have authored some of the only direct research on the effects of 
institutionalized shame campaigns designed to increase compliance with the law.  In “Shame and 
Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncompliance with the Law:  The Case of an Antilittering 
Campaign,” Grasmick, Bursik Jr., and Kinsey (1991) investigated the wide deterrent effects of a 
campaign in Oklahoma designed to shame people who litter.19  Using survey data, the authors 
found that shame (measured by the item “Generally, in most situations I would feel guilty if I 
were to litter the highways, streets, or a public recreation area”) was a significant predictor of a 
self-reported reluctance to litter (measured by the item “In the future, will you ever litter the 
                                                 
18 It is the practice of the Harvard Law Review to publish first-authored student work anonymously, to encourage 
publication and scholarly activity. 
19 The slogan of the campaign, “Don’t Lay that Trash on Oklahoma,” perhaps leaves something to be desired 
compared with the now famous Texas slogan “Don’t Mess with Texas.” 
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highways, streets, or a public recreation area?”).  There are, however, a number of limitations 
this research that make its applicability to shame penalties questionable.  To begin with, the 
campaign might not have succeeded in shaming citizens.  Simply calling for a stop to litter is not 
an attempt to shame, and the item the researchers used to measure shame explicitly mentions 
guilt, not shame.20  In addition, the campaign included other such efforts as handing out trash 
bags for vehicles, which constituted potential confounding variables.  The evidence did suggest, 
however, that the littering campaign worked.  As the authors reported, according to the 
Oklahoma Department of Transportation, “the number of ‘litter items’ in the state decreased by 
22.8%” (p. 238) within 1 year.  Thus, one could argue that the Grasmick and colleagues article 
does constitute at least some direct evidence for the wide deterrent effects of institutionalized 
shaming. 
Subsequently, in “Reduction of Drunk Driving as a Response to Increased Threats of Shame, 
Embarrassment, and Legal Sanctions,” Grasmick, Bursik Jr., and Arneklev (1993) investigated 
the effects of another well-known campaign—that against drunk driving.  The authors set out to 
compare the effects of the threat of legal sanctions against the threat of shame and 
embarrassment on deterring drunk driving.  The items measuring shame and embarrassment 
were the same as those described above.  Items measuring legal sanctions asked participants 
about how likely they felt it was that they would be caught if driving drunk, and how much the 
resulting punishment would affect their lives.  Finally, the items measuring drunk driving 
inquired whether participants had driven drunk in the previous 5 years, and whether they would 
                                                 
20 The other item Grasmick, Bursik Jr., and Kinsey (1991) used, “Would most of the people whose opinions you 
value lose respect for you if you were to litter the highways, streets, or a public recreation area?” actually seems to 
measure shame better than the other item.  The authors took this item to measure embarrassment, and found that its 
effects were much less than shame’s.  I think this indicates that guilt is doing the real work in the Oklahoma 
antilittering campaign. 
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in the future.  The authors concluded that the “increased threat of shame and its relatively strong 
deterrent effect appear to be the primary source of reduction in drunk driving” (p. 61).21 
Even with a smattering of articles that claim to show deterrent effects of shame penalties (or, 
more accurately, shame campaigns), we ought to be skeptical of drawing firm conclusions from 
them.  Research on the topic is still very sparse.  There is not a sufficient corpus of papers from 
which to draw firm conclusions.  The possibilities of publication bias against negative findings 
(i.e., finding no statistically significant effects) is a real concern.  And there are inherent 
limitations in the existing literature, such as confounding variables and lack of control 
populations.  Thus, the empirical literature that directly investigates the effects of shame 
penalties is of little consequence. 
3.3 A New Empirically-Based Argument 
Although existing empirically-based arguments against the deterrent effects of shame penalties 
are not successful, I contend that we can build a successful argument based on investigations into 
shame-proneness. 
3.3.1 Research on Shame-Proneness 
In recent years, psychologists have greatly increased our knowledge not only of the effects of 
feeling shame in the moment, but of the effects of being prone to feeling shame, and the 
conclusions are notably different.  Led in large part by June Tangney (see, e.g., Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), researchers have discovered that shame-proneness (unlike guilt-
proneness) is unrelated to empathy, and is instead associated with feelings of personal distress.22  
Furthermore, being prone to feeling shame is associated with a defense mechanism that leads 
                                                 
21 Once again, a limitation of this research is that it does not effectively distinguish between guilt and shame. 
22 Personal distress is an egoistic way of responding to suffering in others, in which one’s focus turns inwards on the 
distress caused in oneself.  See Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade (1987). 
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from blaming others to anger and even to aggression and other antisocial behaviors.  The 
dominant position among scientists is currently that being prone to feeling shame is a 
maladaptive trait. 
With respect to empathy, Leith and Baumeister (1998) conducted a series of experiments to 
investigate the relationships among shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, cognitive empathy (taking 
another’s perspective), personal distress, and conflict resolution.  They found that shame-
proneness was associated with personal distress, but not with cognitive empathy.  Guilt-
proneness, on the other hand, was associated with cognitive empathy.  Furthermore, it was those 
participants who scored high on cognitive empathy, and hence were better at perspective-taking, 
who had the best outcomes when they had disagreements or conflicts with others.  As the authors 
summarized, “Guilt improved relationship outcomes but shame harmed them” (p. 1).  In the most 
recent meta-analysis of the topic, Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) found that lower cognitive 
empathy (in comparison with affective empathy) was “strongly related to offending” (p. 441).23  
This is an important result, because cognitive empathy is precisely the form of empathy that 
Leith and Baumeister (1998) studied. 
With respect to the defense mechanism associated with shame-proneness, Peters et al. (2014) 
studied the links among shame, anger, and features of borderline personality disorder (BPD).  
Individuals with BPD tend to have trouble in relationships with other, have outbursts of and 
dramatic swings in emotion, and engage in risky behaviors.  The authors found that shame 
tended to lead to BPD symptoms via anger and rumination about anger, illustrating the link 
between shame and anger.  Their data did not support the model that anger tended to lead to 
                                                 
23 Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) warn, however, that the relationship between cognitive empathy and offending 
could be driven by intelligence and socioeconomic status, so “More research is needed to investigate the causal links 
between low SES, low intelligence, low empathy, and offending” (p. 441). 
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shame and then BPD.  This article and others (Stuewig et al., 2010; Wright, GudJonsson, & 
Young, 2008; Tangney et al., 1992; Thomaes et al., 2011) provide solid evidence that shame-
proneness is associated with the defense mechanism of externalization of blame, anger, and 
aggressive tendencies. 
There is further evidence of a link between shame-proneness and problematic behaviors other 
than aggression, Dearing, Stuewig, and Tangney (2005) investigated how guilt and shame related 
to the abuse of alcohol and illegal drugs.  Two large samples of college students, and one large 
sample of inmates, completed the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (or TOSCA), which measures 
guilt-proneness and shame-proneness, along with measures of alcohol and drug use.  The authors 
found a positive relationship between shame and substance use problems in all samples, but 
found negative or negligible relationships between guilt and substance use.  More recent research 
confirms the relationship among shame-proneness, substance-abuse, and associated problems 
such as driving while intoxicated (Stuewig et al., 2015). 
Tignor and Colvin (2016, January 25) conducted a meta-analysis of shame-proneness and the 
tendency to act prosocially.  The authors found that shame-proneness, across many studies, was 
negatively associated with the tendency to act prosocially.  This is an important finding, given 
that a key role of meta-analyses is to investigate trends in the literature, rather than results from a 
small number of experiments. 
3.3.2 Shame-Proneness and Recidivism among Convicted Criminals 
Researchers are beginning to study the relationship between shame-proneness and criminal 
offending and recidivism.  Hosser, Windzio, and Greve (2008) interviewed well over 1,000 
incarcerated adolescents and young adults at several timepoints and administered a frequency 
measure of shame- and guilt-proneness.  The measure asked how often the offender had felt a 
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certain emotion over the last week (from never to very frequently).  The authors also followed 
their participants to determine reoffending after release from incarceration.  The authors found 
that participants who were shame-prone in prison were more likely to reoffend after release, 
whereas those where were guilt-prone were less likely to reoffend. 
Another important study of shame-proneness and criminality was conducted by Tangney, 
Stuewig, and Martinez (2014), and reported in “Two Faces of Shame:  Understanding Shame and 
Guilt in the Prediction of Inmates’ Recidivism.”  In this study, the authors assessed a large 
sample of felons with the Test of Self-Conscious Affect for Socially Deviant Populations 
(TOSCA-SD), which measures inmates’ propensities to experience guilt and shame, as well as 
the propensity to blame someone or something other than themselves for a transgression.  To 
complete the TOSCA-SD, participants read a series of vignettes and rate how likely they would 
be to respond in a variety of ways to those situations.  After baseline assessments, the authors 
followed-up with their participants around 1 year later.  The authors measured whether these 
participants had reoffended through interviews and by acquiring public arrest records. 
All in all, Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez (2014) were able to include well over 300 
participants in their analyses, a substantial number.  They found that shame-proneness predicted 
increased rates of reoffending.  They also found, however, that this relationship seemed to be 
due in large part to the tendency to externalize blame.  When statistically controlling for this 
tendency, the relationship between shame-proneness and increased recidivism rates went away.  
Still, this is not good news for proponents of shame penalties, since at best the results suggest 
that shame-proneness does not contribute to decreasing reoffending.  At worst, the results show 
that cultivating shame in criminals is a bad idea, since it tends to lead to externalization of blame 
and then recidivism. 
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3.3.3 Summary of Recent Empirical Results 
The findings of empirical researchers investigating shame-proneness in recent years can be 
codified into a few statements.  First, being prone to feeling shame has, for the general 
population, negative outcomes.  Second, shame-proneness has either negative effects on 
deterring criminals from reoffending, or counteracting effects such that there is an overall neutral 
outcome.  In the next section, I build upon these findings to provide an updated empirically-
based case against shame penalties. 
3.3.4 Institutionalizing Shame Penalties Cultivates Shame 
As I discussed in the introduction to this paper, there are potentially both narrow and wide 
deterrent effects of institutionalized criminal penalties.  In a narrow sense, the penalties are 
meant to deter convicted criminal who receive those punishments from committing crimes again.  
In a wide sense, they are supposed to prevent crime and increase ethical and legal compliance in 
the general population.  I believe that institutionalizing shame penalties would cultivate shame in 
both convicted criminals and the general population.  Thus, I believe that there is a real concern 
that institutionalizing shame penalties would have negative deterrent effects in both a narrow and 
a wide sense. 
When reviewing single instances of shame punishments, it might be possible to identify deterrent 
effects for convicted criminals who receive the sentence.  The occasional use of such penalties, 
however, is very different than the institutionalized use of the penalties.  Institutionalized 
penalties create an expectation among convicted criminals that future transgressions will likely 
be punished with further shame.  They also communicate to convicted criminals that shame is the 
appropriate emotion to experience after transgressing.  Furthermore, shame penalties typically 
invite repeated shaming and exposure, as numerous members of the community are invited to 
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participate in the punishment.  There are also likely to be long-lasting effects of shame penalties, 
given that transgressions have been publicized to the community who can continue to shame 
(with no definite end point to the punishment).  For all these reasons, institutionalizing shame 
penalties would make convicted criminals more prone to feeling shame. 
Shame penalties not only affect sentenced offenders, but also the community members who 
participate, willingly or not, in the punishment.  By publicly shaming criminals, we continually 
express to ordinary citizens who witness or participate in the punishment that shame is the 
consequence of illicit conduct.  This effect is heightened by institutionalized shame penalties, 
which convey that shame is sanctioned by the state.  This is very likely to increase one’s 
disposition to feel shame in response to transgressing.  Furthermore, it once again conveys that 
shame is the appropriate response to feel if one transgresses.  Thus, even citizens who were not 
convicted of a crime might come to feel ashamed of transgressions, even when those 
transgressions did not violate any laws.  To institutionalize shame penalties would be to take a 
significant step towards becoming a shame culture. 
The fact that institutionalized shame penalties cultivate shame in both convicted criminals and 
the population at large is a reason in favor of abandoning those penalties.  Cultivating shame 
results in increased propensities to feel shame, and the evidence suggests that shame-proneness is 
negatively correlated with prosocial behavior.  Far from deterring criminals and others in the 
community, it appears that institutionalizing shame penalties would create more violations of 
ethical and legal strictures, not fewer. 
3.3.5 Objections 
It is important to address a critical series of objections that one might make to the empirically-
based argument against the deterrent effects of institutionalized shame penalties presented above.  
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One could argue that far from showing that we ought not institutionalize shame penalties, the 
research presented above shows that we must institutionalize shame penalties in a way that 
avoids certain pitfalls.  Is there a way, for example, to ensure that convicted criminals who 
receive shame penalties are also prone to accepting responsibility for their actions instead of 
blaming others?  What if we used restorative justice conferences as shame penalties, as 
Braithwaite (1989) proposes, to avoid stigmatization (or disintegrative shaming, as he calls it) 
and emphasize the reparability of relationships?  What if shame penalties were reserved for 
repeat offenders who were likely to have character flaws that made feeling ashamed a fitting 
emotional response?  Below I address these concerns in turn. 
Tangney’s research on shame-proneness in convicted criminals suggests that were we able to 
break the link between shame-proneness and the tendency to externalize blame, institutionalized 
shame penalties could have deterrent effects for convicted criminals (Tangney, Stuewig, and 
Martinez, 2014).  This suggests that there might be a way to harness the beneficial effects of 
shame-proneness.  It is unclear, however, precisely how one would go about making sure that 
offenders tended to accept responsibility for their transgressions instead of blaming others.  
Furthermore, even if we were to break the link between shame-proneness and externalization of 
blame, that would only address the narrow deterrent effects of shame penalties.  Even if we were 
to reduce recidivism, we would still be moving towards a shame culture by cultivating shame-
proneness in the general population.  This, the evidence shows, would likely lead to antisocial 
consequences.  Thus, the proposal to break the link between shame-proneness and the tendency 
to externalize blame is unlikely to remove to the concern that overall, the effects of 
institutionalized shame penalties on deterrence would be negative. 
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One might object further that Braithwaite’s (1989) restorative justice conferences seem to break 
the link between shame and externalization of blame, to emphasize reparability, and to avoid 
cultivating shame in the general population.24  Braithwaite, after all, distinguishes between a 
damaging, stigmatizing type of shame penalty (disintegrative shaming) and positive, 
reintegrative type.  His favored proposal of restorative justice conferences would limit the 
exposure associated with shame penalties, as only affected parties invited to the conference 
would have the opportunity to express moral condemnation.  This would tend to lessen the 
concern that institutionalized shame penalties would cultivate shame in the general population.  
Furthermore, the emphasis in restorative conferences is on eventually forgiving the offender, in 
an effort to reintegrate the person into society.  This end-point of forgiveness emphasizes 
reparability, and could encourage offenders to accept responsibility for their transgressions, 
instead of blaming others.25  One might argue, then, that restorative justice conferences are a type 
of shame penalty that, if institutionalized, would likely have beneficial deterrent effects and 
avoid the pitfalls of other types of shame penalty. 
The problem with this objection is that restorative justice conferences are not a type of shame 
penalty.26  As Harris, Walgrave, and Braithwaite (2004) admit, there are a number of emotions or 
emotional processes that play a role in such conferences, including guilt and empathy.  While it 
is true that restorative conferences expose an offender, in a limited way, to the offender’s 
                                                 
24 In a 2006 article, Kahan moves closer to Braithwaite’s ideas on shame penalties, but for reasons that have nothing 
to do with deterrence.  Rather, Kahan recognizes that some members of society will feel uncomfortable participating 
in shame penalties and living in a community that sanctions them.  Because of this wider consideration, Kahan 
suggests that something more like Braithwaite’s ideas could be politically acceptable, rather than his original 
proposal. 
25 On reparability, recall the meta-analysis by Leach and Cidam (2015) discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
26 Nussbaum (2004) also argues for this point.  See also Tangney, Stuewig, and Hafez (2011).  Some authors grant 
this point, but maintain that shame can have a role in restorative conferences (e.g., Rodogno, 2008). 
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community, the goal of the conferences is not to make an offender feel like a defective person.27  
In fact, quite the opposite is true.  As Braithwaite (2000) writes, he advocates for “shaming that 
treats the person as a good person who has done a bad thing,” rather than “shaming that treats the 
person as bad” (p. 118).  Given the empirical evidence presented above, it is likely that the real 
work being done in restorative justice conferences stems not from shame, but from emotions 
such as guilt. 
To continue the line of objection, an intuitive proposal is only to use shame penalties on repeat 
offenders, which would increase the probability of applying the penalties to individuals with 
defective character.  After all, if judges have good reason to believe that it is an offender’s 
character that is it issue, wouldn’t a shame penalty be fitting?  Although it is true that in such a 
case, it might be fitting for an offender to feel ashamed, there is a difference between an emotion 
being fitting and it being instrumentally valuable to feel (see D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000, on 
fitting emotion).28  Fear is a fitting emotion when encountering a large, growling dog in an alley, 
but it would be instrumentally better if one did not feel afraid, and felt calm and dominant 
instead.  Similarly, there are times when it might be fitting for offenders to feel ashamed, but the 
empirical evidence suggests that it would not be instrumentally valuable. 
Perhaps there are other proposals for how to modify institutionalized shame penalties.  It is 
difficult to address every possibility (see, e.g., Brooks, 2008; Book, 1999).  I believe that the 
burden of proof, however, is now on proponents of such modifications to demonstrate, ideally 
with empirical evidence, that the revised penalties would avoid the pitfalls of institutionalized 
                                                 
27 In addition, the exposure in question only extends to involved parties, who likely would have known about the 
transgression in any case. 
28 I am skeptical that it is fitting to feel ashamed in as many situations as people think it is.  See Doris (2002).  I 
would like to thank John Heil for pressing the point that there is a difference between an emotion being fitting (or a 
belief being epistemically warranted) and it being instrumentally valuable.  See Heil (1983). 
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shame penalties.  For now, the string of objections that there are ways to institutionalize shame 
penalties without causing negative deterrent effects is unsuccessful. 
3.4 An All-Things-Considered Assessment of 
Institutionalizing Shame Penalties 
I have argued that we ought to avoid institutionalizing shame penalties if we want to increase 
ethical and legal compliance.  Although deterrence is an important factor to consider when 
evaluating sentencing guidelines, and one that proponents of shame penalties rely on heavily, it 
is not the only factor to consider.  Given that expressiveness, retribution, and other factors are 
important, are institutionalized shame penalties an all-things-considered good option?  I believe 
that the deterrence argument presented above, in combination with other arguments and 
counterarguments against shame penalties discussed below, demonstrate that institutionalized 
shame penalties should not be considered a viable option for sentencing. 
3.4.1 The Expressive Function of Shame Penalties 
Shame penalties, aside from anything else, are undeniably expressive.  In an interview with the 
Sunday Times, Kahan claims that the public “wants more from criminal punishment.  They want 
a message.  They want moral condemnation of the offender” (Allen-Mills, 1997, April 20).  
Certainly, if the goal of legal penalties is primarily to express moral condemnation of the 
offender, it is hard to imagine a better punishment than inviting the public repeatedly and 
forcefully to express that condemnation.  Thus, any all-things-considered argument against 
institutionalized shame penalties must acknowledge the expressiveness of those shame penalties. 
3.4.2 Are Shame Penalties Cost-Effective? 
In comparison with incarceration, shame penalties are almost certainly more cost-effective 
(although I hope to have called into question the effectiveness of shame penalties above).  
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Defenders of shame penalties often convey a deep dissatisfaction with the American prison 
system and sentencing practices emphasizing incarceration (Kahan & Posner, 1999; Moskos in 
Simon, Moskos, & Turley, 2013, August 24), partly due to the exorbitant cost of housing 
inmates.  The cost of shame penalties, however, depends on the specific nature of the penalty.  
Sometimes shame penalties cost virtually nothing, for example, when criminals are ordered to 
purchase ads in local newspapers detailing their transgressions.  Other times, however, costs 
could be relatively high, as when a guard needs to monitor a single person for hours on end, for 
several days, while the person holds a sign.  In addition, for a fully appropriate comparison, one 
must consider other alternative sentences such as community service or fines.  The sort of 
monitoring necessary for community service is likely to be on a par with that required for shame 
penalties.  And fines cost nothing but administrative overhead.  Thus, I believe the purported 
cost-effectiveness of shame penalties is not a good argument for institutionalizing them. 
Furthermore, in arguments of appropriate punishment techniques, considerations of cost-
effectiveness should be trumped by other considerations.  An unjust punishment, no matter how 
little money it costs to impose, is unacceptable.  Cost-effectiveness is a secondary concern, 
something that could tip the scales one way or the other if two appropriate sentencing options 
were available.  Several arguments presented below (in 3.4.5 and 3.4.6) question whether shame 
penalties are appropriate in the first place.  Thus, I believe that the cost-effective argument in 
favor of shame penalties is not a strong reason to support those penalties. 
3.4.3 Are Shame Penalties Beautifully Retributive? 
The idea that shame penalties are beautifully retributive comes from a few select examples.  
Certainly, sentencing a landlord to live in one of his own unfit apartments has a quality that one 
could say is beautifully retributive.  Sentencing businessmen convicted of urinating in public to 
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clean the streets themselves is also beautifully retributive.  The majority of shame penalties, 
however, are not beautifully retributive.  Take the most common form, holding a sign in a public 
place.  There is nothing beautifully retributive about this type of shame penalty.  Furthermore, 
other legal penalties can be beautifully retributive—it all depends on the nature of the 
transgression.  If one were to assault a homeless individual, for example, then volunteering in a 
homeless shelter would be beautifully retributive.  If one stole money from a charity, then 
making a court-ordered donation to the charity would be beautifully retributive.  Thus, there is 
nothing to suggest that there is anything about shame penalties as such that makes them 
beautifully retributive.  Rather, what can make them so is the creativity of the judge who uses 
them, a creativity that could be exercised in other forms of penalty as well.29 
3.4.4 Do Shame Penalties Incapacitate Criminals? 
In a model of society as a continual interchange among citizens, shaming penalties are thought to 
incapacitate criminals and make them unable to commit future crimes.  By publicly shaming an 
individual who did not pay back a debt, for example, we could make sure that those in the 
community did not do business with the individual.  Certainly, shame penalties will incapacitate 
a convicted criminal to some extent, especially when the examples focus on explicit interchanges 
like loans.  (It is less clear how incapacitance is supposed to work in a case like the urinating 
businessmen.)  It is likely that this effect is overstated, however, given the possibilities for 
anonymity afforded by our current living conditions.  Human beings no longer live in small, 
isolated communities.  Unless transgressions are widely publicized through shame penalties, one 
                                                 
29 See Markel (2001). 
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has the opportunity to integrate into a new community.30  Thus, there is likely nothing special 
about the incapacitance afforded by shame penalties. 
3.4.5 Human Dignity 
One persistent worry about institutionalized shame penalties is that they represent a state-
sponsored affront to human dignity (Nussbaum, 2004).  Shame penalties are designed, some 
argue, to make individuals feel less than human.  They are also designed to taint an individual’s 
being for the long-term, branding one as a sex offender, thief, drunk driver, and so on, even 
though they are given in response to an illegal action.  It is not a crime, after all, to have a bad 
character.  If part of our commitment as people living in a modern society is to respect the basic 
dignity of all individuals, and to cultivate an environment where every individual can have and 
regain self-respect—even those who commit transgressions—then shame penalties are 
intrinsically problematic.  It is even more troubling for these penalties to be sanctioned and 
administered by the state.  Nussbaum writes: 
The fact that the state is complicit in the shaming makes a large difference.  People will 
continue to stigmatize other people, and criminals are bound to be among those 
stigmatized.  For the state to participate in this humiliation, however, is profoundly 
subversive of the ideas of equality and dignity on which liberal society is based.  (p. 232) 
In addition to worries about human dignity, the stigmatizing tendencies of institutionalized 
shame penalties suggest that they are a poor choice for reintegrating criminals into society.  At 
the end of a shaming penalty, there is unlikely to be a feeling of forgiveness or re-acceptance by 
                                                 
30 Does the internet afford us the opportunity to publicize transgressions to a large amount of the population?  
Perhaps, but the use of the internet in shaming penalties brings up a host of other problematic issues (see Levmore & 
Nussbaum, 2010; Posner, 2015, April 9).  Publicizing transgressions on the internet, for example, is likely to prevent 
the possibility of reintegration into society.  The internet leaves a trail that is almost impossible to eradicate.  Using 
the internet to publicly shame also invites anonymous attacks on transgressors, which seems to produce more vitriol. 
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one’s community.  Thus, shaming penalties do not satisfy the reintegrative functions that legal 
penalties can serve. 
3.4.6 Mob Justice and Unreliability 
Finally, there are two related worries that institutionalizing shame penalties would encourage 
mob justice and be unreliable, respectively.  When judges mete out shame penalties, they signal 
that the public ought to be involved in the punishment of criminals—that the public has work to 
do in deterring crime.  This is a call for a form of mob justice, and it is a major concern about 
shame penalties (see Whitman, 1998).  Normally, state-sanctioned punishment is administered 
by trained agents of the state.  These agents can be held accountable for violating their training.  
There is a much reduced opportunity to hold citizens accountable for inappropriate participation 
in shame penalties.  Only citizens who violate laws themselves (for example, assaulting an 
offender undergoing a shame penalty) could be held accountable.  Furthermore, calling upon 
citizens to participate in state-ordered punishment could lead to citizens policing by themselves, 
potentially targeting other individuals who have committed no crime.  Large sections of the 
public often disagree with the outcomes of legal proceedings.  Encouraging the general public to 
participate in state-sanctioned penalties could encourage them to participate in penalties 
whenever there is a perception of guilt, regardless of a conviction.31 
Relatedly, the outsourcing of punishment to the public makes shame punishments intrinsically 
unreliable.  The same shame penalty, for example, might be very different for a black man than a 
white man, depending on the attitudes of members of the community towards race.  Other things 
being equal, a black offender in America would face much more vitriol standing outside a 
government building than a white offender.  These are things that a judge cannot control when 
                                                 
31 Television programs such as NBC’s To Catch a Predator illustrate the sort of mob justice and use of shaming 
that, although captivating to many, are deeply problematic (see, e.g., Walter & Sauer, 2008, June 24). 
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deciding on a shame penalty, which makes them intrinsically unreliable.  If all members of a 
society are created equal, then all members of a society have a right (within reason) to equal 
punishment for equal transgressions.  Shame penalties fail this requirement, which is an 
important reason to reject their institutionalization. 
3.4.7 Final Assessment 
Given the counterarguments and arguments against institutionalized shame penalties presented 
above, I believe that we must conclude that they are not a viable option.  The only undeniable 
quality of institutionalized shame penalties is that they are powerfully expressive.  One will not 
be able to escape a sentencing without feeling the moral condemnation of a large number of 
one’s peers.  This expressive quality of institutionalizes shame penalties, however, is not a 
sufficient reason to support them, given the numerous downfalls.  Institutionalized shame 
penalties are neither cost-effective nor beautifully retributive.  They do not incapacitate 
convicted criminals as much as some might think.  And they are prone to undermining one’s 
basic human dignity, stifling reintegration, encouraging mob justice, and being unreliable.  All 
things considered, institutionalizing shame penalties is not a viable option for legal punishment. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Can we conclude from the argument presented above that judges ought to stop imposing 
occasional shame penalties?  That is too strong of a conclusion, and one for which I have not 
argued here.  It is likely possible to find exceptional circumstances that warrant shame 
punishment in an individual case.  The target of this paper, instead, has been proposals to 
institutionalize shame penalties, such as Kahan and Posner’s (1999) argument that we ought to 
institutionalize shame penalties in some fashion for white-collar crime, or Ohio’s use of colorful 
and distinctive license plates for certain DUI offenders. 
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There is beginning to be concern about the wide effects of institutionalized shame penalties, and 
it seems that these concerns may be their undoing.  Kahan (2006) worries that shame penalties 
are “deeply partisan:  when society picks them, it picks sides, aligning itself with those who 
subscribe to norms that give pride of place to community and social differentiation rather than to 
individuality and equality” (p. 2076).  Nussbaum’s (2004) original contributions (even though I 
believe they are unsuccessful) generally center around calling into question the motivations of 
the judges, politicians, and members of the community that institute shame penalties.  There are 
concerns about using the public to implement legal penalties, because it encourages mob justice 
and produces unreliable punishments.  And in this paper, I have argued that institutionalizing 
shame penalties would have negative deterrent effects for society.  Instead of producing a society 
that is more ethical and law-abiding, cultivating shame through institutionalized shame penalties 
would likely increase antisocial behavior.  Given these reasons, and the evidence suggesting that 
shame-prone criminals are not less likely to reoffend, I conclude that calls to institutionalize 
shame penalties should become a thing of the past. 
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Chapter 4:  A Critique of Bernard Williams 
on the Restoration of Shame, and Wider 
Implications for Virtue Ethics 
Bernard Williams and Jeb Bush seem not to have much in common.  The two agree, however, 
that we ought to recognize a greater role for shame in modern society. 
In Shame and Necessity, Williams (2008/1993) argues against the view that guilt, in the absence 
of shame, is a sufficient moral emotion: 
In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad side of all the lines.  This is 
well brought out in its notorious association with the notion of losing or saving face.  
“Face” stands for appearance against reality and the outer versus the inner, so its values 
are superficial; I lose face or save it only in the eyes of others, so the values are 
heteronomous; it is simply my face to save or lose, so they are egoistic.  These 
conceptions of what shame has to be, and of how ethical relations that are importantly 
governed by shame have to work, are all incorrect.  (pp. 77-78) 
According to Williams, the ancient Greeks, with their acceptance and use of shame as an 
emotion encompassing guilt, were in a better situation than we are in modern society. 
In Profiles in Character (Bush & Yablonski, 1995) and speeches around that time, Jeb Bush 
argues that our society is regrettably devoid of shame.  In a speech in 1995, for example, Bush 
claims, 
There is no shameful behavior anymore in America.  You can do just about anything you 
want to do, and no one minds….  I believe that we need to restore a sense of shame, so 
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that certain behavior makes you blush.  Certain behavior becomes such that you don’t 
accept it.  And little by little, perhaps that type of attitude becomes pervasive not just in 
your family, but in your neighborhood, and perhaps in your community.  And over time 
begin to restore a sense of shame for behavior that is outrageous.  (October 11th, 1995)1 
Admittedly, Williams and Bush would likely disagree on which actions or circumstances are 
shameful.  It is difficult to imagine that Jeb Bush would agree with the conclusions of the United 
Kingdom’s Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship—chaired by Williams and commonly 
called the Williams Committee—that pornography has a mostly benign effect on society 
(Williams, 2015/1979).  Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that Williams would agree with 
Bush’s (Bush & Yablonski, 1995) belief that abortion should be a deeply shameful behavior, or 
his belief that we ought to shame young men into marrying their girlfriends if the couple became 
pregnant.  Nevertheless, it is a testament to the current interest in restoring shame that two people 
as different as Williams and Bush have positive things to say about that emotion. 
Both Williams and Bush, however, are wrong about restoring shame.  Research over the past 
several decades has demonstrated that the more one is disposed to feel shame, the worse—and 
worse off—one is.  Led in large part by June Tangney, researchers have shown that being prone 
to feeling shame is associated with having symptoms of mental illness, blaming others for one’s 
transgressions, and having anger and aggression problems (for a review, see Tangney, Stuewig, 
& Mashek, 2007).  A propensity for guilt, interestingly, has none of these negative associations.  
For both individuals and society as a whole, then, cultivating shame is a bad prospect. 
                                                 
1 The speech can be viewed at http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/heres-jeb-bush-talking-about-restoring-
shame-to-society#.lmZAk6rwR (accessed 2016, May 15). 
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This paper is not about Jeb Bush, whose contributions to the field of ethics are questionable.  It is 
first and foremost about Williams (2008/1993), his take on shame, and where he goes wrong.  
Much of what Williams writes is characteristically insightful, and empirical researchers would be 
wise to mine its depths.  In particular, William’s characterization of shame is illuminating.  To 
feel ashamed is indeed to feel naked and exposed.  To feel ashamed is indeed to appraise one's 
character or self as defective.  To feel ashamed is indeed to feel a powerful, and motivating, 
emotion.  But to cultivate a propensity to feel shame—to restore this aspect of ancient Greek 
culture—would not be to cultivate a positive moral change in today’s society. 
Although Williams (2008/1003) explicitly argues that we ought to restore a sense of shame, 
some other authors’ views seem to imply it.  Virtue ethical theories are often characterized as 
emphasizing character over action.  If Williams is right that feeling ashamed involves appraising 
one’s character or self as defective, then virtue ethicists might need to endorse the restoration of 
shame as well.  This would mean that virtue ethicists in addition to Williams would face the 
problem of shame, or the problem of explaining how to avoid the morally counterproductive 
consequences of cultivating shame. 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In Section 4.1, I outline Williams's (2008/1993) 
characterization of shame and his argument for restoring its place in modern society.  In Section 
4.2, I summarize the empirical literature on shame, which shows why Williams is wrong about 
the restoration of shame.  In Section 4.3, I respond to two possible concerns:  The concern that 
Williams does not advocate for cultivating “inappropriate” shame, which is what scientists tend 
to measure, and the concern that appropriate shame-proneness is unlikely to be maladaptive, 
given that the trait presumptively evolved because it was adaptive.  Finally, in Section 4.4, I 
explore the possibility that the problem of shame extends beyond Williams's work to virtue 
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ethics more generally.  Although virtue ethics is a diverse field, I conclude that a number of 
virtue ethicists must address the problem of shame. 
4.1 Williams on Shame and Its Restoration 
Williams’s (2008/1993) discussion of shame can be broken into three phases:  His 
characterization of shame, a clarification that he provides, and his final argument, building on the 
clarification, that we would be better off restoring shame in modern society. 
4.1.1 Characterization 
Williams’s (2008/1993) characterization of shame and his theory of its workings are deep and 
nuanced.  He begins by noting the association between shame and nakedness.  “The basic 
experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in 
the wrong condition,” he writes.  “It is straightforwardly connected with nakedness, particularly 
in sexual connections” (p. 78).  In fact, an ancient Greek word for the genitals, aidoia, is 
linguistically connected with their word for shame, aidos, and Williams notes that this pattern 
holds for other languages as well.  Because of its connection with being seen by others, there is a 
worry that shame is heteronomous—that is, that one feels ashamed not when one judges that one 
has done something wrong, but merely when others judge that one has done something wrong.  
This also contributes to the worry that shame is superficial, and concerned only with one’s 
outward appearance or image.  In any case, a feeling of exposure to others is a central feature of 
the phenomenology of shame.  To feel ashamed is to feel naked in front of one’s peers. 
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Given shame’s connection with nakedness, the characteristic action tendency involved with 
shame is, unsurprisingly, to cover-up or hide in self-protection.2  Shamed individuals often hide 
their faces from sight or try to escape situations altogether.  Williams (2008/1993) goes even 
further: 
In my experience of shame, the other sees all of me and all through me… and the 
expression of shame… is not just the desire to hide, or to hide my face, but the desire to 
disappear, not to be there.  It is not even the wish, as people say, to sink through the floor, 
but rather the wish that the space occupied by me should be instantaneously empty.  (p. 
89) 
Because of its connection with self-protection, there is a worry that shame is egoistic.  The 
concern after a transgression is not with others, but with oneself.  In any case, the behavioral 
tendencies of avoidance stand in contrast to those of guilt.  People feeling guilt have a tendency 
to approach others, not avoid them.  Although it can be painful, guilt motivates apology and 
attempts at reparation.  Shame, on the other hand, motivates withdrawal and self-preservation. 
A final difference between shame and guilt, according to Williams (2008/1993), is that shame 
affects someone’s core being, whereas guilt focuses on action and harm done to others.3  Shame 
is closely connected with defects in character, whereas we feel guilty about what we have done.  
“What I have done,” Williams notes, “points in one direction towards what has happened to 
others, in another direction to what I am” (p. 92).  Guilt points in the first direction, outwards 
                                                 
2 Williams (2008/1993) nods approvingly towards Gabriel Taylor’s (1985) work on shame and self-protection. 
3 Williams (2008/1993) discusses two other relatively minor differences between shame and guilt, which I do not 
discuss in detail here.  First, he mentions in passing a proposal that guilt is connected with the voice, whereas shame 
is connected with sight.  Second, he claims that “What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that 
typically elicits from other people anger, resentment, or indignation….  What arouses shame, on the other hand, is 
something that typically elicits from others contempt or derision or avoidance” (pp. 89-90). 
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towards the harm done to others.  “Shame,” in contrast, “looks to what I am” (p. 93).  In this 
respect, shame once again seems to be problematically egoistic.  When feeling shame, one’s 
attention is often focused inward (perhaps superficially, as well) on one’s own image.  Potential 
problems aside, although guilt and shame alike are typically triggered by transgressions, when 
experiencing shame, one tends to feel as if one’s whole being or character is called into question. 
4.1.2 Clarification 
In an attempt to head off confusion, Williams (2008/1993) contends that although shame is 
connected with being evaluated negatively by another entity (be it an individual or a group), it 
would be wrong to think that shame requires a real audience in any straightforward sense.  An 
imagined or internalized other will do—but not just any imagined other.  The imagined other is 
one whose ethical opinions matter and are respected.  “The internalised other is indeed abstracted 
and generalised and idealised, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody 
other than me,” Williams writes.  “He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I 
shall live if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me” (p. 84).  In short, the internalized ethical other can serve as the 
audience that appropriately governs one’s shame responses. 
Through this clarification, Williams (2008/1993) challenges whether shame is superficial, 
heteronomous, and egoistic.   Shame is not perniciously superficial—merely about external 
appearances and image—because there is an internalized other governing shame responses even 
in the absence of publicly-known transgressions; there are, despite what some authors seem to 
suggest (Benedict, 1946), such things as private shame responses.  It is not perniciously 
heteronomous—or only a response to public opinion—because the other is not merely an 
internalization of one’s own ethical views.  It reflects the views of respected community 
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members, and so can serve a substantive ethical role.  And it is not accurate to characterize 
shame as perniciously egoistic—concerned about oneself exclusively rather than others—
because the internalized other binds us to the ethical community at large.  Shame spurs one to 
benefit one’s community by improving one’s ethical self and relationships with others. 
4.1.3 Restoration 
Building on his clarification, Williams (2008/1993) argues that shame ought to have priority over 
guilt in our ethical experience.  Guilt can spur us to apologize for a transgression or right a harm, 
but it cannot spur us to improve our character and make lasting changes in relationships.  He 
writes: 
[Guilt] can direct one towards those who have been wronged or damaged, and demand 
reparation in the name, simply, of what has happened to them.  But it cannot by itself 
help one to understand one’s relations to those happenings, or to rebuild the self that has 
done these things and the world in which that self has to live.  Only shame can do that, 
because it embodies conceptions of what one is and of how one is related to others.  (p. 
94) 
Shame, Williams argues, should encompass guilt.  In this respect, the ancient Greeks were better 
off than we are, given their culture of shame.  “The discussion in this chapter,” Williams writes, 
“as elsewhere in this study, is directed to an historical interpretation from which we can ethically 
learn something…” (p. 90).  “If we come to understand our shame,” he writes, “we may also 
better understand our guilt.  The structures of shame contain the possibility of controlling and 
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learning from guilt, because they give a conception of one’s ethical identity, in relation to which 
guilt can make sense.  Shame can understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself” (p. 93).4 
The importance of shame comes from its close connection with character, identity, and 
relationships with others.  This focus reverses what Williams (2008/1993) sees as a trend in 
modern ethics.  “If guilt seems to many people morally self-sufficient, it is probably because 
they have a distinctive and false picture of the moral life, according to which the truly moral self 
is characterless” (p. 94).  Williams sees this picture as deriving from Kant (and perhaps from 
Plato), although the historical point is not particularly relevant here.  What is important is to see 
what shame can do for us. 
But if we now think, plausibly enough, that the power of reason is not enough by itself to 
distinguish good and bad; if we think, yet more plausibly, that even if it is, it is not very 
good at making its effects indubitably obvious, then we should hope that there is some 
limit to these people’s autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries 
some genuine social weight.  (p. 100) 
4.1.4 Summary 
Williams (2008/1993) characterizes shame as an emotion of exposure, which motivates 
avoidance and affects the whole self or one’s character.  It reflects the workings of an 
internalized other or audience, which reflects community values.  Furthermore, it should be a 
more encompassing and, Williams thinks, more central emotion than guilt.  “By giving through 
the emotions a sense of who one is and of what one hopes to be,” Williams writes, “[shame] 
                                                 
4 For Williams (2008/1993), it is not a disadvantage of shame that it seems less connected with what we typically 
think of as morality than guilt.  In both Shame and Necessity and in other works, Williams questions whether we can 
really make that demarcation of the moral realm in the first place.   He writes, “It is said that we make a lot of the 
distinction between the moral and the nonmoral and emphasize the importance of the moral.  But how far, and in 
what ways, is this really true of our life, as opposed to what moralists say about our life?  Do we even understand 
what the distinction is, or how deep it really goes?” (2008/1993, p. 92). 
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mediates between act, character, and consequence, and also between ethical demands and the rest 
of life” (p. 102). 
4.2 Against Restoring Shame 
According to Williams’s (2008/1993) analysis, shame ought to be an emotion that causes one to 
improve oneself and to become a better ethical citizen.  Thus, Williams contends that we would 
be better off cultivating shame.  Scientific research, however, paints a different picture of shame-
proneness.  Research suggests that by cultivating shame, we would be worse off both as 
individuals and as an ethical community. 
4.2.1 The Leading Scientific Characterization of Shame 
The psychologist June Tangney’s characterization of shame is, at present, widely accepted by 
both scientists and philosophers alike.  According to Tangney (see, e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 
2002), the central characteristic of shame is that it focuses on the self or one's character.  The 
focus of guilt, in contrast, is behavior.  To borrow a slogan from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2005), "people feel guilty for what they do, and they feel ashamed of what they are" (p. 200).  
Tangney contends that this central feature of shame helps to explain its other features.  When 
feeling ashamed, for example, one feels like avoiding others, instead of making reparations, 
because reparations do not fix a fundamentally flawed self.  Also, shame feels more painful than 
guilt, because a failure of the self is more significant than a failure of behavior.  Finally, one 
feels a sense of exposure during shame, but not guilt, because one’s self has been (or is apt to be) 
revealed as flawed. 
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Support for Tangney’s characterization comes via several avenues.  First, it accords with the 
analyses of many philosophers, even if emphases sometimes differ.5  Heidi Maibom (2010), for 
example, writes, “Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain 
standards, norms, or ideals.  The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels 
watched and exposed.  As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is” (p. 566).  Martha 
Nussbaum (2004) also agrees with Tangney’s basic distinction:  “whereas shame focuses on 
defect or imperfection, and thus on some aspect of the very being of the person who feels it, guilt 
focuses on an action (or a wish to act), but need not extend to the entirety of the agent, seeing the 
agent as utterly inadequate” (p. 207).  Most importantly for this paper, Tangney and Williams 
clearly share very similar notions of shame—so similar, in fact, that we may presume that they 
are referencing the same phenomenon, even if their characterizations have slightly different 
emphases.  Like Maibom, Williams (2008/1993) might see exposure as more central to shame 
than does Tangney.  But this is more of a factual dispute about the genesis and workings of 
shame, rather than a conceptual dispute that might lead us to think that psychologists like 
Tangney and philosophers like Maibom and Williams are discussing different phenomena. 
Second, Tangney’s characterization of shame accords with the intuitions of large samples of 
research participants.  In a pair of studies (1a & 1b), for instance, Niedenthal, Tangney, and 
Gavanski (1994) had undergraduates imagine themselves in two situations, one picked to induce 
more shame than guilt (answering a question incorrectly in class and being rebuked by the 
professor), and the other more guilt than shame (being responsible for the death of bird they were 
pet-sitting).  The students then recorded four ways in which the situation and the negative 
                                                 
5 These philosophers include, among others, May (1992, 1996), Manion (2002), Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), and 
Miller (2010). 
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emotion could have been avoided, starting with the prompt “if only….”  The authors coded 
whether these responses referenced the self, one’s behavior, or the situation.  Collapsing across 
both studies, for the shame-inducing situation, participants referenced an aspect of the self 47% 
of the time, and behavior only 26% of the time.  For the guilt-inducing situation, the finding was 
reversed:  Participants referenced behavior 46% of the time, but an aspect of the self only 20% of 
the time.6  The authors concluded that the results favor the proposal that shame focuses on the 
self, because participants tended to undo aspects of the self to avoid feeling it. 
Lastly, Tangney's characterization of shame is captured by a validated and widely-used measure, 
the Test of Self Conscious Affect (or TOSCA; see Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  The robust and 
theory-supporting empirical results stemming from the TOSCA support Tangney's 
characterization.  To give an example, Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) investigated the 
role of shame-proneness in psychological disturbances.  Shame, according to Tangney, is a more 
damaging emotion than guilt, and hence ought to be more associated with psychological 
disturbances.  The authors found that this held across the board.  Shame correlated with all 9 
domains they investigated—including paranoid ideation, anxiety, and depression—even after 
controlling for the overlapping effects of guilt.  Guilt, on the other hand, correlated only with the 
hostility-anger domain after controlling for the effects of shame. 
4.2.2 The Empirical Case Against Shame 
Empirical research on shame comes in two flavors.  Some researchers focus on the state of 
feeling ashamed, whereas others focus on the trait of being shame-prone.  Research on the state 
of shame, or shame felt in-the-moment, tends to report beneficial/prosocial effects, although 
                                                 
6 Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) divided references to the self even further into those referencing 
temporary and more permanent features of the self.  For ease of presentation, I have collapsed those categories here. 
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some research reports negative or ambivalent effects.  A good example of this is a pair of articles 
by de Hooge and colleagues.  In “Moral sentiments and cooperation:  Differential influences of 
shame and guilt,” de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2007) investigated whether there 
were differential effects of feeling guilt or shame on cooperation, and whether these effects 
might depend on one’s general prosocial orientation.  To begin with, the experimenters induced 
guilt or shame in their participants by asking them to recall in great detail a time when they felt 
guilty or ashamed, respectively.  Then the experimenters had the participants play an economic 
game or fill out a questionnaire that allowed them to measure cooperation.  Afterwards, they 
gave participants a questionnaire to make sure that the emotion manipulation worked.  The 
authors also measured whether their participants had an existing tendency to act selfishly (that is, 
a “proself” orientation) versus socially (that is, a prosocial orientation).  The authors found that 
feeling guilty contributed to cooperation, but there was no such effect for feeling ashamed (if 
anything, the results for shame showed decreased cooperation).  This relationship appeared 
among those with a proself orientation, presumably because those with a prosocial orientation 
were already motivated to cooperate. 
In a later article entitled “Not so ugly after all:  When shame acts as a commitment device,” 
however, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) found limited circumstances in which 
the state of shame seemed to be beneficial.  In the experiments reported in this article, the 
authors investigated the difference between what they termed exogenous and endogenous 
influences of shame.  Exogenous influences of shame are those that do not pertain directly to the 
situation in which the shame was induced.  If one were ashamed about treating a friend poorly, 
say, which caused one to give food to a homeless person on the way home, it would be an 
exogenous influence of shame.  If one were ashamed because one scowled at the homeless 
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person before giving food, however, then that would be an endogenous influence of shame—it 
would relate directly to the situation that induced the shame.  The authors performed a series of 
experiments that were similar to that described in the previous paragraph, containing a 
guilt/shame induction, an economic game or cooperation measure, a manipulation check, and a 
measure of proself/prosocial orientation.  The authors found that among those with a proself 
orientation and when considering endogenous influences, feeling ashamed shame increased 
cooperation.  Thus, under limited circumstances, the authors we able to find benefits to the 
experience of shame. 
Moving to the trait of being shame-prone, a substantial amount of research inspired by 
Tangney’s characterization of shame shows that it would be both personally and morally 
counterproductive to make people more prone to feeling shame.  In their review “Moral 
Emotions and Moral Behavior,” Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) write: 
One of the consistent themes emerging from empirical research is that shame and guilt 
are not equally “moral” emotions.  On balance, guilt appears to be the more adaptive 
emotion, benefiting individuals and their relationships in a variety of ways..., but there is 
growing evidence that shame is a moral emotion that can easily go awry....  (p. 350) 
Instead of becoming better people, those who have a propensity for feeling shame also tend to 
blame others for their transgressions, have anger issues, be more aggressive, and have many 
other behavior problems.  Even de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) agree that 
“[research on shame-proneness] convincingly shows that people who are likely to experience 
shame… are also prone to feelings of inferiority, anxiety, lessened empathy, shyness, 
interpersonal distrust, and depression” (p. 934). 
150 
 
A substantial amount of research shows that blaming others (i.e., externalizing blame) is the first 
step in a defense mechanism associated with being prone to feeling ashamed of oneself (see, e.g., 
Tangney et al., 1992, and the data presented in Chapter 2).  By blaming others, one can 
ameliorate the painful and damaging effects of feeling ashamed.  Anger follows externalization 
of blame in the aforementioned defense mechanism (Tangney et al., 1992; Wright, GudJonsson, 
& Young, 2008; Thomaes et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2014).  A final step in the defense 
mechanism can be increased aggression (Stuewig et al., 2010), if externalization of blame and 
anger are not dealt with appropriately. 
In addition to aggression, shame-proneness is associated with other less-than-moral tendencies.  
Peters et al. (2014) investigated the role of shame, anger, and rumination over anger in symptoms 
of borderline personality disorder (BPD).  People with BPD tend to have drastic swings in mood 
and emotion, problematic impulsivity, and unstable relationships with others, among other 
things.  The authors hypothesized that “shame triggers the anger and anger rumination that 
contribute to BPD features” (p. 1).  They found that shame did indeed predict most symptoms of 
BPD, and along the hypothesized route.  To give another example, Stuewig et al. (2015) 
measured shame-proneness in children aged 10-12, and investigated its effects when those 
children were aged 18-21.  Even when the researchers controlled for the participants' 
socioeconomic statuses and for their teachers’ reports of aggression, shame-proneness in 
childhood predicted several troublesome, even immoral behaviors in young adulthood.  
Proneness to shame predicted the number of times a participant had unprotected sex, a younger 
age at which he or she started drinking, the number of types of drug a participant had used, and 
DUIs. 
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There is additional evidence that over time, guilt-proneness tends to lead to prosocial behavior, 
whereas shame-proneness tends to decrease prosocial behavior.  Roos, Hodges, and Salmivalli 
(2014) studied a large sample of 5th and 6th graders using the TOSCA for children and peer 
reports of social behaviors.  They found that over an approximately 6-month period, children 
who were more prone to feeling shame at Time 1 were rated as less prosocial by their peers at 
Time 2.  Prosocial behaviors were identified with items such as “Helps others” and “Does nice 
things for others” (p. 943).  The authors conclude as follows:  “our study supports the theoretical 
predictions [of Tangney] of guilt-proneness, supporting reparative actions and reducing the 
likelihood of engagement in maladaptive behavior, whereas shame-proneness suggests more 
negative prospects by reducing prosocial behavior” (p. 943). 
After decades of research, meta-analyses of shame-proneness are beginning to appear.  Tignor 
and Colvin (2016, January 25), for example, performed a meta-analysis of dispositional guilt, 
dispositional shame, and prosocial orientation.  They found that across two different types of 
measures (scenario-based measures like the TOSCA, and checklist measures that investigate 
frequency), dispositional shame was significantly negatively correlated with prosocial 
orientation.  This is a strong result.  It suggests that findings associating dispositional shame with 
antisocial behaviors are not unusual or likely to be chance findings; not all of the findings come 
from a single sample, from experiments run by a single lab, or from experiments using a single 
measure.  Although there is reason to be skeptical of drawing conclusions from single research 
studies (see Ioannidis, 2005), there is a strong and clear pattern of evidence in the case of 
dispositional shame and prosocial behavior.  Being disposed to feel shame does not make people 
more prosocial, and appears in fact to make people less prosocial. 
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4.2.3 Conclusion:  We Ought Not Restore Shame 
When viewed as a whole, the empirical literature on shame does not support the hypothesis that 
cultivating propensities to feel shame makes people more moral.  In fact, it supports the opposite 
hypothesis.  By cultivating or prioritizing shame, as Williams (2008/1993) wants to do, we 
would make people less moral than they currently are.  Again, that is not to say that there are 
occasions on which feeling shame is beneficial.  It may be the case that it is beneficial for an 
individual, who is not prone to feeling shame, to feel it in limited and appropriate circumstances.  
But were we to cultivate shame, the effects for individuals and for society would on the whole be 
negative.  I conclude that based on this evidence, we ought not follow Williams in calling for a 
restoration of shame. 
4.3 Objections:  Appropriate Shame-Proneness and Its 
Evolution 
I have argued that empirical research supports the view that we ought not cultivate shame among 
members of our society, contrary to what Williams (2008/1993) claims.  One might respond to 
my argument, however, in at least two ways.  First, one might object that of course an emotion 
felt inappropriately—that is, excessively or in unfitting situations—would be maladaptive, but 
that Williams's advocates for appropriate shame in a now shameless society.  Second, one might 
be concerned about how it could plausibly be maladaptive to be prone to feeling appropriate 
shame.  After all, the trait of being shame-prone presumably evolved because it was adaptive.  If 
it is not adaptive when felt in reasonable doses at reasonable times, then there ought to be an 
explanation why. 
153 
 
4.3.1 Appropriate Shame 
Williams (2008/1993) argues against a progressivist reading of morality, according to which the 
Ancient Greeks were premoral—concerned more about things like saving face—whereas under 
the influence of later ethics, such as Christian ethics and Kantian ethics, human beings have 
reached moral maturity.  “In this picture,” Williams writes, “I am provided by reason, or perhaps 
by religious illumination (the picture owes much to Christianity), with a knowledge of the moral 
law, and I need only the will to obey it.  The structures most typical of shame then fall away:  
what I am, so far as it affects the moral, is already given, and there is only the matter of 
discerning among temptations and distractions what I ought to do” (pp. 94-95).  Guilt takes over.  
According to the progressivist, “It is accepted that the world of Homer embodies a shame 
culture, and that shame was later replaced, in its crucial ethical role, by guilt” (Williams, 
2008/1993, p. 5; emphasis added).  With this background in mind, one might object that 
Williams is not advocating for a robust shame culture, but for a culture in which shame plays an 
appropriate role in our ethical lives alongside other emotions like guilt.  And if Williams is only 
advocating for restoring a semblance of shame—or, we might say, proportionate levels of shame 
in fitting situations—then perhaps the research cited above is not enough to show that cultivating 
shame would be bad. 
Researchers investigating shame-proneness and its effects, however, have not concluded that 
there is a level of shame-proneness that is beneficial.  One might think, for example, that an 
inverted u-shape relationship holds between shame-proneness and adaptiveness, such that very 
low levels and very high levels of shame-proneness are damaging, whereas levels in the middle 
are a good thing.  Researchers, however, have not reported such a relationship.  Although it 
might be an effect of failing to test models such as these, the more likely explanation is that this 
154 
 
hypothesized relationship does not exist.7  In any case, it is doubtful that Williams (2008/1993) 
views our culture as shameless.  Certainly, it is rhetorically effective to lament the lack of shame 
in our society, as Jeb Bush does in the quotation that opens this chapter, but Williams never 
suggests that shame is absent from our society.  Nor is it plausible to think that it is.  Participants 
in dozens of studies report tendencies to feel ashamed, and they are able to recall times when 
they felt ashamed.  Thus, the issue at hand is not about restoring a semblance of shame, but about 
cultivating greater levels of shame in a society that already feels it. 
One might continue the objection, however, by arguing that the TOSCA, Tangney’s preferred 
measure of shame-proneness, measures inappropriate (unfitting or disproportionate) shame.  
Some of the TOSCA’s scenarios state that an unfortunate event occurred (e.g., you threw a ball 
and it hit someone in the face).8  One might think that in such a situation, guilt would be 
appropriate, but shame might or might not be, depending on whether the event reflected poor 
character.  Many people would feel an impulse to apologize in such a situation, after all.  So the 
TOSCA might be biased towards identifying appropriate guilt, but inappropriate shame.  While 
such concerns are occasionally expressed (Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 2002; Sanchez, 
2014), they are mitigated by the meta-analysis discussed above (Tignor & Colvin, 2016, January 
25), which included multiple measures of dispositional shame. 
4.3.2 The Evolution of Shame-Proneness 
The former concern leads into another.  For if we grant that Williams is talking about cultivating 
proportionate amounts of shame in fitting situations, then it is difficult to understand how that 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that being shameless in the sense of being unable to be shamed would be a good thing.  There is a 
difference between not tending to feel shame, and not being able to feel shame. 
8 This particular example is from the 3rd version of the TOSCA (or TOSCA-3; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
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could possibly be maladaptive.  Sometimes this worry is put in terms of the evolution or function 
of shame.  de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) state the worry as follows: 
Many psychologists tend to think of shame as a painful emotion that has profound 
negative psychological and behavioral consequences (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
These negative consequences raise questions with respect to the function of shame, 
because emotion theorists generally assume that emotions are functional in the sense that 
they promote behavior that has beneficial consequences for the individual or 
community….  As such, the current psychological knowledge of shame poses a kind of 
paradox:  How could shame be a functional emotion when it has only negative 
psychological consequences?  (p. 933) 
Traits that evolved and were adaptive in the past, however, may or may not be adaptive in the 
present.  Take a propensity to consume sugary foods.  In our evolutionary past when food was 
scarce and exercise was a way of life, consuming sugary foods gave essential boosts of energy 
and provided much needed calories.  But in industrialized societies, this way of life is far from 
typical, and a propensity to consume sugary foods now has negative health consequences.  
Something analogous might be true for shame.  Many authors (among others, Fessler, 1999, 
Gilbert, 1992, and Maibom, 2010) suggest that shame was a beneficial emotion, serving a crucial 
function related to appeasement, when human beings (or their evolutionary ancestors) lived in 
small communities.  Although many of these authors believe that shame continues to be an 
adaptive emotion in modern society, some also recognize that there have been critical changes 
since human beings lived as hunter-gatherers.  We live in a much more fluid society, where 
people can enter different communities relatively easily.  The boundaries that kept people in their 
small communities are gone, so the threats of disrepute or exile are not as great as they once 
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were.  These sorts of lifestyle changes could make shame a much less effective emotion, morally 
speaking, than it was in the past.  Thus, it is possible that the positive effects of shame no longer 
outweigh the negative effects. 
There are other plausible explanations for how shame-proneness evolved.  It might, for example, 
have evolved in a similar way to disgust, which is another moral emotion that some have found 
suspect (Nussbaum, 2004; Kelly, 2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014).  Disgust is almost certainly a co-
opted moral emotion, an emotion that evolved to play a role in a domain other than morality.  
Kelly and Morar (2014; see also Kelly, 2011) argue that disgust evolved to help animals cope 
with “poisons and parasites” (p. 155).  We have an urge to vomit, for example, to expel potential 
poisons, and we physically recoil from sources of parasites like rotting food to avoid infection. 
Thus, disgust evolved to keep illness at bay, by causing us to avoid or respond appropriately to 
toxic substances and potential contamination.  Subsequently, disgust has been co-opted to 
function in the sociomoral domain.  The sorts of things that make people disgusted has expanded 
considerably.  People find those who hold certain political views disgusting, for example, or 
those who profit from others’ misfortune.  These examples do not involve physical toxins or 
contamination, but we respond to them as such. 
Building on their evolutionary story, Kelly and Morar (2014) defend the thesis that “disgust is 
ill-suited to do any moral or social work whatsoever” (p. 154).  More specifically, they address 
two separate ideas:  whether feelings of disgust can justify a moral claim, and whether feelings 
of disgust can be cultivated as an “Admissible Social Tool” (p. 158).  The authors answer no to 
both questions.  In part, this is because disgust did not evolve to be sensitive to ethical issues. 
[...] disgust is not a typical ‘social’ emotion like, for instance, love, sympathy, envy or 
guilt.  It did not originate in the face of adaptive problems connected to reciprocity, 
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commitment or cooperation, or to help navigate Machiavellian social dynamics of 
defection and deceit.  In light of this, it is not completely surprising that disgust is not as 
intrinsically attuned to social cues that carry information about motivation, intentionality 
and agency as those more typically social emotions.  (p. 164) 
Shame is also a good candidate for a co-opted moral emotion.  We appear to feel shame in cases 
that have little or nothing to do with morality.  Most notably, as Williams (2008/1993) himself 
emphasizes, people feel ashamed of their body and being physically uncovered—of nakedness.  
On a co-option view of the emotion, shame evolved to function in the physical domain of 
exposure and protection from the elements, but was co-opted, like disgust, to function in the 
moral domain.9  After all, human beings are noticeably lacking in protection, having no fur, 
feathers, or scales.  It seems logical that we would have a mechanism for protecting ourselves, 
and shame could have filled this role, causing us to seek shelter and protection, and causing our 
least coverable feature, our faces, to flush with blood in protection.  If shame evolved for 
exposure, then it might not be a perfect fit in the moral domain.  It satisficed sometime in our 
evolutionary past, but it is not an optimal solution.  This plausibly explains why when shame is 
felt occasionally, it can be seen to have good effects.  But the overuse or overexposure to shame 
brings out its negative consequences.  Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) put it exactly right:  
“shame is a moral emotion that can easily go awry” (p. 350). 
All in all, there are a host of reasons why the trait of being shame-prone might exist, but not be 
adaptive or functional.  Thus, the objection that shame-proneness would have been unlikely to 
                                                 
9 Another possibility for a co-option account is Darwin’s (1872) own suggestion in The Expressions of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals that shame evolved with respect to physical deformities and shortcomings, and was co-opted 
for moral deformities and shortcomings. 
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have evolved were it not adaptive is inconclusive.  It does not overturn the conclusions of careful 
empirical research on shame-proneness in the modern day.  The main argument in this paper, 
then, still stands:  Counter to what Williams (2008/1993) proposes, we ought not cultivate shame 
in modern society, because it would have counterproductive effects, both at an individual and a 
social level. 
4.4 The Problem of Shame:  A Wider Problem for Virtue 
Ethics? 
Williams (20081993) recognizes that character evaluations and shame go hand-in-hand, and 
argues that this is a reason to restore a sense of shame in our society.  Other authors in the virtue 
ethics tradition, however, have been silent on shame.  Nevertheless, because shame and character 
are linked, others in the virtue ethical tradition might be compelled to endorse shame as a 
desirable moral emotion.  The purpose of this section is to explore whether a similar argument 
against shame to that presented above affects virtue ethicists more broadly.  If so, then virtue 
ethicists face the problem of shame, the problem of explaining how to avoid the morally 
counterproductive consequences of cultivating shame. 
Virtue ethicists advance significantly different theories, however, which hang together loosely.  
It is quite difficult to identify core principles that all virtue ethicists adopt (Trianosky, 1990).  
Consequently, there are some theories that are seen as forms of virtue ethics that do not face the 
problem of shame.  A prime example is Michael Slote’s ethics of empathic care (see his 2001, 
2007, and 2010 works).  Slote stresses the importance of ethical motivation, specifically 
motivation that expresses empathic caring.  According to Tangney’s theory, focusing evaluation 
on motivation probably would not lead to a propensity to feel shame.  Motivation in a particular 
instance is distinct from more long-lasting character traits.  Thus, it is open to Slote to explain 
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that a prominent moral emotion in his theory would be guilt, but not shame.  And guilt does not 
appear to have any of the negative effects that shame does (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). 
Which virtue ethical theories, then, might face the problem of shame?  To the extent that a theory 
emphasizes the evaluation of character over individual actions or in-the-moment motivation, that 
theory faces the problem of shame.  Because of the lack of attention to shame, examples are not 
always straightforward to find.  One example, however, comes from Rosalind Hursthouse.  
Hursthouse (1999) objects to the idea that virtue ethics is somehow under-formulated or vague 
when compared to theories in other traditions.  To demonstrate this, she formulates virtue ethics 
in a way similar to other types of theories, that is, with principles.  She defines right action by 
appealing to character:  "An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically 
(i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances" (p. 28), where "A virtuous agent is one who 
has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, the virtues" (p. 29).  And virtues, for 
Hursthouse, are deep-seated and reliably lead to action.  Evaluations of character, then, are more 
fundamental in Hursthouse’s theory than evaluations of action.  If one transgresses, it hints that 
one has a defect in character, even if it does not conclusively prove it.  Thus, Hursthouse 
emphasizes the evaluation of character, and as a result must face the problem that shame poses 
for her theory. 
McDowell is another virtue ethicist who, although he does not discuss shame explicitly, 
formulates a theory that likely faces the problem of shame.  McDowell (1979) argues that living 
a moral life is not about following a set of rules, but about "being a certain kind of person:  one 
who sees situations in a certain distinctive way” (p. 347).  This suggests that if one does 
something morally wrong, then there is a defect in one's person.  Certainly, there could be 
exceptions to this.  Perhaps someone sees situations in the right way, and hence knows how to 
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act morally, but cannot overcome the countervailing power of coercion or drug addiction.  In 
such a case, acting unethically might not reflect a defect in character.  Still, if being moral is 
about being a person of certain sort, then McDowell’s ethics points us toward the evaluation of 
character over action or motivation. 
More recently, Julia Annas presents a theory that appears to face the problem of shame.10  Annas 
(2011) compares being virtuous to learning and exercising a skill, such as playing a sport.  
According to Annas, being virtuous is about being a good practical reasoner.  If one transgresses, 
however, then it suggests a defect in one’s practical reasoning ability.  It suggests that one is not 
excellent in a way that they should be, which is a judgment that is likely to lead to shame.  It is 
telling, to continue the sport analogy, that people tend not to feel guilty about poor athletic 
performances, but ashamed of themselves.  Furthermore, Annas proposes that the virtues are 
unified:  Having one virtue means that one is likely to have other virtues.  They come, so to 
speak, as a package.  This is another feature that is likely to lead to shame, for it implicates the 
person as a whole, rather than something isolated.  Thus, I believe that Annas is another example 
of an author who needs to address the role of shame in her ethical theory. 
These examples show that the problem of shame that Williams (2008/1993) faces might extend 
to others in the virtue ethical tradition.  At the very least, this argument shows that virtue 
ethicists ought to address the psychological consequences of their theories and whether they, like 
Williams, endorse shame. 
                                                 
10 Nussbaum (2004, 2005) cites a manuscript prepared by Julia Annas in 2000 entitled “Shame and shaming 
punishments” for the Workshop on Law and Social Control, but the manuscript has never been published (Annas, 
2016, August 3, personal communication) and a copy was unavailable upon completion of this paper.  Interestingly, 
according to Nussbaum (2005), Annas argues that shaming organizations might be an acceptable use of shame 
punishment, but not shaming individuals due to concerns about human dignity. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Williams (2008/1993) argues that we can learn something important from studying the 
functioning of shame and guilt in ancient Greece.  According to his analysis, the ancient Greeks 
experienced shame as an emotion that encompassed guilt.  Shame focuses our attention on our 
character, our identity, and our ethical interrelationships with others.  Guilt, he argues, does none 
of these things.  For this reason, Williams advocates returning to a culture in which shame plays 
a central role in our moral lives.  I contend, however, that Williams is wrong in thinking that 
cultivating shame in our society would have ethically beneficial consequences.  Recent empirical 
analyses show that cultivating shame would likely lead to undesirable consequences for both 
individuals and for society as a whole.  In this instance, we have made ethical progress with a 
shift to a guilt culture, and we should not retrogress. 
Several other authors in the modern virtue ethical tradition, besides Williams, appear to focus our 
evaluative attention on character.  Hursthouse (1999) suggests that right action flows from good 
character.  McDowell (1979) suggests that living a moral life amounts to being a certain sort of 
person, one who sees situations in a distinctive way.   And Annas (2011) suggests that being 
virtuous is like having the ability to play a sport.  Each of these authors implies, I believe, that 
we ought to emphasize the evaluation character.  Cultivating a focus on character, however, has a 
strong tendency to be morally counterproductive.  To emphasize the evaluation of character is to 
make people more prone to feeling shame.  Shame-proneness, in turn, leads to negative 
outcomes such as misdirected blame, anger, aggression, and impulsive and illicit behavior.  
These would seem to be unwanted consequences of an ethical theory. 
I conclude that virtue ethicists need to address the problem of shame.  Ideally, adopting an 
ethical theory ought to make one’s community better, not worse.  One way to circumvent this 
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problem might be to argue that the outwardly facing content of virtue ethics need not reflect the 
inwardly facing content.  Inwardly, all that matters is whether the theory is true.11  Along these 
lines, one might argue that we must raise our children to be good in character, but we ought not 
explicitly reveal to them that this is our moral aim.  We should in general conform to virtue 
ethical theory to be morally good—not consciously adopt it. 
This response is certainly an option, but I believe that it would signify a shift in the spirit of 
virtue ethics, one that many virtue ethicists might not be willing to adopt.  Stocker (1976), for 
example, critiques utilitarian and deontological theories on the grounds that they are 
schizophrenic:  The reasons that justify an action are not the same as what motivates the agent.  
The outward/inward difference seems to be similarly schizophrenic, at least in an extended 
sense.  Thus, even if some found it amenable to address the problem of shame by supporting an 
outward/inward distinction, it would be a significant alteration to virtue ethical theory.  This 
simply underscores the need for virtue ethicists to address shame in the formulation of their 
positions. 
Will virtue ethicists stand with Jeb Bush and call for the restoration of shame?  This paper, 
hopefully, will spur an answer. 
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Chapter 5:  There Should Not Be Shame in 
Sharing Responsibility:  An Alternative to 
May’s Social Existentialist Vision1 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is almost 50 years old, and dozens if not hundreds of civilians are 
killed or injured each year.2  Although only a small number of Israelis and Palestinians are 
directly responsible for civilian casualties in the conflict, many have strikingly negative attitudes 
about the other group.  These attitudes contribute to a culture in which the conflict can continue, 
with little hope of sustained peace.  According to Larry May (1992), Israelis and Palestinians 
who harbor these negative attitudes ought to share responsibility for the transgressions of their 
associates.  This does not mean that we should blame non-combatants for the casualties caused 
by their peers.  But we should encourage them to feel ashamed of themselves when they choose 
to be associated in attitude with those who directly cause harm. 
The empirical evidence, I will argue, should make us reconsider the appropriateness of 
cultivating shame to promote morality.  Over the last few decades, psychological research 
spearheaded by June Tangney has established that being disposed to feel shame has many 
negative outcomes (see, for example, Tangney et al., 1992; Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; 
Wright, GudJonsson, & Young, 2008; Stuewig et al., 2010; Thomaes et al., 2011; Peters et al., 
2014).  Although feeling shame can be effective in isolated situations (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; 
de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013), being disposed to 
feel shame leads to avoidance of scrutiny by concealing oneself and one’s transgressions, 
                                                 
1 The chapter was published in June of 2016, with minor changes in formatting, in Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 19, 755-772. 
2 For detailed information on casualties, see the statistics compiled by the human rights group B’Tselem at 
www.btselem.org 
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blaming others for one’s problems instead of taking responsibility for them, failing to manage 
anger productively, and having character issues including a propensity for aggression.  When it 
comes to shame, a little is good, but more is not better. 
In section 1, I present May’s (1992) proposal for sharing responsibility in more detail.  In 
particular, I aim to demonstrate that May would have us develop heightened senses of shame.  In 
section 2, I explain why psychological research on shame poses a problem for May’s vision, 
focusing on several negative outcomes of a heightened sense of shame:  avoidance of scrutiny, 
misattribution of blame, anger, and aggression.  In section 3, I address four potential objections 
to my argument.  Finally, in section 4, I outline a way to retain May’s claim that we ought to 
hold one another more responsible for indirect contributions to harm.  Instead of cultivating 
shame, we ought to cultivate other-oriented emotions such as empathic care and guilt. 
5.1 May’s Vision of Sharing Responsibility 
May’s (1992) central thesis in Sharing Responsibility is that we should broaden the realm of 
moral responsibility by increasing the extent to which we share responsibility for transgressions 
that we do not directly commit.  We should be held more responsible for having harmful 
attitudes, for example, even if it is not our own attitudes in particular that directly cause harm 
(see May, 1992, Part One).  Employees who have sexist attitudes should be held more 
responsible for preventing the advancement of women in their company, even if those employees 
do not directly make the hiring decisions that cause harm.  To give another example, we should 
be held more responsible for personal omissions that contribute to a group’s transgression (see 
May, 1992, Part Two).  No individual has a duty to relieve a food shortage, even though a 
collective does.  Nevertheless, individuals should be held more responsible for failing to 
organize hunger relief, which should combat the well-known phenomenon of diffusion of 
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responsibility. 
May (1992) calls the view of moral responsibility that underpins his central thesis social 
existentialism.  It is existentialist because it focuses on one’s choice of an identity, not merely on 
one’s choice of actions.  He writes, “The underlying principle of existentialist ethics is that one is 
always morally responsible for who one chooses to be, that is, for choices of attitude, 
disposition, and character, as well as for one’s behavior” (p. 150; italics in original).  It is a social 
version of existentialism because it emphasizes that one’s identity is to a significant extent 
determined by the associations one has with others.  “It is social experience or existence,” May 
writes, “as well as individual choosing, that constructs the self” (p. 3).  Thus, according to social 
existentialism, to be more responsible for one’s identity is thereby to be more responsible for 
others and one’s associations with them—it is to share responsibility. 
Adopting social existentialism entails a greater focus on moral emotions other than guilt, most 
notably shame.3  According to May (1992) and many others (for example, Williams, 1993; 
Nussbaum, 2004; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), a basic 
difference between guilt and shame is that guilt focuses on one’s behavior, whereas shame 
focuses on one’s identity or character.  To use a common slogan, we feel guilty about how we 
behave, but ashamed of who we are.4  Thus, shame is fundamental to May’s vision of sharing 
responsibility because the self is fundamental to social existentialism, his underlying view of 
                                                 
3 Another term that May (1992) regularly uses is “moral taint,” but it is unclear whether he uses the term as a near 
synonym of “shame,” in reference to a type of shame, or in reference to a distinct phenomenon.  I will not take a 
stance on this issue, and use the more familiar term “shame” exclusively. 
4 May does not explicitly define shame in Sharing Responsibility (1992), but he does in The Socially Responsive Self 
(1996):  “Shame is best understood as the response that people feel when they believe that others (an anticipated 
audience) would judge them to have a particular failing or character defect.  Shame has its origins in the feeling of 
wanting to hide from someone whose gaze betrays some sort of disapproval of one’s person” (p. 81).  This quotation 
clearly illustrates that May accepts the standard definition of shame, favored by most philosophers and 
psychologists. 
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responsibility.  Consider, for instance, what May says about groups that transgress by failing to 
act.  In such a case, “in which the failure of many people to act is involved, shared responsibility 
normally does not entail guilt” (p. 120).  He continues, 
Shame, though, is directly related to a person’s conception of herself or himself, rather 
than to explicit behavior (which is what guilt most commonly attaches to).  Because 
shame concerns the self’s identity, it is more appropriately felt than guilt when one’s 
group fails to prevent a harm, since it is the association between the group’s identity and 
one’s own that generates the moral feelings, rather than what one has directly done.  (p. 
120) 
To combat the ability of groups to cause harm, May (1992) envisions cultivating what 
psychologists call group-based shame (Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011).5  To experience 
group-based shame is to feel ashamed of oneself because of one’s associations with others who 
transgress.  It is the type of shame one might feel when a family member acts disgracefully.  It is 
not, therefore, the standard form of shame—or what I will call personal shame—in which one 
feels ashamed of oneself for transgressing.  It is also conceptually distinct from other-directed 
shame, in which one feels ashamed of another who transgresses (or another group that 
transgresses).  Nevertheless, to cultivate group-based shame, according to May’s vision, is also 
to cultivate both other-directed shame and personal shame.  It is to cultivate other-directed 
shame, because in feeling group-based shame, we feel that others’ acts are shameful.  It is to 
cultivate personal shame, in turn, because other-directed shame cultivates personal shame in 
those who transgress.  At the most basic level, however, the existentialist component of social 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting explicitly that May (1992) does not base his argument for greater shared responsibility on a 
mechanism of guilt-by-association, even though it can seem that he collapses the notions on occasion.  Whereas 
guilt-by-association is a troublesome notion, the sorts of shame that May describes are meant to do a similar job, 
without the impropriety. 
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existentialism requires focusing evaluation on oneself just as much as on one’s behavior—it 
requires having a propensity for personal shame.  Thus, May does not merely envision a culture 
of group-based shame, but a culture of shame in general. 
By cultivating group-based shame in particular, May (1992) believes that we can reduce the 
amount of harm caused by groups.6  The experience or anticipation of group-based shame should 
cause us to disassociate ourselves—or, as May sometimes says, distance ourselves—from 
transgressions and the people who cause them.  The threat of shame, for example, should spur us 
to take more interest in what our companions are doing.  If we think that it is harmful, then we 
ought to disassociate ourselves from the harm by acting to stop it.  And if we cannot immediately 
influence the actions of others, then at least shame can make us distance ourselves in attitude 
from actions that are harmful.  Most Americans cannot immediately influence the use of torture 
in interrogations, but they can at least strongly disapprove of it, and to that extent disassociate 
themselves from the practice.  In more extreme cases, shame can lead us to resign from a group 
that persistently transgresses.  Such withdrawal lessens the group’s ability to do harm. 
To give a concrete example of May’s (1992) vision, consider politicians in Ireland during the 
Great Famine, who could have organized to stop exporting food to other countries, but did not.  
May writes, 
In my account of collective inaction, shame is what people should feel when groups to 
which they belong have failed to prevent harm that should have been prevented.  These 
people should feel shame literally, in the sense that they should want to hide their faces, 
                                                 
6 Sharing responsibility with others does not mean that one should feel a significantly weaker form of shame:  
“When a person is assigned less than full responsibility for a harm, that person still is subject to blame, punishment, 
or shame for what has occurred, and should feel motivated to choose differently in the future, just as in a case of full 
individual responsibility” (May, 1992, p. 38). 
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to regret that they are members of the groups in question.  […] such feelings of shame or 
moral taint should cause people to seek to change the behavior of their groups or to 
disassociate themselves from their groups.  (p. 121) 
Thus, on May’s vision, the politicians during the Great Famine should have been profoundly 
ashamed of themselves for belonging to a group that caused famine-related deaths.  Facing this 
shame, the politicians should have disassociated themselves from the group by changing their 
attitudes toward exporting and stopping the food shortage, or else by resigning their positions 
and letting others do the job in their place. 
In summary, May (1992) envisions a society in which people take greater moral responsibility 
for whom they are and recognize that whom they are is a function of those with whom they 
associate.  This means that one will be disposed to share responsibility with associates when one 
indirectly contributes to a transgression that they commit.  The appropriate emotion to feel in 
such cases is characteristically shame, since shame relates to one’s identity.  Our increased 
propensity to feel group-based shame will spur us to disassociate ourselves from the harm done 
by bettering others, withdrawing from them, or changing our attitudes.  And this, ultimately, will 
reduce the profound ability of groups to cause harm. 
5.2 The Problem of Shame 
May (1992) believes that by cultivating shame, we can motivate people to improve both 
themselves and society.  Yet this suggestion flies in the face of decades of empirical evidence 
concerning the antisocial consequences of a disposition to feel shame.  Contrary to May’s 
suggestion, people with greater senses of shame tend to become less, not more, virtuous 
members of their moral communities. In this section, I review a selection of evidence that reveals 
dispositional shame’s association with avoidance tendencies and with a defense mechanism that 
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leads to blaming others, anger, and aggression. 
5.2.1 Avoidance of Scrutiny 
Virtually all authors, both those in the humanities and those in the social sciences, agree that 
shame is associated with avoiding scrutiny by concealing oneself and one’s transgressions.  
Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and Cole (1993), for example, investigated the reactions of toddlers to a 
mishap that the toddlers were led to believe they caused.  An experimenter introduced each child 
to one of the experimenter’s favorite dolls, which was rigged to break shortly after the 
experimenter exited the room and the child began to play with it.  The authors coded the 
children’s reactions when the doll broke and when the sad experimenter re-entered the room.  
Even at such a young age, Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and Cole were able to identify a group of 
children who responded to the transgression primarily with avoidance.  This group of children 
displayed a cluster of other shame-related behaviors, which lead the authors to conclude that this 
“avoiders” group was prone to feeling shame. 
One might contend that avoidance of scrutiny, in the form of withdrawing from others, is 
precisely what May (1992) is advocating when associates transgress.  As noted in section 1, May 
often writes of the need to distance or disassociate oneself from a group or group member that 
does harm.  Withdrawing from a group is not equivalent, however, to concealing oneself from 
the disapproving gaze of others.  Furthermore, distancing is not equivalent to withdrawing from a 
group.  Discussing Appiah’s (1987) case of a university that holds shares in a company that 
supports apartheid, May (1992) writes, 
From my social existentialist viewpoint, in order to avoid the responsibility associated 
with taint it is necessary to take reasonable steps to distance oneself from the harm 
caused by one’s group.  What counts as “reasonable steps” will vary according to the 
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context.  In the case of South African apartheid, it is clear that one should do more than 
merely disapprove of one’s university for not divesting.  But it is unclear to me whether 
one needs to march on the president’s office in order fully to avoid sharing in 
responsibility for the harms of apartheid.  The question that each person needs to ask is:  
Have I done all that can reasonably be expected of me to distance myself from this harm?  
(p. 159) 
Distancing often requires action to remedy the situation or, if action is impossible, a change in 
attitude.  It does not require removing oneself from view, which is one avoidance tendency 
associated with shame. 
The fact that shame causes one to conceal transgressions is also problematic for May’s (1992) 
proposal.  Increasing individuals’ propensities to feel ashamed of themselves for their associates’ 
wrongdoings, for example, would make institutional cover-ups more likely.  Just as shame 
motivates hiding one’s own transgressions, it can motivate hiding others’ transgressions, if those 
are what trigger shame.  Consider the sex abuse scandal in the Catholic Church.  Members of the 
Church who did not commit acts of sexual misconduct nevertheless felt compelled to cover-up 
the misconduct of their peers to avoid shame for the Church.  Because of this, harms continued 
to multiply, and the scale of the tragedy became massive.  This sort of institutional cover-up can 
be devastating, and increasing one’s tendency to feel shame for indirect contributions to harm 
would increase one’s tendency to contribute to such an effort to prevent very real problems from 
coming to light. 
In short, the avoidance tendencies associated with group-based shame are not the positive 
tendencies that May (1992) envisions.  May thinks we should distance ourselves from group-
based harm by trying to change the group’s behavior, by disapproving of the harm, or by 
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withdrawing from the group.  The tendencies associated with shame, however, are merely to 
shirk scrutiny and responsibility. 
5.2.2 Misdirecting Blame 
A propensity for shame has been found to be associated with a propensity for externalizing 
blame, that is, a propensity for blaming others instead of assuming responsibility oneself.  
Tangney et al. (1992) asked university students to read scenarios involving potential 
transgressions.  For each scenario, participants rated how likely they would be to behave, think, 
or feel in ways indicative of shame.  They also rated how likely they would be to blame others in 
the scenarios.7   The authors found that “the tendency to experience shame across a range of 
situations was strongly correlated with a tendency to externalize cause or blame” (p. 672). 
Again, blaming others might seem to be desirable for the sorts of case that interest May (1992), 
because others have transgressed and should be held responsible.  Such a response, however, is 
apt to produce scapegoating, where one person or group assumes a disproportionate amount of 
the blame for a transgression.  Consider the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, where a large number of 
people indirectly contributed (to varying degrees) to the acts of torture that occurred at the 
prison.  Cultivating shame would have increased the likelihood of externalizing blame, and the 
salient targets of this blame would have been the soldiers who directly carried out the torture (not 
the administration officials who encouraged, legitimized, or even indirectly ordered it).  In fact, 
only a small group of soldiers ever received punishment for the crime, and shame could have 
magnified this instance of scapegoating considerably.  The focus in such a case needs to remain 
                                                 
7 An example of a scenario from Tangney's most current measure (the Test of Self-Conscious Affect 3, or TOSCA-
3) is, "You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood your friend up" (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002, p. 207).  Participants rate how likely they would be to respond in certain ways, from 1 (not likely) to 
5 (very likely).  They rate, for example, whether they would think “I'm inconsiderate” (p. 207), an indication of 
shame, and whether they would think “My boss distracted me just before lunch" (p. 208), an indication of 
externalization of blame. 
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as much on the vast number of indirect contributors to harm as on the direct perpetrators, to 
combat the sort of institutional evil that can result in harm.  Shame is not a good tool to produce 
that effect. 
There is also a danger that the tendency to externalize blame would cause blame to be 
misdirected towards an out-group.  This could lead to the phenomenon known as blaming the 
victim, a type of exonerating cognition.  As Lickel, Steele, and Schmader (2011) note in their 
review of group-based moral emotions, strong group identification “can lead people to have 
moral blinders with regard to their group’s wrongdoing and also be motivated to find ways of 
exonerating their group from wrongdoing” (p. 158).  An individual who strongly identifies with 
members of his own race, for example, might be inclined to blame out-group victims of racial 
prejudice, instead of the members of his in-group who perpetrated the harm.  Members of racial 
minorities are often pinned as lazy, untrustworthy, criminal, unintelligent—the list could go on 
and on.  This helps justify violence and prejudice against them. 
A culture of shame can also lead to blaming the victim when the victim is a member of the in-
group (Piff, Martinez, & Keltner, 2012).  Shocking instances of this phenomenon occur in 
Pakistan and India surrounding rape.  In an op-ed for The New York Times, Salman Rushdie 
(2005, July 10) writes, “In honor-and-shame cultures like those of India and Pakistan, male 
honor resides in the sexual probity of women, and the ‘shaming’ of women dishonors all men.”  
The deep dishonor (or shame) that men feel when women with whom they are associated are 
“shamed” leads to blaming the victims of rape alongside of—or even worse, instead of—the 
perpetrators.  The example might seem distant to Western readers, but it should not.  Women 
who are raped or sexually assaulted on college campuses often report being blamed themselves 
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when they report the crimes to administrators.8  It seems likely that part of the explanation for 
this commonplace occurrence involves the shame that administrators feel when they are faced 
with assault cases on their own campuses, campuses for which they are supposed to be 
responsible.  Instead of taking responsibility for their indirect roles in the astonishing number of 
rape and sexual assaults on campuses, shamed administrators externalize blame on an easy 
target—the victims themselves. 
All in all, shame’s association with directing blame towards others, instead of towards oneself, 
makes it unsuitable as a tool for sharing responsibility.  Through focusing blame on others, 
individuals who indirectly contribute to a harm deny—rather than acknowledge—their own role 
in the harm.  Misdirected blame can also take the form of scapegoating and blaming the victim, 
which are phenomena that we ought to avoid. 
5.2.3 Anger 
Being prone to feel shame is associated with heightened feelings of anger and with maladaptive 
ways of managing that anger.  To give just one example, Wright, GudJonsson, and Young (2008) 
studied male criminal offenders in a psychiatric evaluation unit.  They measured how much 
shame the offenders felt about committing their crime, and how much anger they felt.  After 
statistically controlling for the effect of guilt, the amount of shame that offenders felt was 
significantly correlated with higher levels of anger.  Furthermore, this finding is not limited to 
this admittedly narrow population, but extends to populations such as undergraduates and young 
adolescents as well (Tangney et al., 1992; Thomaes et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2014). 
Shame-related anger, which likely stems from externalization of blame, can lead to what 
                                                 
8 This has led the White House Task Force to Protect Students From Sexual Assault (2014) to recommend training 
university administrators on how to avoid blaming the victims of sexual assault. 
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psychologists call shame-rage cycles.  This phenomenon is often seen in marital conflicts (Scheff 
& Retzinger, 1991).  A wife (for example) accuses her husband of not being a good parent, 
which causes him to feel ashamed.  This causes the husband to get angry and defensive, whereby 
he attacks his wife’s parenting abilities in turn, leading to further shame and a sustained back-
and-forth argument.  Shame-rage cycles are not, however, limited to the sphere of interpersonal 
relationships.  They can occur in intergroup contexts as well.  Consider, for example, the shame-
rage cycles that are often evident in ethnic conflict.  An increased sense of shame for the 
transgressions of one’s in-group leads to more widespread externalization of blame and anger 
towards the out-group (that is, victim blaming).  Attacking and diminishing the out-group, in 
turn, leads to shame and externalization of blame in that group, and the cycle begins.  Cultivating 
shame for indirect contributions to harm, then, could intensify ethnic conflicts by polarizing the 
groups and intensifying the anger in shame-rage cycles. 
5.2.4 Aggression 
Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that a propensity to feel shame is associated with 
aggression, which follows on the heels of misdirected blame and anger.  In a recent article, for 
example, Stuewig et al. (2010) investigated whether shame causes externalization of blame, 
which in turn causes aggression.  The authors studied four different populations:  undergraduate 
students, adolescents, inmates, and adolescents considered “at risk.”  Each participant filled out 
an appropriate version of the TOSCA (or a measure modeled on the TOSCA), and a measure of 
aggression.  For three of the four populations, a third-party also reported on a participant’s 
aggressive tendencies.  The authors found that in most cases, shame was positively correlated 
with externalization of blame, which was in turn correlated with aggression (although the latter 
relationship held best for self reported aggression).  Although Stuewig et al. did not include a 
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measure of anger in their studies, there is additional evidence that anger mediates the relationship 
between shame and undesirable character traits.  Peters et al. (2014), for example, studied the 
links among shame, anger, and borderline personality disorder (BPD) in a large sample of 
college students.  Individuals with BPD tend to have trouble in relationships with others, have 
outbursts of and dramatic swings in emotion, and engage in risky behaviors.  The authors found 
that shame tended to lead to BPD symptoms via anger and rumination about anger, illustrating 
the link between shame and anger. 
Social existentialism focuses on the way in which our relationships and interactions with others 
shape our own identities.  When an associate’s identity is challenged, so is our own.  This can 
easily lead to a widening sphere of aggression.  James Gilligan (2003) has spent his career 
studying violent individuals in prisons and prison psychiatric units.  In “Shame, guilt, and 
violence,” he writes, 
[...] I have been struck by the frequency with which I received the same answer when I 
asked prisoners, or mental patients, why they assaulted or even killed someone.  Time 
after time, they would reply “because he disrespected me” or “he disrespected my visitor 
[or wife, mother, sister, girl-friend, daughter, etc.].”  In fact, they used that phrase so 
often that they abbreviated it into a slang phrase, “He dis’ed me.”  (p. 1149) 
To be “dis’ed” is to be shamed, and as Gilligan’s quotation makes clear, we can feel “dis’ed” by 
association.  If social existentialism directs us to view our own identities as linked with others, 
then the result would be a greater likelihood of shame-based aggression. 
In summary, the empirical record demonstrates that shame is not the right tool for sharing 
responsibility.  Shame makes us avoid scrutiny, rather than address associates’ transgressions.  It 
leads to denying one’s role in harm, rather than accepting it and making reparations.  Shame also 
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can initiate a defense mechanism of externalizing blame, which increases scapegoating and 
blaming the victim.  Anger follows on the heels of externalization of blame, and can lead to 
intergroup shame-range cycles.  Finally, anger leads to aggression, the ultimate negative 
consequence of cultivating shame.  For all of these reasons, we should reject May’s (1992) 
vision of sharing responsibility that is founded on social existentialism. 
5.3 Concerns and Objections 
One might have several concerns or objections related to the argument presented above, which 
concludes that we ought to dismiss May’s (1992) vision of sharing responsibility.  My aim here 
is to address what I believe are four important concerns or objections.9  First, one might be 
concerned that an empirically based argument is highly unlikely to affect May’s normative 
vision.  Second, one might object that group-based shame is less damaging than personal shame.  
Third, one might be concerned that I have mischaracterized group-based shame, which weakens 
my argument.  Finally, one might object that we can cultivate shame without cultivating its 
negative, merely contingent, effects. 
5.3.1 May Does Not Need to Take Empirical Challenges Seriously 
One might be concerned that May (1992) can justifiably overlook an empirically based challenge 
to his vision of sharing responsibility.  For one thing, philosophers often overstate empirical 
findings.  Empirically based criticisms should not be based on one or two generously interpreted 
findings, but on a pattern of robust results.  But in any case, it is not at all clear that empirical 
facts can bear on a normative vision.  Attempts to bridge the fact-value gap are, at best, 
contentious.  Thus, May need not take an empirical challenge seriously. 
                                                 
9 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and for encouraging me to address 
several of these objections. 
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To begin with, empirical facts about shame of the sort presented above are not value-free.  To 
give an example, consider the research linking shame-proneness with BPD symptoms (Peters et 
al., 2014).  To classify something as a mental disorder is already to make a value judgment, a 
judgment about what is normal or what is good for a person.  Thus, claims that link shame-
proneness with symptoms of BPD are not value-free.  The same goes for claims that link shame-
proneness with misdirected blame and with increased anger and aggression.  Since these claims 
incorporate value judgments, they do, in fact, bear on normative ethical claims. 
This concern, then, hinges upon whether Tangney and her colleagues’ findings constitute a 
reliable pattern of robust results.  At first glance, we must conclude that they do.  Tangney’s 
work is influential enough to have garnered a summary in The Annual Review of Psychology 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).  Her measure of shame-proneness, the TOSCA, has by 
now been used in hundreds of studies and translated into several languages (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).  Even researchers who disagree with Tangney cite her view as established (de Hooge, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008).  None of this is to say, of course, that Tangney’s evidence is 
flawless.  Rather, it is to say that one cannot dismiss this body of research without sustained, 
detailed argument. 
5.3.2 Group-Based Shame is Less Damaging than Personal Shame 
The primary difference between group-based shame and personal shame is that we experience 
group-based shame based on our associations with others who transgress.  It is open to a person 
feeling group-based shame, then, to disassociate from the source of shame—something that is 
not intuitively available to an individual feeling personal shame.  Thus, one might grant that 
dispositional personal shame is harmful, yet argue that dispositional group-based shame, for 
which May (1992) advocates, is less damaging than dispositional personal shame.  Instead of 
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avoiding scrutiny and getting defensive, perhaps those who feel group-based shame tend to turn 
to strategies of disassociation that are favorable to May’s position, such as making an effort to 
better others or withdrawing from harmful groups. 
Admittedly, the criticism of dispositional group-based shame leveled above is based on an 
extrapolation from data concerning dispositional personal shame.  Unfortunately, little if any 
empirical research has investigated dispositional group-based shame.  This extrapolation is 
justified, however, because dispositional group-based shame and dispositional personal shame 
share two properties that account for the harmfulness of the latter.  First, both forms of shame 
focus on the self, rather than on behavior.  It is more difficult to fix a flawed self than it is to 
repair an isolated action.  Second, both forms of shame are dispositional.  Research on isolated 
feelings of personal shame, or situational personal shame, sometimes reveals a positive side to 
that experience (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Bryan, 
Adams, & Monin, 2013).  But that does not mean that we ought to cultivate shame.  Shame is a 
particularly painful emotion.  When cultivated, it quickly becomes counterproductive.  As 
Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) note, “shame is a moral emotion that can easily go awry” 
(p. 350). 
Furthermore, research on situational group-based shame does not paint that experience as wholly 
adaptive to begin with.  Scarnier, Schmader, and Lickel (2009, Study 2), for example, asked 
parents to read a scenario that instructed them to imagine being the parent of a child who 
transgressed (hit another child with a toy truck).  They measured how ashamed the parents 
imagined feeling about the event.  They also asked parents to complete a questionnaire about 
their style of parenting, including which discipline techniques they used.  The authors found that 
parents who reported feeling more ashamed also tended to have a negative parenting style.  
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These parents tended to rely on love withdrawal and overreacted to transgressions. 
As noted above, Lickel, Steele, and Schmader (2011) suggest that the adaptiveness of group-
based shame hinges on the degree to which one identifies with the group (or person) that 
transgresses.  When one’s identity is intimately connected with a group, disassociation is less 
likely, and one is more likely to find ways of exonerating the group.  Shepherd, Spears, and 
Manstead (2013, Study 3), for instance, investigated participants’ willingness to act against the 
possibility of a group-based transgression, namely, resorting to military force to limit Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities.10  They found that participants who strongly identified with their country 
were less likely to anticipate feeling group-based shame for this transgression, presumably due to 
exonerating cognitions, and hence less willing to act to prevent it.  Thus, cultivating group-based 
shame would at the very least have effects that counteracted one another:  better effects when 
identification were weaker, and worse effects when identification were stronger. 
In addition, recall that the position that underpins May’s (1992) proposal, social existentialism, 
fundamentally entails an increase in dispositional shame of all types, including dispositional 
personal shame.  The fundamental principle of existentialist ethics, according to May, is that one 
is responsible for one’s identity and character, not merely what one does.  Again, any benefits 
that might accrue from an enriched sense of group-based shame would likely be offset by the 
costs of an enriched sense of personal shame. 
Finally, the choice we face is not between adopting May’s (1992) shame-based vision of sharing 
responsibility or not, but between adopting it or an alternative vision.  The purpose of section 4 
                                                 
10 This study was conducted in the United Kingdom when the unjustified military incursion into Iraq was salient to 
participants.  Americans might have been less likely to agree that military action would have constituted a 
transgression. 
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of this paper is to argue that we can ground a more productive vision of sharing responsibility on 
the ethics of empathic care.  For all of these reasons, the objection that May advocates for a less 
damaging form of shame is unsuccessful.  We still ought to reject his vision. 
5.3.3 A Mischaracterization of Group-Based Shame? 
To feel group-based shame, as I have characterized it, is to feel ashamed of oneself for being 
associated in some way with another individual or group that transgresses.  Thus, one would 
count as feeling group-based shame if one felt ashamed of being a Boy Scout because of the 
group’s discrimination against homosexuals.  One might be concerned, however, that this is to 
mischaracterize group-based shame.  To feel group-based shame could, for instance, be to feel 
ashamed primarily of the Boy Scouts of America’s poor character, rather than one’s own 
character.  This would be to challenge the object of group-based shame.  Alternatively, one 
might argue that to feel group-based shame is for the Boy Scouts of America, not an individual, 
to feel ashamed of itself.  This would be to challenge the subject of group-based shame.  In either 
case, group-based shame would not share a seemingly crucial feature of personal shame, thus 
challenging the applicability of my argument presented above. 
To begin with, it is worth noting that May (1992) does not characterize group-based shame in 
either of these ways.  May is clear that according to his vision, it is individuals who undergo 
shame.  Likewise, he is clear that it is individuals who are the primary objects of negative 
appraisal, although “it is the association between the group’s identity and one’s own that 
generates the moral feelings, rather than what one has directly done” (p. 120). 
Furthermore, there are reasons to question a vision of sharing responsibility based on either 
alternative characterization.  First, consider a vision of sharing responsibility founded on shame 
directed at the character of groups.  As noted previously in this paper, this is still a method of 
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cultivating shame.  Members of the group in question—to the extent that they identify with the 
group—will feel as if their own identity is under attack, and hence feel shame.  Feeling ashamed 
of the Boy Scouts, for example, is associated with characteristic behaviors and facial expressions 
(shaming practices) that aim to induce shame in others.  Thus, this alternative characterization 
does not escape the argument presented in section 2. 
Second, a vision of sharing responsibility based on groups undergoing shame faces a dilemma:  
Either it incorporates a controversial ontological view concerning groups and emotion, or it 
collapses into a vision that is akin to May’s (1992).  On the one hand, if one took a strong 
ontological stance on groups undergoing an emotion, one would need to claim, for example, that 
the Boy Scouts of America—as an organization distinct from or something over-and-above its 
constituents—ought to experience shame for its views on homosexuality.  Pettigrove and Parsons 
(2012) explain what is wrong with this view: 
One reason, perhaps the primary reason, philosophers have been skeptical of collective 
emotions is because they appear metaphysically dubious.  Talk of collective emotions 
often conjures an image like the one that appears on the 1651 Head edition of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, where a giant crowned head sits atop a body made up of ordinary human 
persons.  Collective emotions on such a picture are thought to presuppose a super-agent 
with a mind more or less like ours….  Such a picture, insofar as it fails to square with our 
experiences, would indeed be incredible.  (p. 504) 
On the other hand, as a group-as-subject vision steers away from a controversial ontological 
view, it steers closer to May’s (1992) own vision.  Consider, for example, Pettigrove and 
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Parsons’s (2012) favored explication of collective emotion, the network conception.11  According 
to this conception, the network of connections among people, policies, institutions, physical 
locations, and so on, enables the collective experience of an emotion.  These connections can be, 
among other things, normative and causal.  When the network is activated and responds in the 
right way, the collective—for example, the Palestinian state—can be said to feel a certain 
emotion.  The shame felt by the Palestinian state is not straightforwardly reducible to the shame 
felt by individual Palestinians.  Nevertheless, “Typically these responses will involve a 
significant percentage of persons who make up the collective experiencing affects of a particular 
sort” (p. 513).  And that is the key.  On a view like that of Pettigrove and Parsons, cultivating 
collective shame would still be to cultivate individual shame, and the argument presented in 
section 2 would still apply. 
Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) have a more optimistic outlook on collective shame than I have 
espoused in this paper.  They argue, for example, that collective shame played a formative and 
positive role in the collective pride that Palestinians now feel.  Even Pettigrove and Parsons 
(2012), however, acknowledge that shame and its associated defense mechanisms “construct 
obstacles to forgiveness and reconciliation” (p. 504).  When looking at the broader picture of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, shame-proneness still plays a role in sustaining the conflict. 
5.3.4 We Can Cultivate Shame without Its Negative Effects 
Even if one agrees with the characterization of group-based shame that May (1992) and I adopt, 
one might contend that the negative effects of dispositional shame are merely contingent effects.  
If to perceive the sorts of situation in which May is interested as shameful is the correct way to 
                                                 
11 Mikko Salmela (2012) is another author, I would argue, whose view of collectively experienced emotions fails to 
distinguish itself sufficiently from May’s (1992) to sustain the concern in question.  Those moved by this concern 
might explore von Scheve and Salmela (2013), Huebner (2011), and Gilbert (2002). 
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perceive them, then perhaps it is best to retain shame, but to change the way that we respond to 
it.  This would be to cultivate a better form of shame. 
This objection hinges on an empirical question:  Whether we could cultivate shame without 
cultivating its negative effects.  This is a question that has not been adequately addressed in the 
empirical literature.  The small amount of research that bears on the question is inconclusive.  
Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez (2014), for example, found that the damaging effects of being 
shame-prone depended on the subsequent tendency to externalize blame.  Without the latter 
tendency, shame-proneness did not have negative effects, as previous studies have shown.  This 
research, however, does not settle the key question at issue.  On the one hand, this research could 
signify that we could cultivate a better form a shame, by breaking the causal link between shame 
and externalization of blame.  On the other hand, it could merely reflect the fact that 
externalization of blame is probabilistically engaged, and appears to be a main reason why 
shame-proneness is damaging.  More research is needed to determine which is the case. 
One might look to the literature on reintegrative shaming, however, for a model of how to 
cultivate shame without cultivating its negative effects.  What is the difference between 
reintegrative shaming and the sorts of shaming practice that would engender negative effects?  
According to Braithwaite (2000), 
The key distinctions seem to be between shaming that is respectful versus shaming that is 
disrespectful of the person or humiliating; between shaming that treats the person as a 
good person who has done a bad thing and shaming that treats the person as bad; between 
shaming that is terminated by repentance and forgiveness and shaming that permanently 
ruptures social bonds.  These are the key dimensions of the difference between 
reintegrative shaming and stigmatization. (p. 118) 
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What Braithwaite is describing, however, is not shame (or shame-induction) at all.  It is what I 
and other researchers know as guilt.12 
To reiterate a previous point, the choice we face is not between May’s (1992) social existentialist 
vision of sharing responsibility and none at all, but between his vision and another, more positive 
vision.  I outline such a vision, which reserves a substantial place for guilt, in the next and final 
section of this paper. 
5.4 An Alternative Vision of Sharing Responsibility 
May (1992) envisions a world in which we take greater responsibility for our associates’ 
transgressions because we take greater responsibility for our own identities and for the social 
connections that partly construct them.  To cultivate a greater sense of responsibility for one’s 
identity, however, is to cultivate a propensity for shame.  Given the negative consequences of 
cultivating shame, we ought to reject the social existentialist grounding for May’s vision.  But 
we need not reject the thesis that it grounds, namely, that people ought to take greater 
responsibility for their indirect contributions to harm.  There are other ways to ground such an 
increase in moral responsibility besides social existentialism.  The purpose of this final section is 
to argue that we can build a more positive vision of sharing responsibility by founding it on 
Michael Slote’s (2007) ethics of empathic care. 
According to the ethics of empathic care, an action or omission is morally flawed to the extent 
that it reflects a lack of empathically caring motivation (Slote, 2007).13  Slote’s notion of 
empathic care is very close to Dan Batson’s (1991) notion of empathy or empathic concern.  
Empathic concern is an emotion that responds to another’s well-being (hence it is empathic), but 
                                                 
12 Nussbaum (2004), for example, who clearly distinguishes between shame and guilt, cites many of the same 
reasons as Braithwaite for rejecting shame in favor of guilt. 
13 See also Slote (2001, 2010). 
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it is not distressing to the person feeling it.  Rather, it is a warm-hearted response, most akin to 
“sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like” (Batson & Ahmad, 2009, p. 146).  Although 
we tend to feel empathy more for those who are near and dear to us than for those who are 
distant and hardly known, an action that reflects empathic concern for one individual or group, 
but a notable lack of empathic concern for another, is still morally flawed.  Thus, diverting 
medical supplies to one’s in-group, even if motivated by empathic concern, is morally wrong.  It 
clearly reflects a lack of empathic concern for members of one’s out-group. 
In most all of the cases that interest May (1992), agents who indirectly contribute to a 
transgression appear to reflect a lack of empathically caring motivation, and hence should be 
held morally responsible for their actions or omissions.  Employees of a company that engages in 
sexism, for example, often have the opportunity to speak out against the company’s harmful 
policies, but choose to remain silent.  This often reflects a lack of empathic caring towards their 
female colleagues, and those who say nothing ought to be held partially responsible for 
preventing the promotion and equal pay of women.14  Individuals who fail to donate a small 
amount to famine relief often do not show appropriate balance in their empathic caring for 
others, ignoring the plight of some entirely.  University administrators who promote a culture of 
sexual assault and rape by dismissing or blaming women who report assaults show a clear lack of 
empathy for the victims.  And in cases of intergroup conflict, those involved regularly show an 
overall lack of empathic care by feeling for members of their in-group, but not members of their 
out-group.  The examples could continue. 
Empathy is well suited for sharing responsibility because we can empathize with people even if 
                                                 
14 In this example and others, one might be sufficiently empathic, but choose to act (or not to act, as the case might 
be) for other reasons, for example, a justified fear of retribution.  In such a case, the action (or omission) would not 
be morally flawed. 
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we have not harmed them directly.  Imagine a doctor who publishes an important, but potentially 
harmful, finding in a reputable medical journal.  If other individuals come upon that research and 
use it to cause harm, then the doctor ought to feel partially responsible for the harm done.  Given 
the doctor’s special link with the victims, she ought to empathize more than others with their 
pain.  This deep feeling of empathic concern is the emotion by which the doctor can accept 
partial responsibility for the harms caused by others. 
Guilt plays virtually no role in May’s (1992) social existentialist vision of sharing responsibility, 
but it would play a role in a vision based on the ethics of empathic care.  Empathy and guilt go 
hand in hand.15  Martin Hoffman (2000) theorizes that empathizing with others is a critical 
mechanism for coming to feel bad about harming them—in other words, for feeling guilt.  There 
is empirical evidence to support Hoffman’s theorizing.  Leith and Baumeister (1998), for 
example, had participants relate a story in which they had a conflict with another person, once 
from their own point of view and once from the other’s point of view.  The authors examined 
whether the two versions contained different information as a way to measure the perspective 
taking component of empathy.  They also coded the stories for themes relating to guilt, themes 
relating to shame, and positive or negative resolution.  Leith and Baumeister found that 
participants who scored highest on empathy also tended to express themes of guilt in their 
stories.  Furthermore, those who expressed themes of guilt in their stories also tended to describe 
positive resolutions to the conflict. 
May (1992) contends that guilt is not an appropriate emotion for sharing responsibility because it 
is too closely connected with directly causing a transgression and with blame.  Researchers who 
                                                 
15 This is in contrast to shame and empathy, which usually are not correlated or are anti-correlated with one another 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).  This could be because shame is self-oriented, whereas empathy and guilt are 
other-oriented. 
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study group-based moral emotions, however, suggest otherwise.16  In their review of group-
based moral emotions, Lickel, Steele, and Schmader (2011) write that we tend to feel group-
based guilt “when the negative actions of others bring to mind some way in which we feel 
personally or collectively complicit in their blameworthy actions” (p. 154).  In other words, we 
tend to feel group-based guilt when we focus on our indirect contributions to transgressions.17  
And group-based guilt can be effective.  Brown et al. (2008), for example, found that non-
indigenous Chileans who felt group-based guilt concerning treatment of indigenous Chileans 
also tended to have the most positive stance on reparation. 
Unlike shame, empathy and guilt have been shown to be largely positive emotions.  Dan Batson 
(1991), for instance, has spent decades researching the link between empathy and altruism.  His 
research indicates that warm, empathic concern for others motivates altruistic behavior.18  Also, 
many of the empirical studies discussed above in section 2 also investigated guilt, and none 
found guilt to be harmful—in fact, often quite the opposite.  To give just one example, in the 
article by Stuewig et al. (2010) reporting on four diverse populations, the authors found that 
“There was consistent evidence that guilt is directly related to low levels of aggression, whether 
using self-report or other reports of aggression” (p. 99). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that by cultivating warm empathic care, we can cultivate guilt 
without cultivating shame.  Stuewig and McCloskey (2005) studied a large sample of mother-
child dyads over many years as the children progressed from school-age into adolescence and 
then late adolescence.  Children who faced early maltreatment were more likely to face rejection 
                                                 
16 Cassie Striblen (2007) also argues that guilt can be an appropriate response to a group-based harm. 
17 Note that this is not a classic (and problematic) mechanism of guilt-by-association, by which, for example, merely 
riding in a car during a transgression means that one is guilty oneself. 
18 For a different take on empathy, however, see Prinz (2011). 
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and a lack of warmth—that is, a lack of care—in adolescence.  Lack of care, in turn, predicted 
higher levels of shame and lower levels of guilt, and was a link between early maltreatment and 
adolescent shame and guilt. 
Cultivating empathic care is a realistic prospect.  At a basic level, we can cultivate empathy for 
others by putting ourselves in their situations.  A host of empirical evidence (including Batson’s) 
testifies to the positive outcomes of imagining being in another’s situation, but we can also take 
the injunction to experience another’s life more literally.  Clore and Jeffery (1972) asked able-
bodied students to spend an hour either in a wheelchair, with a person in a wheelchair, or 
walking around campus.  They found that both the students who experienced being in a 
wheelchair and the students who observed another in a wheelchair adopted more positive 
attitudes towards those with disabilities.  And the changes were long-lasting.  In a follow up four 
months later, these students still showed a change in attitude towards those with whom they 
empathized. 
In summary, we can retain May’s (1992) proposal that we ought to take greater responsibility for 
our indirect contributions to harm by grounding this increase in the ethics of empathic care, not 
social existentialism.  According to this revised vision of sharing responsibility, we ought to 
cultivate empathic care for others, as well as empathy-based guilt.  An increase in our tendency 
to feel such emotions would lead to taking a greater share of responsibility for transgressions that 
we do not directly commit. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Groups of people have the potential to do great harm in the world, much more harm than 
individuals acting alone.  In many cases, such as genocide, a relatively small number of group 
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members directly cause harm, but many others indirectly contribute in some fashion.  Perhaps if 
we could hold group members more responsible for harms to which they indirectly contribute—
that is, perhaps if we could promote sharing responsibility—then we could limit the power of 
groups to cause harm. 
Larry May (1992) argues that social existentialism provides a foundation for such an increase in 
sharing responsibility.  According to social existentialism, one is morally responsible for one’s 
identity, not merely one’s actions, and one’s identity is constructed in large part through 
interactions and relationships with others.  Thus, to be responsible for one’s own identity, one 
must be responsible for the identities and actions of associates as well.  Social existentialism’s 
focus on who one is, however, also leads to a focus on the generally harmful emotion of shame.  
A disposition to feel shame tends to have antisocial consequences such as avoidance of others, 
avoidance of responsibility, misdirected blame, anger, and aggression.  Thus, we should favor a 
vision of sharing responsibility that does not rely on shame. 
We can base such a shame-free vision of sharing responsibility on the ethics of empathic care 
(Slote, 2007).  According to the ethics of empathic care, an action is morally deficient when it 
reflects a lack of empathically caring motivation on the part of the agent.  Many of the actions or 
omissions that indirectly contribute to group-based harm fall within this category.  Such 
contributions typically reflect a deficient concern for members of an out-group or a deficient 
appreciation of their perspective.  Instead of shame, other-oriented emotions such as empathic 
care and guilt are central to this alternative vision.  And the empirical record shows that these 
emotions are much more positive than shame. 
Recall the opening example of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Numerous Israelis and 
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Palestinians indirectly contribute to this conflict by holding harmful attitudes towards the other 
group, and hence should share responsibility for the hundreds of casualties per year that are 
associated with it.  May (1992) argues that to instill a sense of shared responsibility in these 
individuals, we need to cultivate shame in them.  Given the empirical research on shame, 
however, this would likely have counterproductive effects.  Israelis and Palestinians would be 
more likely to get defensive and blame the other group for the conflict, leading to increased 
anger and aggression.  If my revision of his position is correct, however, then we ought to 
cultivate empathy in these individuals for the plight of their fellows, and we ought to cultivate 
guilt in them for their indirect contributions to harm.  These emotions, not shame, are the most 
likely to lead to a peaceful society. 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
Recall the opening of this dissertation, a picture of Auguste Rodin’s sculpture Eve.  We can 
easily see that shame is on study.  The ease with which we can identify shame when we see it, 
however, belies the complexities of the emotion.  It is odd that some see shame as a good thing, 
something to be cultivated, while others see it as something to be avoided.  Jeb Bush (Bush & 
Yablonski, 1995), for example, laments the fact that people do not feel shame anymore.  Monica 
Lewinsky, on the other hand—who knows a thing or two about shame—notes that it “sticks to 
you like tar” (see Ronson, 2016, April 22).  What are we to make of shame?  What role should it 
play in our lives?  These are the questions that I term the normative problem of shame, the 
problem of explaining how shame should fit into our lives and what uses we should make of it. 
In Part I of this dissertation, I investigated the science of shame.  When examining the empirical 
literature, the complexities of shame becomes especially apparent.  Research on the state of 
shame often highlights its positive consequences, such as its ability to prevent lying and 
cheating.  Research on the trait of shame, in contrast, almost exclusively highlights its negative 
consequences, such as anger and aggression.  I do not believe that there is a contradiction in 
these findings.  Rather, they suggest that in small doses, shame can be a good thing, but that we 
ought to avoid any practices that cultivate shame in a more general way.  This is my general 
answer to the normative problem of shame. 
Subsequently, in Part II, I expanded my answer to the normative problem of shame by exploring 
the implications for ethics and the law.  The devil is in the details, and it is necessary to see 
whether this answer to the normative problem of shame has a real impact on these fields.  I 
believe that it does.  Kahan and Posner (1999), among others, propose that we ought to 
institutionalize shame penalties.  To do so, however, would be to cultivate shame-proneness, so it 
would likely be counterproductive.  Williams (2008/1993) argues that we ought to experience 
shame as an emotion encompassing guilt.  We ought to return to something more like a shame 
culture.  Once again, however, this would be to make a morally counterproductive change.  
Finally, May (1992) proposes that shame is a suitable tool to encourage people to share 
responsibility with their associates.  May believes that this will cause a positive ethical change in 
society, but the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. 
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There is much more to be said about shame.  Although I discussed three proposals that identify a 
role for shame in our lives, many others exist (see, e.g., Morgan, 2008; Manion, 2002).  I hope 
that my position on these other proposals will be clear from the arguments I have presented here.  
I am deeply skeptical of shame, not as an occasional tool, but as a more widespread tool for 
social and ethical change.  Other authors, both scientists and philosophers alike, will hopefully 
continue to challenge and refine ideas about shame and morality.  We can only be excited about 
the scholarship that is to come. 
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Appendix A 
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3)1 
For each numbered scenario, a participant rates each lettered statement beneath it from 1 (not 
likely) to 5 (very likely).  The participant’s rating for each lettered statement contributes to the 
scale listed in square brackets after it, for example, to the scale that measures shame. 
1.  You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your friend up. 
A) You would think:  “I’m inconsiderate.”  [Shame] 
B) You would think:  “Well, my friend will understand.”  [Detached] 
C) You’d think you should make it up to your friend as soon as possible.  [Guilt] 
D) You would think:  “My boss distracted me just before lunch.”  [Externalization] 
2.  You break something at work and then hide it. 
A) You would think:  “This is making me anxious.  I need to either fix it or get someone 
else to.”  [Guilt] 
B) You would think about quitting.  [Shame] 
C) You would think:  “A lot of things aren’t made very well these days.”  
[Externalization] 
D) You would think:  “It was only an accident.”  [Detached] 
3.  You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and attractive.  
Your best friend’s spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company. 
                                                 
1 Reproduced without changes in content from Tangney, J.P. & Dearing, R.L.  (2002).  Shame and guilt.  New York, 
NY:  The Guilford Press. 
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A) You would think:  “I should have been aware of what my best friend was feeling.”  
[Guilt] 
B) You would feel happy with your appearance and personality.  [Alpha pride] 
C) You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression.  [Beta pride] 
D) You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her spouse.  
[Externalization] 
E) You would probably avoid eye contact for a long time.  [Shame] 
4.  At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. 
A) You would feel incompetent.  [Shame] 
B) You would think:  “There are never enough hours in the day.”  [Externalization] 
C) You would feel:  “I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project.”  [Guilt] 
D) You would think:  “What’s done is done.”  [Detached] 
5.  You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. 
A) You would think the company did not like the coworker.  [Externalization] 
B) You would think:  “Life is not fair.”  [Detached] 
C) You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker.  [Shame] 
D) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.  [Guilt] 
6.  For several days you put off making a difficult phone call.  At the last minute you make the 
call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well. 
A) You would think:  “I guess I’m more persuasive than I thought.”  [Alpha pride] 
B) You would regret that you put it off.  [Guilt] 
C) You would feel like a coward.  [Shame] 
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D) You would think:  “I did a good job.”  [Beta pride] 
E) You would think you shouldn’t have to make calls you feel pressured into.  
[Externalization] 
7.  While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
A) You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a ball.  [Shame] 
B) You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching.  [Externalization] 
C) You would think:  “It was just an accident.”  [Detached] 
D) You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better.  [Guilt] 
8.  You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very helpful.  A 
few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could. 
A) You would feel immature.  [Shame] 
B) You would think:  “I sure ran into some bad luck.”  [Externalization] 
C) You would return the favor as quickly as you could.  [Guilt] 
D) You would think:  “I am a trustworthy person.”  [Alpha pride] 
E) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.  [Beta pride] 
9.  You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
A) You would think the animal shouldn’t have been on the road.  [Externalization] 
B) You would think:  “I’m terrible.”  [Shame] 
C) You would feel:  “Well, it was an accident.”  [Detached] 
D) You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down the road.  [Guilt] 
10.  You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well.  Then you find out you did poorly. 
A) You would think:  “Well, it’s just a test.”  [Detached] 
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B) You would think:  “The instructor doesn’t like me.”  [Externalization] 
C) You would think:  “I should have studied harder.”  [Guilt] 
D) You would feel stupid.  [Shame] 
11.  You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project.  Your boss singles you out 
for a bonus because the project was such a success. 
A) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.  [Externalization] 
B) You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues.  [Shame] 
C) You would feel your hard work had paid off.  [Beta pride] 
D) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.  [Alpha pride] 
E) You would feel you should not accept it.  [Guilt] 
12.  While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there. 
A) You would think:  “It was all in fun; it’s harmless.”  [Detached] 
B) You would feel small… like a rat.  [Shame] 
C) You would think that perhaps that friend should have been there to defend 
him/herself.  [Externalization] 
D) You would apologize and talk about that person’s good points.  [Guilt] 
13.  You make a big mistake on an important project at work.  People were depending on you, 
and your boss criticizes you. 
A) You would think your boss should have been more clear about what was expected of 
you.  [Externalization] 
B) You would feel like you wanted to hide.  [Shame] 
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C) You would think:  “ I should have recognized the problem and done a better job.”  
[Guilt] 
D) You would think:  “Well, nobody’s perfect.”  [Detached] 
14.  You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children.  It turns 
out to be frustrating and time-consuming work.  You think seriously about quitting, but then 
you see how happy the kids are. 
A) You would feel selfish, and you’d think you are basically lazy.  [Shame] 
B) You would feel you were forced into doing something you did not want to do.  
[Externalization] 
C) You would think:  “I should be more concerned about people who are less fortunate.”  
[Guilt] 
D) You would feel great that you had helped others.  [Beta pride] 
E) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.  [Alpha pride] 
15.  You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog 
runs away. 
A) You would think:  “I am irresponsible and incompetent.”  [Shame] 
B) You would think your friend must not take very good care of the dog or it wouldn’t 
have run away.  [Externalization] 
C) You would vow to be more careful next time.  [Guilt] 
D) You would think your friend could just get a new dog.  [Detached] 
16.  You attend your coworker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new cream-
colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
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A) You think your coworker should have expected some accidents at such a big party.  
[Detached] 
B) You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the party.  [Guilt] 
C) You would wish you were anywhere but at the party.  [Shame] 
D) You would wonder why your coworker chose to serve red wine with the new light 
carpet.  [Externalization] 
